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Summary 
 
The focus of this thesis was the hedonic value of stimuli, which is more commonly 
known as pleasure or positive affect. 
 
First, the scientific meaning of hedonic value was dissected. 
 
Second, a classification identifying core causes of positive affect was created. The 
classification was derived from specific positive moments reported by individuals 
throughout a day (collected through experience sampling methodology). Seventeen 
triggers of positive affect were identified, which were extracted from the data rather than 
originating from theory. 
 
Third, affective influences on reflexive-like motor responses were investigated using an 
approach-avoidance task. Contrary to previous studies, approach reaction times were not 
speeded by highly affective stimuli. Instead, a novel non-emotional effect was found on 
reaction times, which could directly explain the current results, and those of previous 
studies, in non-affective terms. 
 
Fourth, the propagation of hedonic reactivity from pleasurable to neutral stimuli was 
investigated. Contrary to expectations, the evaluative conditioning procedure utilised did 
  
iv 
not exhibit a phenomenon called blocking. Instead, 'liking' spread non-selectively to all 
stimuli co-occurring with the source hedonic stimulus. 
 
Fifth, the positive effect of pleasure on goal-directed motivation was established: 
participants were found to press a food trigger harder for highly palatable snacks 
compared to bland snacks, even though participants were not informed about the hidden 
measurement of forces. Additionally, the impact of hedonic value on actual food intake 
was quantified with best-fit equations that predicted consumption at both the group and 
individual level. 
 
In the last study, hedonic habituation, or the inhibitory effect of pleasure on itself, was 
demonstrated: eating pleasant snacks, as compared to bland ones, reduced the hedonic 
ratings of test foods that were consumed afterwards. 
 
Finally, these inputs and outputs of hedonics were integrated into a model specifying 
principal roles of pleasure in human behaviour. This pleasure-incentive model explains 
the effects of pleasure on incentive motivation, and makes important predictions about 
the mechanisms of pathological conditions such as over-eating and drug addiction. 
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I. What is Pleasure? 
 
The focal point or object of study for this synthesis was pleasure. But what is pleasure? 
This question is similar in form to asking what any unknown concept is e.g. who is a 
Martian? To understand who a Martian is, it would help to come across a few Martians, 
as well as to know what they and their relatives are called. Furthermore, it would be 
helpful to know something about their ‘genetic’ makeup or essence, as well as to learn 
about their characteristic external features. Last, but not least, we would also need to 
know how a Martian interacts with the world, what influences it and what it influences, in 
order to fully grasp the meaning of who, or what, a Martian is. I will adopt similar 
approaches in order to understand what pleasure is: first I will define pleasure by 
examples (seeing a few Martians); then I will present a set of synonyms and terms related 
to pleasure, as a linguistic approach to conveying meaning (learning what the Martians 
and their relatives are called); third I will attempt a core working definition by identifying 
necessary criteria for the concept of pleasure (their essence); followed by an operational 
definition that would allow experimental identification of the construct (characteristic 
looks). Finally, I will describe what processes act upon pleasure or what effects pleasure 
has on other faculties of the human mind (interactions and influences). The latter will not 
only help to define what pleasure is, but will also highlight the importance of pleasure in 
general, through the roles it plays in human behaviour.  
I. What is Pleasure? 
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Examples and Cognates 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once famously said, when trying to define the 
concept of pornography, "I can't define it, but I know when I see it" (Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
1964). In a similar vein, I will first illustrate what pleasure is by pointing to its instances 
(ostensive definition). Pleasure occurs when eating ice-cream, especially if it is a hot day 
and you are hungry; pleasure abounds in fun games or sport; we enjoy a good joke; if we 
expect it to be a rainy day and it is sunny instead, we are happy; when someone praises 
our good work, we become cheerful; passing an examination with flying colours yields 
joy; pleasure peaks during orgasm; euphoria rushes through the brain seconds after 
snorting cocaine; and we mustn’t forget breath-taking landscapes and many works of art 
and so on. A complementary way of understanding what pleasure means is to inspect the 
different names given to the concept, as well as to related terms. Figure 1 presents a 
compendium of such labels that should highlight the implicit shared meanings of words 
related to pleasure, and in so doing emphasises the similarities and differences between 
these representations (see Perry, 1967 for explicit semantic analysis of the pleasure 
lexicon).  
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Fig 1. Concepts Related to Pleasure 
 
The figure presents clusters of words that share characteristics with 
pleasure, while also possessing more or less nuanced differences from 
pleasure. The existence of such distinct, but closely related labels 
helps to highlight and pinpoint the meaning of what pleasure is. 
delicious 
palatable 
delight delight in 
mouth-watering 
palatability 
relish 
savour 
sweet 
tasteful 
tasty 
fun 
entertainment 
merriment 
hedonia 
hedonics 
pleasing 
pleasurable 
pleasantness 
pleasant hedonic value 
hedonic 
pleasure 
hedonic reaction reward 
positive affect 
high 
continuing effect 
get nice 
impact of effect 
nodding 
pharmacogenic 
orgasm 
rapture 
euphoria 
buzz ecstatic 
euphoriant 
euphoric 
euphorigenic 
euphorogenic  
orgasm 
orgasmic 
passion 
ecstasy 
rush 
bliss 
experienced 
utility 
happy  
subjective 
well-being 
quality of life  
hedonism 
happiness 
subjective effect  
well-being 
utility 
enjoyment 
feeling good 
liking 
liking of 
nice 
niceness 
serenity 
good 
appreciation 
attractive 
cheerfulness 
enjoy 
glad 
gladness 
jolliness 
like 
likes  
liking for 
please 
affective tone 
elation 
hedonic tone 
hedonic state 
heightened 
mood 
positive mood 
sybaritic 
craving 
desire 
mania 
hypomanic  
indulgence 
manic 
positive emotion 
affective 
affect 
positive feeling 
enticing 
alluring 
enthusiasm 
incentive 
motivation 
exhiliration 
exuberance 
appetite 
exuberant 
approval  
ebullience enthusiastic 
wanting 
love 
awe 
flow laughter 
pride 
positive 
reinforcer  
instant 
gratification 
positive 
reinforcement 
positive valence 
rewarding 
unconditioned 
stimulus 
valenced 
gratification 
satisfaction 
affording satisfaction  
comfort 
contentment 
one's pleasure 
choice preference wish 
depression 
dysphoria 
unpleasant 
negative affect 
displeasure 
anhedonia 
misery 
pain 
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The Core of Pleasure 
Defining pleasure through examples and listing clusters of related concepts are useful 
ways of conveying meaning, but a full definition would be lacking without a more formal 
scientific definition of pleasure. Before dwelling further, however, I acknowledge that the 
literature review is highly selective here, so as to allow us to focus on the core of 
pleasure. Further reading on the topics are provided by e.g. Beebe-Center (1965), Frijda 
(2001), Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz (2003), Snyder and Lopez (2002), Katz (2006), 
Kringelbach and Berridge (2010), and Russell (2003b). In attempting a core working 
definition, we need to know what such a definition is and what it gives us, in other words, 
why it is worth specifying a core working definition of pleasure. For our purposes, core 
definitions specify a set of necessary conditions (‘must have or be’) that together should 
be sufficient to identify the concept. Having such a specification caters for an explicitly 
shared understanding, so that we would not talk at crossed purposes, which would lead to 
long-standing, often undetected confusions and other avoidable inhibitions on scientific 
progress. Additionally, by having explicit core definitions, these specifications can then 
be tested and improved to provide meaningful explanations and predictions of real-world 
phenomena. That is, scientific process does not endeavour to create just any arbitrary 
concepts, but ones that summarise observations accurately as part of the conceptual 
framework of the system of interest, which is the human mind for psychological 
investigations (Hempel, 1952). In summary, we are looking for a set of conditions that 
anything we wish to call pleasure must satisfy, so as to explicate a variable that most 
I. What is Pleasure? 
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closely models the instances of that component in the observable world, instead of 
providing another ‘red herring’ to filter out of our field.  
Firstly, is the state of mind which we refer to as pleasure a continuous variable or 
a categorical variable? A multitude of psychophysical tests suggest that pleasure does not 
exist as discrete non-comparable categories, but that pleasure comes in comparable 
portions on a continuous interval magnitude scale (e.g. Cabanac, 1979; Cabanac & 
Ferber, 1987; Engen & McBurney, 1964; Rashdall, 1899). Furthermore, pleasure may 
even possess ratio properties i.e. have a true zero point (see magnitude estimation in 
Cardello & Schutz, 2006). To qualify, being a continuous variable does not mean that 
there are no biases in the measurement of pleasure - there are - but such issues are 
separate matters to the fundamental nature of the variable. So the first necessary 
condition for pleasure is that it is a state of mind that is a continuous quantity rather than 
being incommensurablea.  
I turn next to the debate surrounding conscious versus subconscious pleasure (or 
whether subconscious pleasure is an oxymoron). Firstly, by conscious, I mean first-order 
phenomenal consciousness, not second-order consciousness or self-awareness (for 
terminology see e.g. Block, 1995; Morin, 2006). I subscribe to two answers: A) Pleasure 
can be subconscious, because the effects of pleasure appear to be present in situations 
where pleasure is too weak to be verbalisable (e.g. Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 
2009) or when subjects are distracted by other strong stimuli that, so to speak, ‘push the 
                                                 
a Impossible  to  compare / lacking a common quality on which to make a comparison. 
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pleasure out of consciousness’ (e.g. Di Lollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Franklin, 2005). B) 
In parallel, a relationship holds with the magnitude of pleasure and consciousness of 
pleasure, such that the stronger the pleasure the more likely it is to be conscious (e.g. 
Hobson, 1997; Taylor, 1996). Therefore, the vast majority of ecologically interesting 
everyday pleasures are strong enough to be conscious pleasures e.g. who would not 
notice when food tastes delicious. Additionally, subconscious pleasures may have too 
weak effects to play an important role outside of the laboratory, although this claim needs 
empirical validation. Consequently, on the basis of both premises or at least the first 
premise, making the subconscious versus conscious pleasure distinction may have little 
functional relevance to the core definition of pleasure. The second necessary condition, 
then, is that all but the weakest of pleasures enter phenomenal consciousness.  
I shall turn next to the question of whether pleasure has intrinsic value in the 
minds of the human species. I, and many others, think that it does. The intrinsic part just 
means that pleasure comes with this property rather than something extrinsically 
attaching this property to pleasure i.e. intrinsic value is at the core of pleasure and 
pleasure would not exist without it. There are many ways of expressing the (intrinsic) 
value part, e.g. "During pleasure - that is, during unmitigated pleasure - things are good 
as they are" (Frijda, 2007, p. 69); “pleasure and pain are unconditional, intrinsic values: 
in all times and places, cross-culturally and throughout the sentient realm, every 
pleasure is good and every pain bad in itself” (Goldstein, 1989, p. 257) or as Epicurus 
explained “εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴπερ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν” (“seeing that 
when happiness is present, we have everything”; "Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 122," 
I. What is Pleasure? 
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n.d.). This is not a behavioural statement, saying that people are motivated to seek 
pleasure (and to avoid pain; Smuts, 2010), although pleasure does have such effects on 
behaviour, as we will see later. Introspection, though fallible, may be the only appropriate 
kind of evidence available to support the statement that being in this state is continually 
gratifying in itself (Rachels, 2000). Examples of instances in which the physical signals 
of bodily damage are detached from intrinsically bad pain feelings may help to make the 
case: “surgeons used to give their patients whisky before operations; as anybody may 
verify, this does not diminish substantially the intensity of the pain-sensation, but may 
make it a great deal easier to bear” (Hare, 1972, p. 88); such a dissociative phenomenon 
is even more pronounced under modern anaesthesia (C. R. Chapman, 1996). 
Furthermore, a rare condition exists called Congenital Indifference to Pain, in which the 
physical sensation of pain is intact, but the aversive (nature of) pain is absent from birth 
(Krafte & Bannon, 2008), akin to seeing sirens of an ambulance flashing, but without the 
strongly unpleasant feeling from the loud noise that normally co-occurs with the sirens. 
As the third necessary condition then, for pleasures that are privy to consciousness, 
pleasure has the subjective quality of being intrinsically good, equivalent to pain 
consisting of intrinsically aversive qualia.  
What is the relation of pleasure to hedonic tone or mood? When talking about 
pleasure we primarily refer to the momentary hedonic reactions to specific stimuli, but 
this does not mean that pleasure is necessarily always stimulus-locked and fleeting: 
instead, pleasure can also be objectless (or non-intentional in philosophers’ jargon) and 
last for more than minutes or hours. This background or baseline hedonic tone, even 
I. What is Pleasure? 
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though it has a relatively low magnitude level, or is almost neutral for most people, is still 
the same psychological kind as the more conspicuous but short-lived peaks of pleasure 
(Watson, 2000). This position is thoroughly substantiated by Russell (2003a), and he 
chooses to call pleasure core affect in order to emphasise that point. As more intuitively 
obvious examples of the background hedonic tone being a longer-lasting instance of 
pleasure, consider the prolonged high of 2-14 hours derived from methamphetamine 
(Mayfield, 1973), or even more extremely, the minimum period for diagnosing 
hypomania in bipolar disorder being 4 days (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
Further, this unification of the peaks and the baseline highlights that pleasure is strictly 
speaking not a property of a stimulus: instead, hedonic value is a property of a stimulus 
that refers to the capability of the stimulus to elicit a hedonic reaction or pleasure. As the 
fourth condition for pleasure, pleasure constitutes not only the fluctuating peaks but also 
the ever-present baseline pleasure, on top of which those transient signals vary.  
I deal next with the bipolarity of pleasure i.e. the presence of negative magnitudes 
on the pleasure dimension and what that negative represents. To begin with, pain is not 
the negative extreme on the scale of pleasure, even though common expression - 
pleasure and pain - suggests otherwise: pain is a different dimension and is an antonym 
of pleasure only in the sense of constituting aversive rather than good qualia, as 
described above (Hunt & Koltzenburg, 2005). If anything, depression is a state in which 
baseline core affect has dropped below zero (Lorr, Mcnair, & Fisher, 1982). Such a 
conceptualisation provides further evidence for a true zero point in that both long-lasting 
and short-lasting dips into the negative co-occur with a corresponding flip in qualia from 
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good to bad. This bipolarity makes the pleasure criterion of intrinsically good qualia 
conditional on the magnitude or sign of pleasure. Whether you agree with such a bipolar 
one-dimensional nature of pleasure, however, is not of high impact here as I primarily 
scope the positive / intrinsically good side of pleasure in this thesis.  
Thereafter, I list two critical negations (‘must not have or be’) in order to ensure 
that pleasure is not confused with important related, but distinct concepts. I start with 
pleasure as emotion.  Pleasure with its effects and concomitants, such as arousal, action 
tendencies, bodily reactions, cognitive appraisals, may qualify as a fully-fledged emotion, 
but the core concept on its own is not an emotion (Scherer, 2005). As such, pleasure is 
not equated with action tendencies or arousal or sensations or other individual 
components of emotion (or their combinations), except for the subjective feeling 
component, which may be identical to pleasure in the case of positive emotions (Russell 
& Barrett, 1999). The identification of pleasure as a separate identity to the other 
components of positive emotion does not mean, of course, that the components do not 
occur together. Normally, pleasure, arousal, action tendencies and many other 
phenomena do occur together, albeit at different levels of activation depending on the 
emotional episode. I.e. the experience or state of pleasure can be identified as a 
separable, but integral component of positive emotions. Also, the separation of pleasure 
from appraisals and so on is not to be confused with what causes pleasure: pleasure can 
indeed be caused by appraisals, for instance, but the causation of pleasure is a different 
matter to the core experience of pleasure, which does not equal to appraisal etc. 
Furthermore, the ‘heterogeneity problem’ (Mason, 2007) needs to be dealt with here: 
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obviously, sexual pleasure is a different beast to pleasure resulting from completing a 
work task i.e. no doubt a lot of things are different across these situations such as 
different causes of the pleasures, different thoughts, levels of arousal etc. But according 
to the core affect position, one of the fundamental components is the same across all 
these instances, pleasure (Smuts, 2010); although I, of course, remain open to the 
possibility that pleasure may need to be subdivided into multiple core kinds that are 
fundamentally different under these different circumstances. So pleasure is not an 
emotion on its own, but a key part of all positive emotions, if not the thing that makes the 
positive emotions positive.   
Secondly, is pleasure the same as desire, incentive, motivation, craving, appetite? 
No. This distinction has been advocated by many people and in many forms, one of them 
being the liking and wanting distinction (e.g. Berridge, 2004; Dai, Brendl, & Ariely, 
2010): in short, liking is intrinsically good, but does not directly motivate behaviour, 
whereas wanting is not intrinsically good, while it does influence behaviour directly. In 
fact, liking appears to influence behaviour indirectly through wanting, mediated by a 
process called incentive learning (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002), but more about that 
under the effects of pleasure. In terms of language, however, liking and wanting (or 
pleasure and incentive) are often grouped together and when I do not distinguish between 
them, I use the word affective. I conclude the core definition of pleasure by stating that 
pleasure is an entity distinct from incentive.  
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Measuring Pleasure 
Now that we know the nature of the object of study (pleasure), we need to find an actual 
way to identify the entity in the observable world: we need an operational definition of 
pleasure. Before proceeding, however, I point out the concentrated nature of the 
following synthesis, for a broader context please refer to Hein and colleagues (2008), 
Kahneman and colleagues (2003), and Parducci (1995), for example. 
Currently, the best measure available for pleasure is affective self-report. Asking 
people how good they feel during events of interest surely has both pros and cons, as do 
all experimental techniques. On the limitations side, evaluative ratings are subject to a 
multitude of confounding influences with respect to its use as an instrument of pleasure: 
expectation biases and cognitive categorisation effects, potential attitude, misattribution 
and social desirability biases, sensitivity to incentive/desire not just pleasure and so on 
(Kuznicki, Johnson, & Rutkiewic, 1982; Larsen & Fredrickson, 2003). The key 
advantages of event-contingent affective self-report on the other hand are that it is 
sensitive to pleasure or the goodness of feeling, in fact it may be the only currently 
available tool capable of capturing such personal subjective experiences (Tiffany, Carter, 
& Singleton, 2000). Furthermore, except for the weakest subconscious pleasures, it 
appears that all the necessary features for pleasure can be assimilated with an appropriate 
hedonic rating scale, such as the Labelled Affective Magnitude scale (LAM; Schutz & 
Cardello, 2001): that is to say, pleasure can be identified as a continuous bipolar 
conscious variable that is intrinsically good on the positive pole of the dimension. In 
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terms of using the LAM scale rather than any other self-report instrument as the pleasure 
measure, its merits include using semantic labels - e.g. Like Very Much, Like Extremely – 
rather than having solely numbers on the scale, allowing for more absolute judgments to 
be made that are more comparable than the more relative judgments provoked by purely 
numbered scales (Nicolas, Marquilly, & O'Mahony, 2010). Another virtue of LAM arises 
from the positioning of these semantic labels with respect to the numbers, such that they 
are non-aligned to the numbers, placed according to the anchoring that is empirically 
derived using the magnitude estimation technique (Schutz & Cardello, 2001). That is, the 
conventional meaning of a phrase such as Like Moderately does not necessarily 
correspond exactly to 30, 40, 50 or 60 on a 100 point scale, the shared meaning of Like 
Moderately is instead found to map to 36 on the LAM scale (Cardello & Schutz, 2004). 
Raw estimates from magnitude estimation are generally not normally distributed, 
however, but this problem was corrected in the development of the LAM scale with a 
normalisation procedure with geometric means (see p. 123 in Schutz & Cardello, 2001). 
As a downside to the LAM scale there tends to be clustering of ratings around the 
semantic anchors.       
You are now probably thinking that it would be great, if not critical, to use non-
self-report / behavioural / physiological measures of pleasure, and I agree, it would be 
very useful to complement self-report ratings with other types of measures that are not 
confounded by the same factors as self-report. Unfortunately, we do not currently have 
alternative measures that have been properly validated in terms of being discriminably 
sensitive to the key necessary characteristics of pleasure. Measures such as facial 
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electromyography (fEMG; Hu & McChesney, 1999; Huang, Chen, & Chung, 2004) or 
affective priming (Fazio, 2001; Ferrand, Ric, & Augustinova, 2006) show promise, but 
they have not been properly tested in prototypically pleasurable situations, such as when 
eating delicious foods, taking euphorigenic drugs or even during sexual stimulation. For 
instance, fEMG signals were found to correlate with the unpleasantness / pleasantness of 
different drinks (Hu et al., 1999), but it is not known how much of that sensitivity 
originated from the unpleasant / disgust reactions rather than the positive pleasurable 
properties of the flavours; in addition, it is not known whether fEMG is sensitive to 
strong obvious pleasures from other sources such as highly euphoric drugs, which 
evaluative self-report is sensitive to. The bottom line is that it is currently unclear 
whether such techniques really measure hedonic properties as opposed to being sensitive 
to aspects of negative emotion instead or to arousal, familiarity or similar (Degner, 
Wentura, & Rothermund, 2006). In conclusion, as long as care is taken to minimize the 
main confounds by using appropriate designs and analyses, then non-retrospective 
affective ratings stand as the current best operational definition of pleasure, until 
complementary non-self-report methods are properly validated.  
 
Pleasure as a Function 
Now that we have a core working definition and an operational definition for pleasure, 
let us delve into what pleasure does. That is, the remainder of this work will deal with the 
ins and outs of pleasure, so that this entity could be put on a map and made functional 
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through specifying its roles in the human mind and behaviour. Furthermore, knowledge 
about its effects, and the circumstances when those effects arise, allows us to learn about 
the importance of pleasure, in terms of its significance in the everyday and clinical 
realms. We start by identifying when pleasure occurs, in the following chapter, by 
creating an empirical classification of all the different core inputs capable of triggering 
positive affect. Then we study what one might call the most basic influence affect might 
have, which is the effect of affect on fast, reflexive-like approach and withdrawal 
reactions. In the third empirical chapter we explore the development of new likes, or what 
pleasure does to neutral stimuli co-occurring with the hedonic reactions. Next, we 
describe perhaps the most important effects that pleasure produces: the impact of pleasure 
on incentive motivation and on actual choices / consumption. The fifth experimental 
chapter investigates whether pleasure inhibits itself, by examining whether hedonic 
habituation occurs with foods. The last concluding chapter attempts to bring all these 
disparate findings together to form a bigger picture that specifies an integrated model of 
the important roles of pleasure in our minds and behaviour. This framework is then 
applied to determine the significance of pleasure in everyday life, as well as the 
importance of pleasure to some compulsions entailing excessive consumption.  
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II. Causes of Positive Emotion 
 
Cakes, spreadsheets, colleagues and clocks, what do they have in common? You are 
likely to enjoy the taste of a piece of cake, finishing your work on a spreadsheet will elicit 
a positive feeling, your colleagues might lift your mood through praise and you might be 
positively relieved after meeting a stressful deadline. These examples illustrate the key 
aim of this study, which was to identify what are the core causes of positive emotion at 
the workplace. To clarify, by core causes we do not mean a list of objects, like cakes or 
spreadsheets, that are sometimes involved in eliciting positive emotion, and nor do we 
mean activities that are sometimes pleasant, such as eating or entering data, as being the 
core causes. Instead, our aim was to identify primary and separable core triggers: not, 
therefore, the finishing of data-entry on your spreadsheet per se, but the perception of the 
achievement of a desired state of affairs, which is directly responsible for causing 
positive emotion, plus many other core causes of positive emotion. 
Although a number of studies have investigated the sources of positive emotions 
at work, the aims of such studies have not been to identify the core causes of positive 
emotion. Rather than seeking to identify a full classification of primary triggers that 
directly mediate the causation of positive emotion, existing works have mostly focused 
on a small set of secondary causes of positive emotion. The following types of secondary 
causes of positive emotion have been studied: positive activities, such as interacting with 
customers or involvement in planning (e.g. Basch & Fisher, 2000); job features, such as 
difficulty of work tasks (e.g. Saavedra & Kwun, 2000); personal states and traits, such as 
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level of interest (e.g. Fisher & Noble, 2004); broad collective categories, such as acts of 
co-workers (Miner, Glomb, & Hulin, 2005); and many other types of important 
secondary triggers of positive emotion (e.g. Kanis, Brinkman, & Perry, 2009; Shraga & 
Shirom, 2009). In some cases, core causes of positive emotion have indeed been studied, 
but then focusing on only a few core candidates rather than trying to establish a full 
classification e.g. investigations of the effect of perceptions of goal progress or 
achievement on positive emotion (Alliger & Williams, 1993; Basch & Fisher, 2000; 
Goetz, Frenzel, Stoeger, & Hall, 2010). By contrast, establishing a full classification of 
core causes that directly elicit positive emotion has not, to our knowledge, received 
experimental attention.  
Experience sampling methodology (ESM) is a fit method for studying everyday 
experience. Assessing positive emotion prospectively near the time the events actually 
occur provides more accurate measurements than retrospective interview or survey 
techniques, thanks to limiting recall and integration biases involved in retrieving 
information from the more distant memories (Reis & Gable, 2000). Another classic 
advantage of ESM is its ability to study the phenomena of interest in their natural context, 
at least in comparison to the other methods available. Furthermore, experience sampling 
has previously been employed for the study of positive affect showcasing its use for our 
purposes (e.g. Kashdan, Uswatte, & Julian, 2006; Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, Delespaul, 
& deVries, 2003). 
In order to identify what are the core causes of positive emotion at the workplace, 
office-workers were instructed to keep open an online form. Whenever the office-workers 
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experienced positive emotion, they were asked to fill in and submit a detailed description 
of what was happening when they felt good. The reports collected using this experience 
sampling methodology were then thematically analysed using a qualitative factor analysis 
technique. Applying this Critical Incident Technique (CIT; Bitner, Booms, & Tetreault, 
1990; Flanagan, 1954) enabled the extraction of elements common to the positive 
emotion experiences recorded by the participants and resulted in an empirical 
classification of causes of positive emotion. These different types of core causes of 
emotion that were derived from the data (Table 1) plus associated quantitative hedonic 
ratings that were also taken (Figure 2), constituted the main results of the study.  
 
Experience Sampling Experiment 
Participants, Apparatus and Stimuli 
Sample. 84 office-based workers (49 female), mean age 33.3 years (SD = 9.7), 
were included in this experiment. The occupations of the participants were primarily 
project manager, lecturer, engineer and lead administrator. Recruitment took place 
through employers who were members of an Estonian cross-organizational e-mail list and 
who passed the study advert on to their employees. We do not know the response rate i.e. 
how many individuals signed up compared to how many were approached. The 
participants received an invitation linking to a web-based recruitment questionnaire at 
http://tinyurl.com/ESstudy that served as a common introduction to the study (the link 
provides an English translation of the distributed Estonian web-page). The sample size 
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was not pre-set beforehand, but was set by demand by way of how many volunteers 
signed up during our recruitment period. The achieved sample size appears to be 
satisfactory to detect differences for a large effect in the hedonic ratings associated with 
the different pleasure categories (with power .8; see Figure 2), for which approximately 
30 participants would have been needed. We specified a large (f = 0.4) effect rather than a 
medium or small effect, because, at least initially, only substantial differences in the 
quantitative hedonic profiles are of interest, rather than spending resources to detect small 
differences that may have little real-world relevance or applicability. Recruits received no 
monetary compensation for participation in a full work-day session. The study was 
carried out according to the local ethical regulations in Estonia.  
Experimental Setup. Participants were tested in their normal office environments 
with the help of their own office computers. Participants kept an online form open 
throughout the study day (http://tinyurl.com/ESform) and were instructed to fill in the 
form whenever they felt positive emotion on that day. Workdays lasted from about 0800 
to 1700.   
Stimuli and Scales. Participants were provided with a text box to enter full 
descriptive details about what was happening when they felt good (see 
http://tinyurl.com/ESform). To provide quantitative evaluative ratings, positive feelings 
were rated on a digital version of the Labelled Affective Magnitude (LAM) scale (Schutz 
& Cardello, 2001). The LAM scale is a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) that displays the 
following positive semantic anchors: like extremely; like very much; like moderately; 
like slightly; neither like or dislike. The positioning of the labels is not uniform on the 
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LAM scale, however, but has been derived through magnitude estimation to yield ratio 
properties (for further details see Cardello & Schutz, 2004). 
 
Procedure 
On the morning of the study day, the participants opened the introduction page 
(http://tinyurl.com/ESstudy), where the procedure for the rest of the day was fully 
explained (see Appendix A). The most important instructions were, firstly: “We ask you 
to enter the positive events as soon as possible after they occur, and to make sure you fill 
in the main questionnaire at least once every hour.” and “… you might enter something 
like "I finished filing the documents" or "my colleague said my Excel table looks good". 
Note that we ask you to enter all positive events in the workplace, which includes things 
like having a chat with a friend about shopping or reading an anecdote online etc. 
Additionally, please make sure to enter events associated with weak feelings, we are just 
as interested when you feel slightly good as we are interested when you feel extremely 
good.” Secondly: “Use the scale (2) to indicate how much you liked the moment you 
described in 1). In doing so, please do not use only the numbers on the scale, but read the 
text labels as well e.g. Like Moderately. And note that the text labels are supposed to be 
non-aligned with the numbers.” Before opening the main study form, we emphasised the 
anonymity of taking part and asked the participants to provide a couple of demographic 
variables such as gender and age. Participants then proceeded onto the main study form 
(http://tinyurl.com/ESform), which they were instructed to keep open for the duration of 
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the day. Whenever a positive feeling occurred during the work-day, the participants were 
asked to fill in and submit the form, which consisted of the aforementioned text box to 
describe what exactly the participant was doing when the positive emotion occurred and 
which consisted of the aforementioned LAM scale to quantify how good the participant 
felt. The participants carried through with the learned procedure of filling in the main 
form as soon as possible after any positive event occurred, until the evening. Before 
leaving work, the participants filled in a final questionnaire (http://tinyurl.com/ESfinish) 
that asked for general feedback on the study.  
Data Analysis. In order to derive core categories from the 438 positive event 
reports received and reveal a list of data-based core causes of positive emotion, we used 
Critical Incident Technique (CIT; Bitner et al., 1990; Flanagan, 1954). The key steps in 
this qualitative analysis technique were firstly to define the nature of the categories to be 
extracted, which was chosen by design as core causes of positive emotion. Next, critical 
incidents were identified by filtering out any reports that did not fulfil the following 
criteria: incident was rated above zero on LAM scale; incident was a discrete event, not a 
fact etc; incident happened to the respondent, not to some other individual; respondent 
provided detailed enough description relating to the source of positive emotion. After 
identifying the critical incidents, we processed these reports by abstracting the meaning 
of the core words of each report. If a report contained more than one candidate cause of 
positive emotion, we selected the first one mentioned in the text.  
After these tentative categories were established, brief definitions were made of 
the cause categories that had surfaced (Table 1 in Results section). When formulating the 
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criteria that made up the cause definitions, the following question was considered in order 
to confirm that the grouping of reports was according to the associated core causes of 
positive emotion: What features or attributes of these events are most critical for 
triggering this type of positive emotion; or in other words, what qualities or patterns does 
this affective process recognize? Finally, the categories were reviewed to further ensure 
that the causes that surfaced were as separable and non-overlapping as possible. The 
procedure was carried out by two researchers with iterative discussions allowed after 
report categorization. As a separate analysis, the reports were classified according to 
which type of activity they primarily involved: for example, reading or talking. In order 
to map reports to specific activities, we utilised a modified version of a taxonomy of 
activities called Alternative Classification of Time Use Activities (ACTUA; Hoffmann & 
Mata, 1998). All quantitative analyses were carried out using Microsoft Excel 2010, R 
software (version 2.10.1; http://www.r-project.org/) and PASW 18 packages. 
 
Results 
In order to build a classification of core causes of positive emotion, we analysed the 
positive event reports written by office-workers and extracted the common elements from 
these reports using Critical Incident Technique. As specified in Table 1, we identified 17 
separable triggers for eliciting positive emotion. The different ways by which positive 
emotions were induced were Attachment, Auditory Aesthetics, Euphorigenic Drugs, 
Eureka, Fulfilled Expectations, Humour, Improvement, Joy of Others, Knowledge Gain, 
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Liquid, Pleasant Cues, Positive Self-Image, Relief, Synchrony with Others, Tastes and 
Smells, Temperature Normalization and Visual Aesthetics. The meanings of these labels 
are detailed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Core Causes at the Workplace 
Cause Name Characterization of the Cause Derived From Data Specific Examples 
Attachment 
When: participant feels good about 
an individual, e.g. friend, family, 
lover or pet, for whom the participant 
holds long-term stable affection. 
A friend called me who I had 
not heard from for a long time. 
Auditory 
Aesthetics 
When: participant enjoys the melody and 
rhythm of an auditory stimulus. 
I listened to my favourite 
song on the radio. 
Euphorigenic 
Drugs 
When: experience involves 
pharmacological substances, which 
induce pleasure by acting directly on 
the central nervous system. 
I had my morning cigarette; 
I took a breath of fresh air. 
Eureka 
When: the reported experience involves 
discovery of a connection. And when: 
that connection perceived to explain a 
puzzle or perfectly fill a gap. 
I suddenly thought of a perfect 
solution to my software bug! 
Fulfilled 
Expectations 
When: an expectation or goal, 
that has previously been set, is 
met or exceeded. 
The results of my experiment turned 
out as I expected, perhaps even 
slightly better than I expected. 
Humour 
When: experience incorporates 
recognition of an unusual pattern. 
And when: that recognition leads 
to amusement or laughter. 
What do you call a penguin 
in the Sahara Desert? Lost. 
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Improvement 
When: circumstances are subjectively 
perceived to change from worse to better. 
And when: goals or expectations relevant to 
the circumstance were not set beforehand. 
I noticed they had fixed 
the road. 
Joy of Others When: expressions of joy are sensed. 
I saw a baby smile on the street; 
I saw that my son was happy. 
Knowledge 
Gain 
When: gaining knowledge that you 
care about or that you can apply. 
I learned of a technical nuance 
about the resistors we use. 
Liquid When: liquidness of a drink is sensed. I drank water. 
Pleasant 
Cues 
When: memories or sensory stimuli are 
activated that have become capable of eliciting 
positive emotion on their own through past 
association with positive affect. 
The characteristic smell 
from my summer cottage 
made me feel very good. 
Positive 
Self-Image 
When: a situation is perceived to 
reflect well on self. 
My boss praised me. 
Relief When: negative affect diminishes. 
After I had finished giving 
my stressful presentation, I 
felt extremely good. 
Synchrony 
with Others 
When: participant realises that 
another person is thinking or feeling 
similarly to the participant. 
I realised we think and feel the 
same way about a TV program 
that aired yesterday. 
Tastes and 
Smells 
When: experience involves gustatory 
flavours i.e. food taste, smell or oral texture. 
I ate a chocolate bar. 
Temperature 
Normalization 
When: sense warmth while body is 
cold or cold while body is too warm. 
I enjoyed the warm water 
flowing over my cold hands. 
Visual 
Aesthetics 
When: participant enjoys a 
visual stimulus. 
I saw a picture of a particularly 
pleasing landscape. 
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In deriving the causes of positive emotion from the data, we also established inter-
rater reliability: this was assessed as number of agreements over total number of reports. 
A native Estonian speaker, previously not involved with the study, was provided with 
unidentified data and the categories in Table 1, so that she could independently categorize 
the reports. No additional information was provided. An agreement was counted 
whenever the raters assigned a given report to the same core cause category; otherwise a 
disagreement was counted. Joint probability of agreement was then calculated as number 
of agreements over number of disagreements + agreements (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Inter-rater agreement was satisfactory, at 68%, with most disagreements arising from 
incomplete understanding of the categories in the early phase of processing. 
Next we determined the profile of the hedonic ratings and frequencies associated 
with each cause of positive emotion. Figure 2 presents the averages and spreads of the 
hedonic ratings (the box plots) as well as how often the causes of positive emotion 
occurred (greyness of the boxes). Rare causes are omitted, such that only causes that 
occurred on more than 1% of all occasions are shown. As Figure 2 illustrates, the cause 
hedonic ratings did not differ significantly from each other, F(10, 343) = 1.00, MSE = 
528.20, p = .43. However, the incidence of causes did differ significantly from each 
other, χ2(10) = 339.99, p < .01. Fulfilled Expectations were reported by far the most 
often, at 30.5% of all the common cause occurrences (binomial test z = 14.01, p < .01), 
followed by Improvement and Positive Self-Image, at 18.3% (z = 6.06, p < .01) and 
18.0% (z = 5.88, p < .01), respectively. All the other causes were reported less than 10% 
of the time. 
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Fig 2. Hedonic Ratings of Common Causes 
 
The ranges of hedonic ratings that the causes are capable of producing 
are indicated by the box-and-whiskers plots. The hedonic potencies of 
the causes do not differ significantly from each other. The greyness of 
each box provides a relative indication of how often each cause 
occurred: the darker the higher the percentage occurrence. Causes shown 
are those that occurred more often than 1% of all causes registered. 
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In order to identify which activities were associated with the most positive causes 
of positive emotion, we grouped together different causes of positive emotion that 
occurred during the same activity. This grouping produced a hedonic ranking of activities 
according to the mean hedonic ratings of all the positive events that took place under 
each activity. As Figure 3 illustrates, the hedonic ratings associated with activities 
differed from each other significantly, F(11, 234) = 2.79, MSE = 489.93, p < .01. 
Attending Meetings and Commuting were associated with a more than 20-point (SEM ±8) 
hedonic rating increase above the mean rating, corresponding approximately to an 
increase from Like Moderately to Like Very Much. Activities of Talking, Reading, Eating 
and Drinking were also associated with a significant increase of more than 15-points 
(SEM ±7) above the mean. Remaining activities were not associated with a significant 
effect on magnitude of hedonic ratings. The incidence of positive activities also differed 
significantly from each other, χ2(11) = 269.90, p < .01. The occurrence of Talking was by 
far the most common, at 34.5% of all the common positive activity occurrences (binomial 
test z = 14.87, p < .01), followed by Eating and Drinking at 15.0% (z = 3.80, p < .01). All 
the other positive activities occurred at 10% or less of the time. 
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Fig 3. Activity Ratings 
 
The top five activities shown were the activities that separately 
surfaced as having significantly larger hedonic ratings than the other 
activities. The greyness of each bar provides a relative indication of 
how often each positive activity was reported – the darker the higher 
the percentage of reports. Activities shown are those that occurred at 
least as often as 1% in proportion to all activities registered. 
Error bars represent Standard Error of the Mean (SEM). 
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Discussion 
This study identified a classification of core causes of positive emotion that was not 
manufactured from theory but derived from empirical data. Resultant causes were, for 
example, Fulfilled Expectations whereby positive emotion is experienced whenever a 
desired goal is reached; or Positive Self-Image whereby positive emotion is caused when 
perceiving any state of affairs to reflect well on oneself; see Table 1 for the full 
taxonomy. The two aforementioned examples and Improvement were the most commonly 
occurring causes of positive emotion at the workplace. When the extent of positive 
emotion arising through such different routes was quantified (Figure 2), however, the 
different causes did not differ significantly from each other in the magnitudes of positive 
emotion the causes were capable of eliciting. Finally, activities such as Eating and 
Drinking and Talking, did differ in the extent to which they produced positive emotion 
(Figure 3) – the two examples plus Reading, Commuting and Attending Meetings were 
associated with significantly higher than average hedonic ratings.  
We have purposely evaded the issue of the positive emotion response being one 
or many different kinds of response, so that the classification of causes could be treated 
as a separate investigation from the investigation of how many types of different resultant 
positive emotion there are. We remain open to the possibilities that there is a one-
dimensional positive affect response arising from different contexts (e.g. Ortony & 
Turner, 1990; Russell, 2003a) or alternatively that there are multiple qualitatively 
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different positive basic emotions such as love, awe, joy, enthusiasm, contentment, 
laughter and others (e.g. Ekman, 1999). 
The nature of this study was correlational and depended critically on self-report: 
therefore, the classification derived is not necessarily a classification of causes and may 
reflect what people think caused an emotion (attitudes or misleading attributions) rather 
than what actually caused the emotion. The impact of these limitations for the current 
enquiry can be evaluated with further research, although we did choose non-retrospective 
design parameters that should have already minimised misattributions. Given that 
confounding influences may be more or less dominant under different sets of 
circumstances, then unless the aforementioned limitations are shown to critically 
confound the reports given under current conditions, we regard the classification 
produced to contain valid new information. Therefore, our default interpretation is that 
Table 1 provides an empirically-derived comprehensive taxonomy of causes of positive 
emotion at the workplace.  
Quantitatively, however, we are highly concerned about making comparisons 
between cause types e.g. when rating how much you like a brownie, you compare this 
brownie to the pleasantness of other brownies and desserts, or foods in general, but not as 
much to the extent to which you enjoy praise from your superior, for instance. Such a 
categorization effect makes it difficult to compare the hedonic ratings of different classes 
of experiences (Zellner, 2007), which is a serious concern when comparing the ratings 
given to the different causes in this study. In future studies, magnitude matching 
technique might help to alleviate this issue of relative interclass comparisons of hedonic 
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ratings (using a scale such as the hedonic gLMS, see D. J. Snyder & Bartoshuk, 2009, p. 
577). Further issues may arise from comparing estimates of positive emotion magnitudes 
from different people (Klocksiem, 2008). However, it is not known how large of a bias 
such confounds create. It is therefore possible that the relative nature of evaluative 
judgments as well as issues arising from interpersonal comparisons do not produce large 
enough effect sizes to warrant an alternative interpretation. Our default interpretation, 
therefore, is that the different causes do not genuinely differ in their potency to elicit 
positive emotion. We had sufficient power to detect large affect differences between the 
cause categories, but it is clear that the same cannot be claimed about smaller differences. 
A larger sample size is needed in future studies to ascertain whether smaller differences 
differentiate these causes of positive emotion, because the current results can not inform 
our judgment about that: all we can evidence with this study is that large differences did 
not exist between the cause quantitative profiles. Instead, what appears to differentiate 
between a single cause producing a weak positive emotion versus the same cause 
eliciting an extremely strong positive emotion, is the modifiers or the values of the 
critical parameters involved in the causal mechanism. For instance, for Fulfilled 
Expectations goal achievement is enjoyed much more when the desired state of affairs is 
exceeded rather than just reached. Therefore, if we wish to increase positive well-being at 
a personal or organizational level, it is not only a matter of trying to increase the 
frequencies of causes, but also a matter of understanding the causal mechanisms better, in 
order to create the circumstances that would maximally tap into the cause mechanisms 
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(Diener, 2009; Kahneman et al., 2003; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; C. R. Snyder 
& Lopez, 2007).  
Of the more enjoyable activities, only Attending Meetings was directly related to 
work. By contrast, it is not so much that Commuting per se was enjoyable but that 
Commuting was mostly associated with leaving the work-environment, either for lunch or 
to go home at the end of the day, and such escapes appeared to primarily improve 
positive emotion. Talking and Reading were also not intrinsic work rewards, but 
contained mainly chatting with colleagues or reading news or jokes online. Based on the 
content of the top activities it seems that the activities that were associated with the 
highest gratification had a social component (Attending Meetings) and/or were not 
directly work-related, or involved food: suggesting that working alone was not enjoyed to 
a great extent. This does not necessarily mean that participants did not work at their 
workplace, just that they did not enjoy working alone. 
Figure 3 presents only the positive aspects of the listed activities, i.e. the hedonic 
means presented do not take into account any negative events that might have occurred 
during the same activities. For instance, it is possible the activity associated with the 
highest peaks was also the activity that produced the most negative emotions. Secondly, 
the estimates in Figure 3 do not take into account the duration of the emotions either. For 
instance, an activity could have lasted three hours, but within those hours there may 
occurred only a single short positive event. That is, this study evaluated only one of the 
three critical aspects required for complete affective ranking of activities: the positive 
aspect. A full emotional profile of activities would incorporate positive emotions minus 
II. Causes of Positive Emotion 
 
 
45 
negative emotions weighted with time durations or frequencies of individual events. Note 
that the timescales or frequencies also incorporate repeatability, such that some pleasure 
triggers may be short-lived and not repeat themselves spontaneously (e.g. enjoying a bit 
of chocolate), whereas others may last much longer and resurface on their own (e.g. 
winning a Nobel prize and re-living that for years after).Report data in this study did not 
allow us to specify some of the causes as precisely as others. For example, if a participant 
enjoys a visual stimulus, this does not mean that they enjoy any or every visual stimulus, 
but rather those with specific visual patterns. Additionally, some causes of positive 
emotion are missing altogether from Table 1 e.g. Sexual Stimulation. In order to provide 
a more thorough classification of causes of positive emotion, we present Table 2 with 
speculative elaborations on the empirical classification of Table 1. The three added core 
causes, Fragrances, Mania and Sexual Stimulation, and further specifications of existing 
causes may allow the total classification to be representative of not just causes of positive 
emotion at the workplace, but outside as well. 
We have already mentioned the pros of experience sampling methodology, but 
obviously ESM has drawbacks as well that pertain to the interpretation of our results. 
Firstly, demand effects: individuals were unlikely to report their positive experiences 
when they arose from sources associated with negative connotations e.g. sexual or erotic 
events. In addition, participants were less likely to register events that they perceived to 
be inappropriate as activities at work, such as browsing extensively online or taking long 
breaks; although we did receive some reports of this kind. These issues limit the breadth 
of our dataset. Secondly, the act of observation may actually change what is observed, so 
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that the participants did not go through their workday and the encountered positive events 
in a normal way, because they were making observations about their experiences.  
 
Table 2. Further Core Causes 
Cause Name Additional Non-Data-Based Characterization 
Attachment Also if: the source is a favourite toy or object e.g. old T-shirt. 
Auditory 
Aesthetics 
More specifically if: the sounds contain specific, but currently undefined, 
melodic and rhythmic patterns capable of eliciting positive affect. 
Fragrances 
If: participant enjoys non-food scents. And if: these perfumes are 
not made more pleasant by hunger. 
Humour 
Also if: participant recognises unusual relations in interesting did-you-know 
type of facts, for example, the opposite sides of a dice always add up to seven. 
Joy of Others More specifically if: genuine expressions of joy are sensed. 
Liquid 
More specifically if: increasing thirst amplifies this pleasure i.e. thirst is a 
positive modulator uniquely amplifying pleasure from liquid source. 
Mania 
If: positive effect does not require cognitive processing. And if: 
the positive effect is dominantly self-generated from the body 
itself without requiring external stimulation. 
Sexual 
Stimulation 
If: involves physical stimulation of excited erotogenic body parts. 
Tastes & 
Smells 
More specifically if: increasing hunger amplifies this gustatory pleasure i.e. 
hunger is a positive modulator uniquely amplifying pleasure from food flavours. 
Visual 
Aesthetics 
More specifically if: the visual stimuli contain specific, but currently 
undefined, visual patterns capable of eliciting positive affect. 
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The current study is positioned to specify the arrow in Affective Events Theory 
(AET; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) that starts from affective events and ends with 
positive emotion. As such, through the broader framework of AET, causes of positive 
emotion have implications for job satisfaction and subjective well-being in general 
(Fredrickson, 2001; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1994; Wegge, van Dick, Fisher, West, & 
Dawson, 2006). The significance of the current classification may be even broader, in 
that as a comprehensive classification of primary / direct causes of positive emotion, then 
any and all secondary influences on positive emotion would work through a mixture of 
such primary / direct causes. So, for instance, positive activities such as playing a game, 
watching TV, hiking or going out might all be recipes with the causes as the ingredients. 
As such, if we were to understand the direct causal mechanisms better, including the 
modifiers that trigger the mechanisms most powerfully, that would go a long way 
towards manipulating these subjective utilities for subjective well-being (Hudlicka, 2003; 
Ryan & Deci, 2001). Furthermore, potential causes of positive emotion from broader 
levels of classification, such as income, personality, type of work, having children and 
climate, might ultimately all have their positive impact through the most proximal causes 
of positive emotion, the primary core causes we have identified (Dolan, Peasgood, & 
White, 2008). 
This study provides the first classification of core causes of positive emotion. As 
for any first classification, more data are needed to test and adjust the taxonomy. The 
classification should be validated and modified from data across a wide range of samples 
and settings for the results to become generalisable. That is especially true in terms of 
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generating an understanding of core causes that are present outside the workplace, given 
our sample included only office-work (out of practical convenience). A major issue with 
relying on reports from work to create a classification of pleasure sources is that 
individuals often do not enjoy their work and as such many of their pleasures would not 
be registered, compared to carrying out the same study over a weekend, for instance. 
Furthermore, the activities outside work need to be included in future studies, because 
even when individuals enjoy their workplace life, non-work activities may involve a 
distinct set of pleasure sources from work activities. For the main quantitative analysis, 
the study appears to be sufficiently powerful, but that does not mean the study has the 
power to detect a full range of pleasure sources in the qualitative sense. It is difficult to 
estimate power for qualitative analyses, so that question remains largely unanswered, 
other than the sample and report size being on par with other studies in the literature. 
Most notably, two of the more closely relevant articles, Basch and Fisher (2000) and 
Bitner and colleagues (1990), had a similar sample size and a slightly smaller number of 
reports compared to this study (approximately 100 fewer positive reports). Another 
potential issue for generalisability may be response rates: it is possible that only a small 
percentage of the individuals approached actually took part in this study, leading to issues 
with selection and having a representative sample of the population. The possibility of a 
substantial self-selection bias is problematic and may be eliminated if all individuals in a 
given organisation were required to participate in a future study of this kind. The latter 
approach may introduce its own problems, however, and an alternative would be to 
incorporate methods for measuring response rate so as to become informed about the real 
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extent of this potential issue. Non-correlational studies that directly manipulate the 
candidate causes to determine if they actually work are needed as well (Roseman & 
Evdokas, 2004). In terms of differentiating the causes by their effectiveness potentials, at 
first sight e.g. Sexual Stimulation and orgasm as the pinnacle of that, may be a much 
more potent cause than for instance Positive Self-Image. However, it seems that all 
causes are capable of eliciting a wide range of positive emotion, from weak to extremely 
strong. Imagine winning the Nobel Prize, as an example of Positive Self-Image, which 
would seem capable of competing with even the best Sexual Stimulation. Given the 
equipotency of the different causes in terms of the wide range of emotional strengths that 
all causes are capable of producing, then the burden of increasing positive emotions is 
placed on understanding these causal mechanisms more fully: so as to alter the 
circumstances that can fuel the maximal horsepower of the core causes. 
 
This chapter identified the inputs of pleasure, assuming the reported positive experiences 
are similar to each other because of the shared core affects. Knowing the different 
triggers of hedonic reactions gets us closer to identifying when pleasure occurs, which is 
important because it allows us to identify the circumstances when pleasure could be part 
of everyday life, or be part of psychiatric aetiologies. It appears that pleasure is not a 
fringe phenomenon that rarely takes place, for instance, once a month and only in 
extreme and artificial situations (including only in the laboratory). Instead, pleasure 
seems to be a much more widespread happening with a multitude of sources ranging from 
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daily enjoyment of foods to fulfilment of goals and hopefully some humour and other 
sources of fun in the evenings. 
Having established the non-negligible presence of pleasure at the minimum, and 
daily ubiquity of pleasure at the other extreme, questions arise as to what are the 
consequences of these pleasures? The following chapters deal with just that. In this 
chapter, we identified eating and drinking as a non-trivial source of pleasure and we 
therefore decided to study the products of this source of pleasure, because food is a more 
experimentally tractable source than many of the other major ones, such as those 
stemming from personal interactions. The initial stage in this analysis was to examine 
whether basic approach/withdrawal responses to food-related stimuli were determined by 
their affective valence. 
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III. Effects of Affect on Motor Reactions 
 
Bacteria tend towards high concentrations of food. Seeing nectar may make bees start to 
fly faster. Your hand may be quicker to approach a bar of chocolate than to withdraw 
from it. Hungry sleep-walkers may be magnetically drawn to their fridges? How does 
hedonic value of a stimulus influence motor responding was the broad question posed by 
this study. More specifically, the aim was to determine whether higher hedonic value of a 
stimulus facilitates the speed of approach to the reward and congruentlyb slows down the 
withdrawal response (Solarz, 1960). Furthermore, the aim of this study was to evaluate 
sub-second reflexive-like hedonic congruence effects on reaction times, rather than 
supra-second influences on muscular activities.  
Existing studies (see Discussion) have pre-selected their stimuli primarily based 
on the connotations of the stimuli (positive and negative meaning), as opposed to the 
genuine affective reactions the stimuli elicit (pleasantness and unpleasantness), so the 
effects on responding that have been observed may be due to the connotations rather than 
the intrinsic pleasantness of the stimuli. To clarify what we mean by connotations, let us 
play a free association game and notice what are the first words that come to your mind 
when you read, for instance, dog …… weak …… white …… Or, what do cows drink? 
Whatever words or associations came to your mind are examples of connotation, which is 
related to cognitive concepts such as semantic memory association; paired-associate 
learning; implicit attitudes; semantic differentials and in this context, evaluative labelling. 
                                                 
b In the current context, congruent means faster to approach a pleasant stimulus than to withdraw from it.  
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We are drawing a critical distinction between connotations of a stimulus on the one hand 
and on the other hand, the intrinsic affective value of a stimulus. The affective property 
of a stimulus is its core affect- or emotion-eliciting capability, which is presumed to be 
the independent variable underlying the effects of affective responding described in the 
aforementioned studies. For example, when you read words like flowers, friend, 
happiness, or monster, guns and poison, do you feel genuine positive or negative 
emotion? At the same time, what connotations would you class or label the words to 
possess? In fact, it may not be easy to stop yourself from making such semantic 
connotative links. The distinction is that such words do not necessarily make you feel 
good or bad, but are at the same time associated with positive or negative meaning, in a 
non-experiential sense. Furthermore, at times connotations can actually trigger true 
affective reactions, so the two phenomena can influence each other, but the critical 
distinction is that connotations and affect are different things, and as such at other times 
they do dissociate. 
Even though existing studies have employed stimuli that possess strong 
connotations, a distinction between connotative and affective properties has not been 
made previously. Therefore, to investigate the potentially independent contributions of 
stimulus affective and connotative values on approach and withdrawal reactions, this 
study did not pre-select its stimuli based on their connotations. Instead we used a mixture 
of stimuli, which the participants rated for their intrinsic pleasantness and separately for 
the connotations the stimuli produced. Separating the two was particularly important, 
because the effects on responding observed in this field are attributed to the intrinsic 
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affective reactions the stimuli elicit rather than the connotations, while the effects could 
be mediated by connotations alone, if the two are dissected apart.  
Other than establishing whether responding was really influenced by the affective 
values of stimuli, a second aim of this study was to investigate affective and connotative 
effects in overweight individuals, who are trying to lose weight. Studying such a 
population in the current context was relevant, because genuine affective reactions to 
foods and automatic cognitive associations may both play an important role in 
determining their levels of consumption. Furthermore, this special sample possesses 
strong attitudes towards foods as well as strong health goals, which is why we chose food 
words as the primary stimulus type for this study. These in turn may have clinical 
implications. For instance, this study may reveal that overweight individuals have strong 
affective reactions to food that also drive food intake, indicating that a simple reaction 
time task may be of utility as a clinical marker of such hedonic eating. Alternatively, this 
study may reveal that reaction times are not influenced by the pleasantness of foods, 
while showing that food elicits strong cognitive associations in overweight individuals, 
which again could be indexed with a simple reaction time task. In addition, it would be 
informative to know how these automatic associations influence food intake, in 
particular, whether they help to reduce or do they increase the amounts eaten, in order to 
then target interventions accordingly. Of course, in order to know whether our results are 
characteristic to overweight individuals we later need to carry out similar comparative 
studies with healthy volunteers.  
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The current study employed a computerized version of an approach-avoidance 
task. Specifically, we employed the manikin version of the affective Simon task (De 
Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001; De Houwer & Eelen, 1998). In order to 
determine whether affective or connotative properties of stimuli influence approach and 
withdrawal responses, overweight participants were presented with different food words, 
one at a time in the middle of the screen, and a man-like stick-figure randomly on either 
the left or right side of the stimulus word. On each trial the participant was instructed to 
make the manikin either approach towards or withdraw away from the food word by way 
of left or right key presses. The required response type - approach or withdrawal - was 
determined by a feature irrelevant to the affective and connotative values of the stimulus: 
participants were required to approach if the target food word was written in lowercase 
letters and withdraw if the word was in UPPERCASE (with mappings reversed for half of 
the sessions). The original reason we chose to use the affective Simon task rather than the 
Implicit Association Test, for instance, was its face validity for studying emotion/affect 
rather than attitudes. As the name suggests, affective Simon task was designed to 
incorporate affective stimuli as the independent variable, while measuring these affective 
effects on response reaction times. Furthermore, we chose the task for pragmatic reasons 
as we had already programmed a version of the affective Simon task for another project 
we carried out. This study was incorporated under a larger study involving a weight-loss 
agent sibutramine and satiety manipulations. The prime reason for this was of pragmatic 
nature, in terms access to overweight individuals and through such collaboration a 
convenient opportunity to carry out our study in the first place. The drug and satiety 
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manipulations per se were primary manipulations for studies other than ours, which is 
why they were introduced.  
Unlike in previous studies, the stimuli used in this study were not pre-selected 
purely on the basis of their connotationsc. Instead, participants were asked to give 
connotative and affective ratings to all the food stimuli utilized in this study. The 
connotative scale asked the participants to rate how healthy they found the foods, and the 
affective scale asked the participants to rate how pleasant they found the foods. Such 
ratings allowed identification of stimuli that had: 1) positive connotations, but were 
affectively neutral e.g. oats, salad, carrots; 2) foods that had negative connotations but 
which at the same time were neither strongly liked nor disliked; 3) pleasant-affective 
stimuli without strong connotations; 4) unpleasant-affective stimuli without strong 
connotations. Furthermore, the groupings of stimuli were done individually for each 
participant, allowing creation of accurate categories according to personal likes and 
dislikes. The approach and withdrawal response reaction times were then analysed 
according to either the affective values of the stimuli (pleasant versus unpleasant) or 
according to the connotative values (positive versus negative). The key prediction was 
that pleasant approach would be faster than pleasant withdrawal, and pleasant approach 
would also be faster than unpleasant approach. Alternatively, positive-connotative 
approach rather than pleasant approach would be the fastest response, if the effects on 
                                                 
c As explained above, connotations are positive or negative meaning associations to words like peace, 
happiness, monster and prison, which enter the mind at a cognitive, non-emotional level.  
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responding are actually mediated by the connotative rather than the affective properties of 
the stimuli.   
Affect vs Connotation Experiment 
This study consisted of four tasks: the reaction time manikin task (aka the affective Simon 
task), the affective rating task, the connotative rating task and a popcorn task.  
 
Participants, Apparatus, Stimuli and Scales 
Sample. 28 overweight volunteers (6 female), mean age 34.3 years (SD = 7.2), 
were included in this experiment. Their mean Body Mass Index (BMI) was 27.3 kg/m2 
(SD = 1.6). The participants were also trying to lose weight. We chose to focus on such a 
sample in order to characterise their affective and cognitive reactions to food, because 
having such an understanding may become useful for devising better interventions for 
weightloss. Furthermore, the reaction time task employed in this study may serve as a 
clinical marker for differentiating certain types of overeating. This study was part of a 
large series of studies carried out in the UK over two two-week periods and the 
participants were recruited for the whole project rather than separately for the individual 
studies. The sample size was planned by the organisers of the larger study. It was 
sufficient to detect a large effect between response and stimulus types (see Figure 4). 
That is, a minimum of 20 participants, thanks to the large number of trials included in this 
design, would have been required for this design to be powerful enough to detect large 
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effects. Again, we were interested in large differences in reaction times rather than 
smaller ones, because of the correspondingly larger meaningfulness large effects carry, 
especially in the context of clinically relevant research. The latter is a matter of resource 
and time investment, and, of course, different sample sizes may become desirable in 
future studies depending on the outcomes of this study. Ethical approval and procedures 
for the study were also implemented by the organisers of the larger study, including the 
regulations pertaining to drug administration.  Recruits received no separate monetary 
compensation for participation in the affective Simon, ratings and popcorn tasks of this 
study.  
Experimental Setup. For the affective Simon (reaction time) and rating tasks, 
participants were tested individually in a test room in which they sat at a table facing a 
computer screen (laptop with a 1280x1024 resolution display). The software package 
providing the reaction time trials, as well as delivering all the instructions and rating 
scales to the computer screen, was custom-coded for this study in Visual Basic 2005 
(.NET 2.0). For the reaction time task, the “z” and “?” keys on the keyboard were marked 
using left and right arrow stickers. The affective Simon and rating tasks were repeated on 
four different session days, with new stimuli each session, with the aim that on half of 
these days participants would be under the influence of a weight-loss drug sibutramine. 
The sessions also differed from each other in that the participants were fasted on half of 
the sessions (no food that morning), whereas participants had been pre-fed for the other 
half of the sessions (breakfast). The order of these sessions was counter-balanced 
between-subject. Each participant also had a ‘break from experiments’ in a TV room on 
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their first session day, where comfortable seating was positioned near a pre-weighed 
bowl of popcorn. This and the availability of episodes of The Simpsons and Friends 
comprised the setup for the popcorn task. 
Stimuli and Scales. A total of 128 common food words were used in the affective 
Simon and rating tasks. The food words were, for example, carrot, chocolate, cucumber, 
lollipop, marmalade, omelette, onion rings, salad, sandwich, toffee and tofu. The whole 
word list was homogenized for number of letters, and contained commonly known foods, 
half of which belonged to high-calorific category and the other half to low-calorific 
category. A further 128 non-food words were presented to the participants, such as fax 
machine, needles and sunlight, inter-mixed with the food words. The non-food words 
were not included in the rating tasks, however, and were therefore not used in the 
analyses. Additionally, each word was shown twice, once in UPPERCASE and once in 
lowercase letters, which indicated to the participant whether approach or withdrawal was 
the correct response (see Procedure). The practice stimuli were always the same and 
were not re-used in test trials: four non-food words presented in both letter-cases. The 
order of the test stimuli was randomized by the software, separately for the reaction time 
task, the affective rating task and the connotative rating task.  
For the affective rating task, the stimuli were rated on the affective version of the 
9-point scale called Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985; Lang, 
1980). The computerized version of this affective SAM scale presented each word with 
the question “How pleasant is this food to you?”. The rating was chosen according to a 
series of horizontal icons that changed from a happy/smiling figure to an 
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unhappy/frowning figure, with semi-happy, neutral and semi-unhappy figures in-
between. Additionally, the horizontal left extreme was labelled “pleasant” (in green 
letters), the middle “neutral” (in black letters) and the horizontal right extreme 
“unpleasant” (in red letters). The most pleasant rating possible on the scale corresponded 
to the maximum value of 9, neutral to 5, and the most unpleasant rating to minimum 
value of 1; but no numbers were actually displayed on the scale. Ratings were provided 
on a continuous Visual Analogue type scale rather than a discrete integer-only Likert-type 
scale. The connotative ratings task used the connotative version of the SAM scale, which 
was different from the affective SAM scale with respect to the question presented and the 
extreme labels: the connotative SAM asked “How healthy is this food to you?”, and the 
leftmost and rightmost labels were “healthy” and “unhealthy”, respectively. The 
connotative SAM did not display any affective figures. The SAM scales rather than the 
LAM scale were used in this study, because they allowed both affective and connotative 
ratings to be measured.  
 
Procedure 
Procedures involving the experimenter were carried out according to a Standard 
Operating Procedure (SOP)d to maximize accurate and consistent execution of 
experimental protocol. 
                                                 
d SOP consists of detailed written instructions for the experimenter to follow when setting up and running 
the experimental tasks.  
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Affective Simon Task. The first screen introduced the reaction time task as follows 
“This game will feature a stick-man, which represents a person. In the following screen 
you are presented with different words in either lower or UPPER case and all you should 
do is make the stick-man approach the word if the word is in UPPER case, but make the 
stick-man move away from the word if the word is in lower case.” An interactive tutorial 
of the main trial type then led the participant through a sample trial (see Appendix B). The 
figure manikin, with a head as a circle; body, arms, legs as lines; and height of 222 
pixels, appeared randomly on either the mid-left or mid-right side of the screen. After 750 
ms the stimulus word appeared in the middle of the screen (farmer for the sample trial) 
and reaction time measurement started. The participants learned what to do through the 
following instructions “After a short pause, a word with a stick-man is displayed like this. 
As soon as you see the word your task is to move the stick-man by pressing either the 
marked ← or → key on the keyboard. Specifically, please make the stick-man move away 
from the word if the word is in lower case and move the stick-man towards the word if the 
word is in UPPER case.” As soon as the participant pressed down either the key marked 
“←” (“z”) or the key marked “→” (“?”) reaction time measurement stopped. As a 
consequence, the manikin either moved into the word (into the middle) or away from the 
word (out of the screen), depending on which key the participant pressed and which side 
of the word the manikin appeared in the first place. The movement of the manikin was 
animated as smooth horizontal sliding (by 4 pixels every millisecond). Next, eight 
practice trials allowed the participants to apply their understanding of the task in action. 
A notification appeared after the eight practice trials, informing the participant that test 
III. Effects of Affect on Motor Reactions 
 
 
61 
trials are about to begin. However, the first ‘test’ trial was actually a ninth practice trial, 
as the data from that trial were not used in analyses. 128 test trials followed. The inter-
trial interval (ITI) was 1500 ms. Numbers of incorrect responses were also registered, 
depending on whether the participants approached or withdrew from the word 
appropriately, as indicated by the word letter-case. The letter-case assignment was 
counter-balanced such that half of the sessions required approach to lower case and the 
other half required approach to UPPER case words.   
Rating Tasks. As shown in Appendix B, the first rating task was always the 
affective rating task and started with the following instruction “Now please rate the 
words according to how much you personally like these foods. Simply rate how much you 
would enjoy eating each food!” All the food words that had been presented in the 
previous reaction time task were then presented one by one, together with the affective 
SAM scale described above. The next task was the connotative rating task, which was 
introduced with “Now please rate the words according to how healthy you personally 
think they are for you.” Again, all the food words were presented in random order, but 
with the connotative SAM scale described above. 
Popcorn Task. Participants were individually given a ‘break’ from tasks, which 
they spent in a TV room watching either an episode of Friends or The Simpsons. 
Beforehand, a pre-weighed food bowl with popcorn had been placed near their seat as 
freely available snack food. Participants were allowed to relax and eat for ten minutes, if 
they so wished, and the food bowl was weighed again afterwards to determine the 
amount consumed. Unrelated to this study, the TV episodes also contained subconscious 
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stimulus presentations, but the subliminal stimuli were allocated randomly with respect to 
overall intake comparisons for the whole group, which was the data of interest for this 
study. Participants were debriefed afterwards according to the approved ethical protocol 
of the study. 
Data Analysis. All data points with reaction times below 150 ms and above 1500 
ms were excluded from analyses, except for calculation of percentage of incorrect 
responses. Beforehand, extreme raw outliers were also removed, separately from each 
participant’s set of reaction time scores per session, using Tukey’s fences box-plot 
method (Brant, 1990). Unpleasant-affective and pleasant-affective stimuli were 
determined separately for each participant, based on their affective SAM ratings 
(unpleasant < 5, pleasant > 5). The same cut-offs were applied for identifying negative-
connotative and positive-connotative stimuli for each participant, but on the basis of 
connotative SAM ratings (negative < 5, positive > 5). Three out of twenty eight 
participants that completed the experiment had to be excluded from all analyses, because 
these participants did not provide a sufficient range of affective and connotative ratings, 
which resulted in incomplete ANOVA cells. Percentage incorrect responses were 
calculated per condition as number of incorrect trials over number of total trials for the 
given condition. Data and statistical analyses were carried out using Microsoft Excel 
2007,SPSS 17 and 19, and R 2.11.1 packages, except for Cohen’s d effect size values, 
which were retrieved from http://www.uccs.edu/~faculty/lbecker/ 
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Results 
Firstly, we sought to determine the influences of the larger study context into which the 
affective Simon task was incorporated. For that purpose, we conducted an ANOVA with 
the following within-subject factors: pharmacon (sibutramine or placebo), fullness (fed or 
fasted), affect (pleasant or unpleasant), connotation (positive or negative) and response 
(approach or withdrawal). Fullness and affect did not influence reaction times, Fs < 1. 
We also added a between-subject factor of order, with the levels determined by whether 
sibutramine or placebo was administered first. Again, this did not influence reaction 
times, F < 1. Furthermore, only three significant effects were found in this global 
analysis. A) Under the influence of sibutramine, mean reaction times (RTs) were 
generally shorter than RTs in the placebo condition, 551.8 ms (SEM = 19.9) versus 597.3 
ms (SEM = 25.5), F(1, 24) = 10.59, p < .01. B) Participants were also generally faster to 
approach than to withdraw, 556.9 ms (SEM = 21.2) versus 592.8 ms (SEM = 22.4), F(1, 
24) = 9.12, p < .01. C) Finally, there was a three-way interaction of pharmacon X 
connotations X response, F(1, 24) = 5.80, p = 0.01, which we will explore further and 
contrast against lack of influence of affect. 
The nature of the interaction involving sibutramine or placebo was evaluated 
further by determining whether connotations interacted with responses under sibutramine 
alone. This was not the case, F(1, 24) = 1.65, p = 0.13. That is, under the influence of 
sibutramine, reaction times did not differ significantly from each other as a function of 
connotations and response, with 538.7 ms (SEM = 21.2) versus 540.2 ms (SEM = 20.5) 
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as positive-connotative and negative-connotative approach RTs, and 557.2 ms (SEM = 
19.4) versus 571.6 ms (SEM = 20.6) as positive-connotative and negative-connotative 
withdraw RTs. The overall three-way interaction arose from the placebo condition given 
congruency effects were not present under sibutramine (above), so next we assessed 
congruency under placebo alone. To assess whether connotative instead of affective 
properties of the stimuli influenced the speeds of approach and withdrawal responses 
under placebo, we compared the RTs for positive-connotative versus negative-
connotative approach and RTs for withdrawal from positive-connotative versus negative-
connotative words. For the following analyses the two independent categories were not 
affective but connotative in nature, based on healthiness ratings given to each food word 
in a separate rating task: negative stimuli (connotative SAM < 5) versus positive stimuli 
(connotative SAM > 5). As Figure 4 illustrates, mean approach RTs to positive-
connotative words were shorter than approach RTs to negative-connotative words 
(bottom line). In a compatible inverted manner, mean withdrawal RTs from positive-
connotative words were longer than withdraw RTs to negative-connotative words (top 
line in Figure 4). This response-dependent effect of stimulus connotations on RTs, as 
opposed to the aforementioned lack of affective effects, was confirmed as part of the 
four-way ANOVA with response (approach versus withdraw) and connotative rating 
(positive versus negative) as well as fullness (fasted versus fed) and affective rating 
(pleasant versus unpleasant) as within-subject factors: there was an interaction of 
response and connotative rating, F(1, 24) = 3.06, p = .05, together with the presence of a 
general approach tendency, F(1, 24) = 9.44, p < .01, and no evidence of non-specific 
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main effect of connotative rating, F(1, 24) < 1. In order to determine whether shorter 
reaction times (RTs) were associated with approach rather than withdrawal responses to 
pleasant-affective words, we compared the RTs for pleasant approach versus withdrawal 
and also RTs for unpleasant approach versus withdrawal responses under placebo. The 
two affective categories were based on pleasantness ratings given to each food word in a 
separate rating task and the assignments were determined individually for each 
participant and each stimulus: unpleasant stimuli (affective SAM < 5) versus pleasant 
stimuli (affective SAM > 5). Mean approach RTs to pleasant-affective words were shorter 
at 580.2 ms (SEM = 26.5) from withdraw RTs at 616.4 ms (SEM = 27.0). 
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Fig 4. Non-Affective Approach Speeding 
 
Influence of connotative ratings on approach and withdrawal reaction 
times. Connotations are cognitive associations that automatically enter 
your mind in terms of how good or bad something is, but without 
necessarily making you feel genuine emotion. Approaching positive-
connotative words took shorter time than approaching negative-
connotative words, even though these stimuli were affectively neutral. 
Correspondingly, withdrawing from positive-connotative words took 
longer time than withdrawing from negative-connotative words. 
These observations contrasted with lack of effects on responding when 
affective-pleasant versus affective-unpleasant stimuli were compared. 
 
However, mean approach RTs to unpleasant-affective words were also shorter from 
withdraw RTs to unpleasant-affective words, at 570.4 ms (SEM = 23.6) versus 623.6 ms 
(SEM 26.6), respectively. Furthermore, the means indicate that approach to pleasant-
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affective words took longer than approach to unpleasant-affective words. The 
aforementioned general fastness of approach as well as lack of consistent affective effects 
on RTs was confirmed by the same four-way ANOVA as above: there was the main 
effect of response, whilst there was no evidence of an effect of affective rating nor an 
interaction of response and affective rating, Fs < 1. 
As control analyses, we determined whether the connotative categories above had 
fortuitously become confounded by similarly changing affective ratings, by identifying 
whether the positive-connotative condition was associated with pleasant affective ratings, 
and whether the negative-connotative category was associated with unpleasant affective 
ratings. Affective ratings of positive-connotative stimuli with a mean of 4.7 (SEM = 0.1) 
were similar to affective ratings of negative-connotative stimuli which also had a mean of 
4.7 (SEM = 0.2). Lack of any affective differences between all the connotative conditions 
was confirmed by an ANOVA with positive-connotative approach, negative-connotative 
approach, positive-connotative withdrawal, negative-connotative withdrawal as the 
within-subject cells: there was no evidence of any affective differences, Fs < 1. 
Furthermore, these scores together did not differ from 5 on the affective SAM scale, 
which indicates affective neutrality: one sample t test, t(24) = 1.68, p = .10. The same 
question regarding cross-contamination, this time by connotative ratings to affective 
categories, was evaluated next i.e. given pleasant-affective and unpleasant-affective 
stimuli did not affect responding, then the pleasant stimuli should not have strongly 
positive connotative ratings and the unpleasant stimuli should not have strongly negative 
connotative ratings, because connotative ratings did influence responding. Again, there 
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was no evidence of mixing, with equivalent connotative ratings for the pleasant-affective 
and unpleasant-affective stimuli, with means of 5.6 (SEM = 0.1) and 5.4 (SEM = 0.1), 
respectively (Fs < 1). 
Next we determined whether number of errors made also differed in accord with 
the effects observed on reaction times. An error trial was registered if the participant 
approached (or withdrew from) the stimulus when the correct response was the opposite: 
withdrawal (or approach), as determined by the letter case of the target word (see 
Method). Mean percentage incorrect responses were very low overall, at 1.5% (SEM = 
0.1). Furthermore, an ANOVA of identical structure as the first global ANOVA with 
factors of pharmacon (sibutramine or placebo), fullness (fed or fasted), affect (pleasant or 
unpleasant), connotation (positive or negative) and response (approach or withdrawal), 
showed no evidence of any differences between the percentages of incorrect responses 
across conditions, with non-significant main effects and interactions, all Fs < 1. See 
Table 3 for the respective mean values.  
 
Table 3. Percentage Errors 
Condition with Levels First Level Mean 
(SEM) 
Second Level Mean 
(SEM) 
Pharmacon: Sibutramine vs Placebo 1.1 % (0.3) 1.9 % (0.5) 
Fullness: Fed vs Fasted 1.5 % (0.4) 1.6 % (0.4) 
Affect: Pleasant vs Unpleasant 1.8 % (0.3) 1.3 % (0.3) 
Connotation: Positive vs Negative 1.7 % (0.4) 1.4 % (0.2) 
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Response: Approach vs Withdrawal 1.4 % (0.3) 1.7 % (0.4) 
 
Finally, we assessed the question whether the connotative or affective ratings of 
the food words were able to predict consumption of actual food, in a separate popcorn 
task carried out in a natural setting on the same set of participants. The essence of the 
popcorn task was that a bowl of popcorn was weighed, unbeknownst to the participant, 
before and after a participant had a break from tasks in a TV room, where they watched 
Simpsons or Friends, and could help themselves to popcorn. Neither of the covariates 
predicted grams of popcorn eaten: mean affective ratings from each participant did not 
predict popcorn eaten [F(1, 24) = 1.59, p = .14] nor did mean connotative ratings (F < 1).  
This same ANCOVA also contained fixed factors of fullness and pharmacon and showed 
that fullness did not influence grams of popcorn eaten either, fasted participants ate 31.3 
g of popcorn (SEM = 3.8) versus fed participants eating 32.2 g (SEM = 4.6), F < 1. The 
only significant effect was that of pharmacon, F(1, 24) = 5.36, p = 0.02, such that 
participants ate less popcorn under the influence of sibutramine, 28.2 g (SEM = 4.0), than 
under placebo, 35.2 g (SEM = 4.6).  
 
Discussion 
This study demonstrated that pleasant-affective stimuli did not speed up approach 
reactions and nor did they slow down withdrawal reactions. By contrast, positive-
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connotative stimulie did speed up approach reactions, as well as slow down withdrawal 
reactions. However, the latter occurred only under the placebo condition, such that there 
were no congruence effects found under the influence of sibutramine.  
Firstly, we interpret the lack of interaction or flattening of the reaction times 
under sibutramine to be a result of a floor effect. Specifically, sibutramine produced a 
general speeding of all responses, which is likely to make the detection of further 
speeding more difficult, including e.g. the detection of further speeding of approach to 
positive-connotative words. Alternatively, sibutramine has been found to enhance 
attention and general performance (e.g. Wesnes, Garratt, Wickens, Gudgeon, & Oliver, 
2000), and this may underlie the general speeding effect as well as the lack of specific 
effects by over-riding any detriments to response times. Furthermore, as the effects of 
sibutramine were not the prime focus of the current study, we will now concentrate on the 
effects observed under the placebo condition. We do admit, however, that incorporating 
this study under a larger one may limit the interpretability of this study, because of the 
involvement of a plethora of manipulations and tasks from the larger study that were not 
primary for our design; yet these might have still influenced our results. That is, the 
possibility remains that if we had executed this study on its own then the results would 
not be confounded by factors from the larger study, and thus be different. Furthermore, 
part of the limitation is that it is difficult to know whether any such critical confounds 
exist or not.  
                                                 
e I.e. words that produced positive cognitive associations 
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We already know that affective stimuli do not directly modulate specific 
voluntary muscle contractions. Chen and Bargh (1999) provided evidence for the original 
proposition that humans have biologically hardwired affective predispositions. That is, 
according to this specific-muscle-activation hypothesis, pleasantness automatically 
influences muscular contractions such that faster arm flexion, as opposed to arm 
extension, is observed when pulling positive stimuli towards our body (for invested 
theoretical accounts see e.g. LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). Although such tendencies 
have evolutionary face validity and the idea presents as an attractive meme, newer 
evidence has challenged the claim (Lavender & Hommel, 2007; Markman & Brendl, 
2005; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). As an example, Markman and Brendl (2005) found that 
pulling a reward stimulus towards one’s body was associated with the opposite effect to 
what is predicted by the specific-muscle-activation hypothesis: the counter-evidence 
brought forward that pulling a positive stimulus towards the participant’s body was found 
to be slower than pushing it away. In fact, Markman and Brendl (2005) found that 
participants were faster to move the positive stimuli not towards their body, but instead 
towards their name, which was written on the computer screen. As a substitute to the 
specific-muscle-activation account then, distance-regulation hypothesis posits a more 
complex influence of pleasantness on motor responding, in that we are faster to cause 
movements that decrease the distance between a representation of ourselves and the 
affective stimulus. 
With regard to the first main question posed by this study, however, our findings 
suggest that motor responses are not modulated by affect. The sample size for this study 
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was large enough to detect large differences in responding, but not smaller ones, so the 
lack of affective congruency effects may be a false negative. Although it is noteworthy 
that we were able to demonstrate connotative differences - in contrast to the lack of 
affective differences, while using similar measures - we have no confidence to posit that 
smaller affective congruence effects did not exist. Given small affective congruence 
effects would also possess theoretical implications, the results of this study cannot be 
taken to fully support the distinction between connotative and affective effects. Future 
studies with more power are needed to test the weight of this alternative interpretation. 
We also acknowledge that we did not specifically control for the imageability and 
concreteness of the word stimuli and the lack of such matching may damage the signal-
to-noise ratio for our primary conditions of interest. Furthermore, these uncontrolled 
factors, or any others for that matter, may not only produce reliable effects on reaction 
times but also correlate with our independent variables, highlighting a limitation in the 
interpretation of our results; that is, the primary effects may have not arisen due to 
connotations, but due to co-correlating imageability of the stimuli, for instance. At first 
sight, this interpretation may seem to conflict with a number of previous studies that have 
reported the influence of affect/emotion in the affective Simon task. However, if it has 
been the connotative properties rather than the affective properties of stimuli that have 
produced those effects, then this seemingly conflicting evidence would turn into 
converging evidence. Studies investigating affective effects on motor responding seem to 
have indeed pre-selected their stimulus sets based on the connotations rather than the 
genuine affective potencies of the stimuli. 1) De Houwer and Eelen (1998) used words 
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like monster, gangster, liar and flowers, peace, love, based on a word list from Hermans 
and De Houwer (1994); 2) Based on the same word list, De Houwer and colleagues 
(2001) used words like enemy and friend. In fact, the scale used to test and choose the 
source words used labels from "negative" to "positive", rather than scoring with 
“unpleasant” to “pleasant” or similar; 3) Zhang and Proctor (2008) used visual icons that 
had clear stereotypical meanings e.g. a picture of the skull that labels poisonous bottles; 
4) Eder and Rothermund (2008) pooled aggressive, annoying, bad, loyal, nice, sunny etc 
from Schwibbe and colleagues (1981). Again, what differentiates these words most 
clearly are their negative and positive connotations, respectively, rather than being 
differentiated by the genuine unpleasant and pleasant affective reactions the words elicit; 
5) The study by Krieglmeyer and Deutsch (2009) utilized stimuli like kiss, crime, prison, 
baby, slave, kitten and butterfly, from Hager and Hasselhorn (1994) and Klauer and 
Musch (1999). Again, it is not difficult to guess which of these words had negative and 
which had positive connotations, in fact, such associations tend to be automatic; 6) 
Krieglmeyer and colleagues (2010) also found effects on responding with words like 
violent, arrogant, cooperative, tolerant and so on, based on Wentura and colleagues 
(2000). Therefore, if connotative value is a substitute for affective value as the 
independent variable underlying the effects seen in these tasks, then the body of evidence 
supporting the idea that highly affective stimuli speed up approach responses, is critically 
weakened.  
On the basis of the observations above, we predict that connotations are necessary 
for the effects on responding to arise and furthermore that it does not matter how these 
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connotations are evoked, as long as these associations do arise. In simple cases, the 
stimuli have acquired strong connotations themselves, such that the associations are 
evoked automatically without any additional conditions needing to be satisfied. However, 
genuinely affective stimuli that do not possess strong default connotations would still 
produce such cognitive associations, but only if participants are asked to directly 
categorize and respond on the basis of the affective values of the stimuli. In other words, 
these connotations would arise only if the affective value is the relevant feature that needs 
to be cognitively processed in order to make the correct response (Lavender & Hommel, 
2007; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003; Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). If the 
connotative properties of the stimuli are strong enough, however, then they might still 
influence performance, even if the responding criterion is an irrelevant feature, such as 
letter-case. The necessity for cognitive labelling of stimuli extends the evaluative coding 
account of responding effects (Eder & Rothermund, 2008), which found that cognitive 
labelling of the approach and withdrawal responses was also required for the responding 
effects to occur.     
The meaning of our findings becomes clearer with the realization that affective 
ratings given to food words reflect the motivational values of the stimuli, not how much 
actual pleasure is elicited when reading those words. For example, when you walk around 
a supermarket and see all the different food options, you might really want some of the 
items, and not want other items so much. This does not mean that you actually enjoy the 
foods right there in the food-store, most of the pleasure is experienced later while eating 
the foods. Similarly, food words are predominantly motivational triggers predicting likely 
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future pleasures that will be elicited later on when tasting the actual foods. That is, 
affective self-report is sensitive to not just the pleasure from stimuli (hedonic reactions or 
actual liking), but the ratings can also be indicative of the desire for stimuli (incentive 
motivation or wanting; Booth, 2009; Finlayson, King, & Blundell, 2007b). Affective 
ratings are a non-selective composite of hedonic value and incentive motivational value, 
and food words, which are signals of pleasurable events (conditioned representations of 
unconditioned stimuli), possess primarily incentive motivational rather than hedonic 
value (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). With the realization that affective ratings reflect 
motivational value of food stimuli rather than the pleasure the words elicit, the 
interpretation of the current findings with respect to the first key question of this study 
needs to be revised. I.e. we can assert that motivationally potent stimuli do not affect 
responding, but we cannot assert the same about the effects of online hedonic reactions 
any more. In fact, to answer whether current pleasure affects responding requires an 
experimental design whereby pleasure is induced at the time of making the approach or 
withdrawal response, and not after. Most affective stimuli used, however, do not cause 
pleasure at the point that access is gained to them, the pleasure is caused after approach 
or withdrawal in the consummatory phase. Perhaps using pleasant odours, or inducing a 
positive mood would serve to investigate modulation of responding by online pleasure 
reactions. As a qualification on the main null result with affective ratings then, given that 
the affective ratings to food words reflect motivational potency rather than current 
pleasure, it is possible that effects on approach and withdrawal reaction times may still be 
observed when current pleasure is present at the time of making such responses.    
III. Effects of Affect on Motor Reactions 
 
 
76 
Another recognition that clarifies the scope of the current study is that the type of 
design employed does not allow statements to be made with regard to the effects of affect 
on slower voluntary actions. That is, such designs allow investigating facilitation of fast 
post-trigger movement selection or movement execution, but not planning, choosing and 
execution of intentional movements, which appear to be a different kind than reactive 
movements. The following excerpt illustrates the distinction: “Nobel laureate Niels Bohr 
considered why, during a gunfight, the man who drew first was the one to get shot. He 
suggested that the intentional act of drawing and shooting is slower to execute than the 
reactive action in response (Cline, 1987), an idea grounded in the everyday trade-off 
between stimulus-driven behaviour and intentional, planned actions. This distinction 
between different classes of action is not merely semantic …” (Welchman, Stanley, 
Schomers, Miall, & Bulthoff, 2010, p. 1) 
The second key aspect of this study was that our sample consisted of overweight 
individuals who were attempting to lose weight. In that regard, our participants may have 
possessed special or particularly strong food associations. In fact, it is possible that the 
connotative effects on responding are an indication of such health goals and food 
attitudes that only this select population possesses, and which would not be present in 
healthy volunteers. Therefore we can only present hypotheses, but not generalise these 
effects to non-overweight samples. Furthermore, the participants were highly aware that 
the study was focussing on their weight, which makes demand effects more likely to 
occur. Although such reaction times are fast and relatively hard to control, a limitation of 
the current design is that such appetitive responses may have been confounded.  
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What is the predictive validity of the effects we found? Firstly, it is good to 
witness that the anti-obesity drug sibutramine did indeed reduce the amount of popcorn 
eaten. However, neither mean affective ratings nor mean connotative ratings predicted 
actual food intake in the popcorn task. Perhaps individuals struggling with weight are 
characterized by strong health awareness as it relates to food, but at the same time, when 
it comes to actual consumption the predominant factors that controls intake are not the 
cognitive health goals. The situation may be similar to trying to teach a child that candy 
is bad: you may be able to make the child automatically associate ‘bad’ with 
encountering sweets, but that connotation would be cognitive and perhaps relatively 
ineffective in terms of influencing intake. In fact, we think that this kind of learning of 
cognitive connotations has already been demonstrated experimentally in the manikin task 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2001). It is, of course, possible that if instead of using mean 
ratings for all foods as predictors, we had ratings for popcorn specifically, then 
relationships between connotations and intake, as well as between affect and intake might 
have surfaced. This is speculation, however, and leaves the role of health associations 
open, while such cognitive goals seem to be characteristic markers in themselves, are 
they at the same time ineffective in terms of guiding food intake in overweight 
individuals, or do they perhaps have other important influences on behaviour not 
specified here? We regard the functional parsing of connotative consequences versus 
consequences of affect an important avenue to explore.     
In summary, this study found that highly affective or motivational stimuli do not 
potentiate approach responses and do not suppress withdrawal responses. Furthermore, 
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these findings highlight that the affective Simon task may actually be a non-affective 
task, even though we and others have mistakenly treated it as providing important 
information about affective processing. Instead, the task appears to be sensitive to the 
connotative properties of stimuli, which may possibly be used to study these types of 
strong cognitive associations in special populations, such as in individuals attempting to 
lose weight. Perhaps the affective Simon task should be renamed to the connotative 
Simon task?   
 
This chapter established that affective stimuli do not modulate fast approach and 
withdrawal reactions, but since affective ratings of food words are more prone to reflect 
motivational properties of these stimuli, then we did not answer the question whether the 
genuine hedonic reactions or pleasure from stimuli modulates such responding. The 
latter question will need to be answered with further research. 
On the basis of the confounding of connotative and affective properties with 
symbolic food-related stimuli (i.e. words), we decided to use real foods in the following 
investigations of the effects of food pleasure. The two upcoming chapters assess the role 
of the affective properties of real foods as mediated by the two main types of event 
relationships: stimulus-outcome and action-outcome relationships. The next chapter will 
study the first type of relationship, which is a facet of pleasure sometimes called 
development of liking. Namely, we will examine what happens to neutral stimuli that co-
occur with pleasurable stimuli, or to be more precise, what happens to neutral stimuli that 
co-occur with the pleasure stemming from the hedonic stimuli. 
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IV. Learning of New Likes 
 
Food intake is influenced by the hedonic evaluation of both the to-be-eaten food and 
food-associated stimuli. In other words, people do not only eat the food they like, but are 
also biased by affective cues related to the foods. The affective potency of such cues is 
largely learned through experience and one form of experiential learning comprises 
evaluative conditioning. Evaluative conditioning is the process of learning to like (or 
dislike) objects and features of the environment as a result of their association with 
attractive (or aversive) events. For instance, when potential homebuyers visit a property 
in California, some agents apparently bake bread in the house before the client arrives, 
thereby filling the rooms with highly pleasant scents from the oven, in the hope that the 
liking will transfer to the property itself. Such examples of evaluative conditioning 
depend on successful pairing of two stimuli – the initially neutral conditioned stimulus 
(CS), the property, and a hedonic unconditioned stimulus (US), the smell of baking 
bread. Although such evaluative conditioning resembles standard Pavlovian conditioning 
procedurally, a number of authors (e.g. Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995; Martin & Levey, 
1978) have argued that different learning processes mediated these forms of conditioning. 
The purpose of the present studies was to investigate whether evaluative conditioning is 
sensitive to one of the major determinants of Pavlovian conditioning, blocking.  
Flavour liking can be acquired in many ways. Firstly, through flavour-flavour 
learning (FFL; e.g. Yeomans, Leitch, Gould, & Mobini, 2008), whereby initially neutral 
flavours become liked as a result of pairing with already pleasant flavours (or disliked 
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when paired with unpleasant flavours). Secondly, through flavour-nutrient or flavour-
consequence learning (FCL; e.g. Gibson & Brunstrom, 2007), which produces changes in 
liking as a result of pairing novel flavours with ingestive consequences, which may be 
positive or negative. In a subtype of FCL of conditioned taste aversion learning (CTA; 
Garcia & Koelling, 1966), the consequences are negative (e.g. nausea) and the flavours 
become disliked, but FCL also produces learning through pairing with positive 
consequences, such as the satisfaction derived from reduction of nutrient deficiency or 
from relief of caffeine deprivation (e.g. Yeomans, Gould, Leitch, & Mobini, 2009). 
‘Cognitive learning’ due to disgust elicited from mental imagery may be a separate 
learning model involved in flavour liking (e.g. Eertmans, Baeyens, & Van den Bergh, 
2001). Thirdly, flavour liking can be acquired through mere exposure effects (e.g. Pliner, 
1982), whereby liking for a flavour is increased simply as a function of exposure to the 
flavour i.e. the more you experience a flavour, the more you start to like it.  
Evaluative conditioning or evaluative learning fits into the liking acquisition 
processes as a general form of FFL. In other words, FFL is a specific form of evaluative 
conditioning involving flavours rather than pictures of beaches or other stimulus types. 
Increases in liking have been observed with sweet-paired flavours (e.g. Brunstrom & 
Fletcher, 2008), as well as with a multitude of other positive stimulus types (see De 
Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Similarly, pairing with bitter or soapy tastes has 
been shown to decrease flavour liking (e.g. Yeomans, Mobini, & Chambers, 2007). 
Evaluative conditioning does not always produce changes in liking, however, and the 
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investigation of boundary conditions for liking to change is an active research area (see 
e.g. Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Yeomans, 2010). 
A cardinal feature of Pavlovian conditioning is that only surprising or unexpected 
USs support learning, which is most succinctly illustrated by the blocking effect (Kamin, 
1969). Blocking is observed when the amount learned about a cue is attenuated or 
blocked by the presence of another cue that has been pretrained as a predictor of the same 
outcome. This cue competition effect can be illustrated by imagining drinking a novel 
and  refreshingly palatable soft drink, Mezzo (US), which has a distinctive logo on the 
bottle (target CS), which itself has a shape that is similar to that of an established, 
attractive soft drink (pretrained CS), for example Pepsi. If blocking were to take place, 
then the presence of the Pepsi-shaped bottle would predict the positive affective reaction 
to the drink US and therefore block the acquisition of liking (evaluative conditioning) to 
the novel Mezzo logo. 
Although blocking has been demonstrated in a number of human conditioning 
paradigms, such as electrodermal (Hinchy, Lovibond, & Terhorst, 1995), and eyeblink 
conditioning (Martin & Levey, 1991), the evidence for blocking in appetitive evaluative 
conditioning is mixed. When Dickinson and Brown (2007) pretrained the colour of a 
drink as a predictor of whether it would taste sweet or soapy, the amount of evaluative 
conditioning to a flavour added to the drink was unaffected by whether its taste was 
predicted by its colour. In other words, prior colour-taste learning failed to block flavour-
taste learning. By contrast, in a procedure in which visual icon CSs were paired with fruit 
juice USs, Tobler, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz (2006) reported blocking of the 
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conditioning of a positive evaluation of the icons. Although there are many procedural 
differences between these two studies, one of the most notable concerns the modality of 
the CSs and USs. Tobler and colleagues (2006) used an across-modality procedure, in 
which the CSs were visual and the USs were gustatory, whereas Dickinson and Brown 
(2007) used a flavour-flavour, within-modality procedure. Given this difference, the 
purpose of the present study was to re-examine whether blocking occurs in across-
modality evaluative conditioning of the type envisaged by the hypothetical competition 
between the shape and logo of soft drink bottle.  
Therefore, similarly to Tobler and colleagues (2006), we employed visual CSs 
and gustatory USs. However, as our procedure differed from that employed by Tobler 
and colleagues in a number of respects, Experiment 1 established that this procedure 
supported evaluative conditioning to the visual CSs before Experiment 2 investigated 
whether this form of conditioning was subject to blocking. 
 
Exp 1. Evaluative Conditioning 
A problem with employing gustatory USs is that participants vary greatly in their liking 
for such stimuli. In an attempt to minimize such variation, we developed a novel 
procedure in which the participants selected their own highly-palatable hedonic foods to 
act as USs. At the time of recruitment, the participants were asked to identify their most 
liked foods in a number of categories and the two that were most liked were chosen to act 
as the hedonic USs. During conditioning, the opportunity to consume each of these 
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hedonic foods were then signalled by a different CS, which were visual logos (H), before 
the participants were finally asked to rate their liking for the CSs. 
The second change concerned the control CS against which evaluative 
conditioning is assessed. Tobler and colleagues (2006) compared the ratings for a CS 
paired with a hedonic US to one paired with no US. However, this control confounds the 
hedonic value of the outcome associated with each CS with whether or not the CS is 
associated with any US. To minimize this confound, we assessed evaluative conditioning 
by contrasting the change in the liking for the H logos from the initial, preconditioning 
ratings with those for another pair of neutral CSs (N logos) that signalled neutral USs 
during conditioning. Evaluative conditioning would have occurred if the positive change 
in liking was greater for the H logos than for the N logos. 
The use of the neutral CS control also allowed us to address a further concern. In 
addition to assessing evaluative conditioning, we also measured contingency learning by 
asking the participants to predict on each trial which specific food was associated with 
each logo CS. The importance of assessing contingency learning lies with the 
interpretation of any difference in the post-conditioning evaluative ratings for the H and 
N logos. An interpretation of such a difference in terms of evaluative conditioning 
attributes the effect to the hedonic valence of the US rather than to a difference in the 
ability of the particular USs to engage learning processes per se. An assessment of 
contingency learning therefore allowed us to assess the extent to which any evaluative 
conditioning was mediated by the impact of the US valence on general learning. 
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Finally, Tobler and colleagues (2006) also reported an implicit, reaction time 
(RT) measure of conditioning by asking their participants register by spatially 
differentiated responses the location of the CS during training and found faster 
responding to CSs associated with a hedonic US. As this implicit measure goes someway 
to validating the explicit evaluative ratings, we also included a spatial RT measure during 
the assessment of evaluative status of the CSs. 
 
Participants, Stimuli and Apparatus 
Adult volunteers, mainly undergraduates (females: 3; males: 7), were recruited from the 
Cambridge area and were asked to have a light morning or afternoon meal and then to 
fast for at least 4 h before the experimental session. This was essentially a pilot study, so 
the sample size was chosen to be small. Participants were tested individually in an 
experimental room in which they sat at a table facing a computer screen (PC with a 
1280x1024 display; Figure 5). The program controlling the experiment was written in 
VB.NET 2008. The volunteers were paid for their participation at the end of the session. 
Ethical approval for this study was attained from the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Cambridge (see Appendix E). Information about the study 
was provided to the participants through the recruitment website (see Appendix F), and 
through the consent form when the participant arrived, as well as the study tutorials 
themselves (Appendix C). A written consent form was given to each participant to read 
and to sign at the start of the session (see Appendix G). In addition, the participant was 
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asked if they have any questions, or if anything is unclear before the experiment 
commenced. All data was recorded anonymously using anonymous participant IDs, and 
the volunteers were free to stop the experiment at any time without having to give a 
reason. Although participants chose their own favourite foods, any participant who 
reported a food allergy was excluded from taking part in the study. At the end of the 
session, an interview was conducted with each participant, in which they were debriefed 
about the experimental hypotheses, and asked to give feedback about the study, with 
emphasis on any discomfort the study might have caused (see Appendix H). None of the 
participants reported discomfort, but reported rather enjoying their favourite foods.   
Abstract Brand Logos (CSs). Four abstract pictures selected from a set 
constructed by (Kuwayama, 1973) served as CSs. This source contains a collection of 
commercial brand logos that are likely to be unfamiliar to the general population and that 
are utilised in marketing research (Henderson & Cote, 1998). The original black and 
white images of different shape categories were digitally coloured for this experiment to 
enhance the discriminability of individual images. The CSs were 400 by 400 pixels in 
size and presented in either the top left- or right-hand side of the screen. The assignment 
of the pictures to the roles of the H and N logos were counterbalanced across participants.  
Food Unconditioned Stimuli (USs). The hedonic USs were established using a 
web-based questionnaire during initial recruitment of participants (see 
http://tinyurl.com/fabfood). The participants specified six of their most favourite foods 
from different food categories and then ranked the list, allowing us to pick the two most 
liked foods to act as hedonic USs. Examples of the hedonic USs are Belgian chocolates, 
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strawberries or different cheeses. The neutral USs, oats and miniwheats, were picked 
from a pilot study as dry and bland foods that the participants generally rated as 
moderately disliked. The unit sizes are visible in Figure 5, as well as the total amount 
consumed. Relative nutritional values and energy densities were not controlled, but 
determined by the nature of the favourite foods chosen by the participants. As illustrated 
in Figure 5, the two hedonic USs and the neutral USs were placed on the table with the 
computer on each side of the participant. The positions of the individual USs with respect 
to each other were rotated across participants.  
 
Fig 5. Food Placements 
 
 
Both the hedonic and neutral foods were placed on each side of the 
computer that presented the brand logo CSs. The arrows were 
used as US indicators to point to the participants, which 
food they need to self-administer with a given brand logo. 
The arrows also represented the four different foods on the surfaces 
when the participant had to predict, which food a given brand CS was 
followed by – to measure contingency knowledge. 
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Procedure 
Participants were asked to sit behind the computer and to follow the instructions on the 
screen. Before each stage instructions appeared describing to the participant step by step 
what they should do, which was always followed by 2 practice trials. 
Initial Evaluation Test. To provide baseline evaluative ratings, initially the four 
CSs and four USs were rated on the Labelled Affective Magnitude (LAM) scale (Schutz 
& Cardello, 2001), which is claimed to have ratio properties (Cardello & Schutz, 2004). 
The scale presented the following (negative) positive scale points: (-)80-60: (dis)like 
extremely; (-)60-40: (dis)like very much; (-)40-20: (dis)like moderately; (-)20-0: (dis)like 
slightly; 0: neither like nor dislike. Each CS was presented individually once on either the 
left or right side of the screen together with the LAM scale and the participants were 
required to rate this stimulus by moving a cursor along the scale using the mouse. To 
encourage immediate evaluations, the participants had no more than 7 s to make each 
rating. An additional spatial reaction time (RT) measure was also taken during CS 
evaluations. This measure was the RT to press the marked G and H keys on the keyboard 
to register whether CS appeared on the left or right side of the screen, respectively. These 
keys were chosen to make the spatial position of the CS and the response compatible. In 
each CS evaluation test, the trial started with the RT measure and was then followed by 
the LAM measure. The USs were also rated on the LAM scale while the participants 
actually tasted the food but without the RT component.  
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Evaluative Conditioning. After the initial evaluations, each participant received 
six trials with each of the four CSs presented in a random order that varied across 
participants. In the initial instructions the participants were told to self-administer a given 
food whenever one of the US indicators (arrows) appeared on the screen. One H logo 
consistently signalled consumption of one of the hedonic USs, and the other H logo the 
consumption of the other hedonic US. Similarly, each of the N logos signalled 
consumption of one of the two neutral USs. In order to assess contingency learning, each 
conditioning trial started with the presentation of one of the CSs and a centrally placed 
panel displaying four arrows indicating the locations of the four USs and an instruction to 
predict which of the four foods was signalled by the logo CS. The participants then 
decided which US indicator arrow to click to indicate which food they thought they 
would be eating next and were instructed to hold down the mouse button longer if they 
were more confident about their prediction.  Having predicted the location of the food 
paired with the CS, the correct US arrow flashed on the screen indicating to the 
participant which of the four USs to consume. During the 16-s period while the particular 
US was being eaten, the CS flickered randomly every 1-4 s, and the participants had been 
instructed to count the total number of CS flickers. Then, immediately after this 
consumption period, they reported the number of flashes by highlighting the appropriate 
number with a click of the mouse in a list of numbers from 0-9. The purpose of this task 
was to ensure that the participants attended to the CS during consumption of the US. The 
trial then terminated with a request to take a sip of water from a glass on the table in 
order to neutralize the taste of the food before the next trial started. The next trial was 
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started by the participant by clicking a button, which was preceded by a 1-s inter-trial 
interval (ITI).  
Final Evaluation Test. The experiment concluded with a repetition of the 
procedure used in the baseline evaluation phase. Note that our design enabled the use of 
change in evaluations between initial and post-conditioning scores rather than post-
conditioning scores on their own, which de-confounds the currently uninteresting visual 
aesthetic evaluation from that of conditioning related evaluation i.e. not confusing how 
‘pretty’ a visual attribute of an image is with food pairing related changes in evaluation.  
 
Exp 1. Results and Discussion 
The evaluative ratings for the USs shown in Figure 6 (Panel B) confirm that the 
individual selection of the USs on the basis of the questionnaire responses did in fact 
yield hedonic USs with a higher evaluative ratings than those for the neutral USs, 
acquired at the start of the session, t(1, 9) = 12.4, p < .01. More importantly, Figure 6 
(Panel A), which displays the difference between the initial and final evaluation ratings 
for the CSs, illustrates that the hedonic USs supported more evaluative conditioning to 
their associated CSs than did the neutral USs.   The H logos showed a positive increase 
from an initial mean rating of 7, whereas the N logos, if anything, decreased from an 
initial mean rating of -4. The reliability of this differential evaluative conditioning was 
confirmed by a significant interaction between the effects of the evaluation test (initial vs. 
final) and CS type (H logo vs. N logo), F(1, 9) = 5.54, p = .04. 
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Fig 6. Evaluative Conditioning 
 
 
The top panel shows the main evaluative conditioning result, comparing 
the evaluations of H brand logos (paired with hedonic food) with 
evaluations of N brand logos (paired with neutral food). 
The bottom panel shows that the participants liked the hedonic food USs 
more than the neutral USs. The error bars represent double Standard 
Error of the Difference (SED), for the depicted comparisons. 
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We also assessed Tobler and colleagues (2006) observation that evaluative 
conditioning was accompanied by implicit learning as assessed by the RT to register the 
side on which the CS was presented. This RT increased by 130 ms for the H logos, but 
decreased by only 5ms for the N logos, an effect that is substantiated by a significant Test 
X CS Type interaction, F(1, 9) = 6.02, p = .04.  
The percentage of trials on which the participants predicted the correct food was 
pooled across two-trial blocks for analysis and presentation in Figure 7 of contingency 
learning. The percentage of correct predictions of the next food increased with training, 
F(2, 18) = 5.37, p = .01, illustrating that contingency learning occurred with our 
paradigm. Although the graphic data suggests that less learning may have occurred to the 
N logo CSs than to the H logo CSs, we doubt whether a general learning deficit with the 
neutral USs contributed to the differential evaluative conditioning. Neither the effect of 
CS type nor the interaction with trial block approached significance, both Fs < 1. 
 
Exp 1. Discussion 
We replicated the evaluative conditioning with visual CSs and food USs observed by  
Tobler and colleagues (see also Johnsrude, Owen, Zhao, & White, 1999; 2006).  It is not 
clear why Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, & Crombez (1990) failed to find such cross-
modal evaluative conditioning, although it may be significant that they used uniformly 
coloured CSs, whereas the successful procedures, including the present one, used more 
complex visual CSs. 
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Fig 7. Non-Evaluative Predictive Learning 
 
The figure shows how the participants learnt to predict which food US 
was paired with a given brand CS, in Experiment 1. With more 
conditioning pairings of the brands with the foods, the percentage 
correct predictions increased significantly for the brand logos. 
Participants provided more accurate predictions for brands that were 
paired with hedonic food (H) compared to predictions for brands paired 
with non-hedonic food (N), although the difference was not significant. 
* indicates p < .05 
 
In summary, this experiment established that our procedure employing self-
selected food USs established cross-modal evaluative conditioning, both in terms of the 
explicit hedonic ratings and the more implicit spatial RT measure. Moreover, this 
differential evaluative conditioning was observed in the presence of significant 
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contingency learning for both CS types. Therefore, we employed this procedure to 
investigate whether blocking occurs in this form of evaluative conditioning in the next 
experiment.  
 
Exp 2. Blocking 
Table 4 illustrates the design of the second experiment and Appendix C provides 
screenshots of the interactive tutorial guiding the participant through the procedure. After 
the initial hedonic evaluations of the CSs and USs, the pretraining stage was identical to 
the training given in Experiment 1. The H logos were established as predictors of hedonic 
USs, whereas the N logos signalled neutral USs. This basic training regime continued 
into the compound training phase, except for two changes. First, a second novel logo was 
also presented on each trial with the B logos being presented in compound with the H 
logos and the C logos in compound with the N logos. Second, these cue compounds 
consistently signalled a hedonic US. Finally, the hedonic evaluations of the cues were 
reassessed. 
  
IV. Learning of New Likes 
 
 
94 
Table 4. Design of Blocking Experiment 
Condition Initial Evaluations 
Pre-Training 
(Conditioning) 
Compound 
Training 
(Conditioning) 
Final 
Evaluations 
 
Blocking 
H H→USH 
BH→USH 
H 
B  B 
 
Control 
N N→USN 
CN→USH 
N 
C  C 
 
Neutral 
X 
 XY→USN 
X 
Y Y 
 
Cues H, B, N, C, X, Y: brand logo CSs; 
USH: hedonic food US; USN: neutral food US 
 
The critical evaluations for assessing blocking are those of the B and C logos. The 
B logos were trained in compound with the H logos, which had been previously 
associated with a hedonic US. Consequently, if blocking occurs in this form of evaluative 
conditioning, relatively little conditioning should have accrued to the B logos during 
compound training because the occurrence of the hedonic USs on these trials would have 
been predicted by the presence of the pretrained H logos. By contrast, the C logos were 
trained in compound with CSs, the N logos, that had been previously associated with 
neutral USs so that the occurrence of the hedonic US on the compound trials in this 
control condition should have been unpredicted and surprising, and therefore capable of 
IV. Learning of New Likes 
 
 
95 
supporting evaluative conditioning to the C logos.  In summary, the critical contrast for 
assessing blocking is that between the final evaluative ratings for the B and C logos -
relative to their initial ratings – and blocking would have occurred if the ratings for the B 
logos were lower than those for the C logos. 
Although the interpretation of a blocking effect with this design is 
straightforward, the theoretical significance of a failure to observe blocking is more 
problematic. Therefore, we included two further elaborations on the basic design to 
strengthen interpretation of similar evaluative ratings for the B and C logos. First, 
blocking can only be observed if the compound training stage actually supports some 
evaluative conditioning to be blocked. Therefore, a compound of two further sets of 
logos, X and Y, were paired with the neutral USs (see Table 4). A comparison between 
the relative final evaluations of the C logos with those for the X/Y logos established 
whether or not the compound training supported evaluative conditioning to the C logos as 
well as showing that the measurement technique is sensitive enough to discriminate 
between the conditions.   
The second modification was to include a test of contingency knowledge 
following the assessment of the final evaluative ratings. A failure to observe evaluative 
blocking could only be of theoretical significance if our design supported the basic 
conditions for blocking to occur. As it is well established that contingency learning is 
subject to blocking (e.g. Aitken, Larkin, & Dickinson, 2000; G. B. Chapman & Robbins, 
1990; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984), a demonstration that less had been learned 
about the contingency between the B logo and the hedonic US than about the C logo-
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hedonic US relationship during compound training would establish that our procedure 
was capable of supporting blocking. 
 
Participants, Stimuli and Apparatus 
Adult human volunteers (females: 8; males: 8) were recruited as in Experiment 1 and 
tested under the same conditions with the same apparatus. The sample size for this 
experiment was chosen to be slightly above that of Experiment 1 given that the first 
experiment produced significant results with a small number of recruits. However, this 
was not sufficient to yield a powerful design with respect to the measurement of 
blocking: in order to be able to detect a small effect, the sample size should have been 
approximately 200; about 35 participants would have been needed to detect a medium 
effect (d = 0.5). The sample size was sufficient to detect large effects (d = 0.8; 
approximately 15 participants needed). Nevertheless, we were as interested in small and 
medium effects, as large effects, because of the theoretical implications of any effect size, 
so this study was under-powered. We employed the same type of brand logo CSs, but 
included an additional four pairs of logos to play the roles of the B, C, X and Y logos. 
The assignment of actual brand logos to the different CS conditions was counterbalanced 
between participants, such that any given physical brand logo for one participant was 
trained under a different contingency for another participant. Again, the hedonic USs 
were selected for each participant using the web-based questionnaire as in Experiment 1 
and the neutral USs were the same as before.  
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Procedure 
Initial Evaluation Test. The procedure for assessing the baseline evaluative 
ratings for the CSs and USs using the LAM scale, was the same as in Experiment 1 
except that the additional CSs were also rated.  
Pretraining. The procedure during the pretraining was identical to that employed 
during the evaluative conditioning of Experiment 1. In summary, each H and N logo 
predicted a hedonic and neutral US, respectively, for 6 trials. 
Compound Training. The pretraining procedure was continued into the compound 
training stage with three changes. First, each trial presented two CSs, one in the top left 
hand corner of the screen and the other in the top right hand corner. The H logos were 
presented in compound with the B logos and the C logos in compound with the N logos. 
The identity of the individual logos comprising each BH and CN compound remained 
consistent across trials, although spatial location of the CSs within the compound was 
varied randomly across trials. Second, both the BH and CN compounds signalled the 
consumption of a hedonic US with identity of the US paired with a logo compound 
remaining consistent across trials. Moreover, the specific hedonic US paired with a 
particular BH compound was the same as the hedonic US that was paired with that H 
logo during pretraining. Finally, trials were also included in which a compound of the X 
and Y logos signalled consumption of a neutral US. Seven presentations of each 
compound were given in a random order that varied across participants. In all other 
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respects, the procedure was identical to that employed during evaluative conditioning in 
Experiment 1.    
Final Evaluation and Contingency Knowledge Test. The experiment concluded 
with a repetition of the procedure used in the initial evaluation test, followed by a 
contingency knowledge test. The participants were asked to report their contingency 
knowledge for B and C as well as X and Y. Contingency knowledge was measured the 
same way as during the conditioning stages except that no feedback and no self-
administrated US followed. 
The final measure of contingency knowledge utilised two components. First, 
whether the participants correctly identified the hedonic food US as the food US paired 
with the brands, yielding a score of 1 if the participant correctly predicted B or C to be 
paired with hedonic food and -1 if the participant incorrectly predicted B or C to be 
paired with neutral food. For the brands X and Y, which were paired with neutral food, 
the opposite assignment was made, 1 if the participant correctly predicted X or Y to be 
paired with neutral food and -1 if the participant incorrectly predicted X or Y to be paired 
with hedonic food. Even though our analyses sought to determine whether the 
participants had knowledge with regard to the valence of the food (pleasant or not) rather 
than knowledge about the specific food identity (e.g. strawberries), the participants were 
nevertheless asked to predict the specific foods (and thereafter the valence prediction was 
extracted from their specific predictions, for analyses). 
The second component of the contingency knowledge measure was the 
confidence rating determined by how long the participant held the mouse button to 
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indicate how sure he or she was about the correctness of the prediction. As individual 
baselines of confidence rating varied between participants and the participants used the 
range of the scale to varying degrees, the raw confidence scores were converted into z 
scores, where the mean and standard deviation were calculated based on all non-practice 
confidence ratings for each individual. In computing the individual z-scores the values 
for B, C, X and Y CSs for any given participant were always assessed against the same 
mean and standard deviation. The final measure of contingency knowledge was then 
calculated by multiplying the correctness of prediction (1 or -1) by the confidence z 
score. Consequently, when a participant correctly predicted the valence of the US and 
was confident about the prediction being correct then the contingency knowledge index 
was high and positive. Conversely, when a participant incorrectly predicted the incorrect 
food valence, but was not confident about the prediction, the index would have had a low 
and negative score.  
 
Exp 2. Results 
Acquisition of Predictive Response. The profile of contingency learning during 
pretraining was similar to that observed in Experiment 1 in that the participants rapidly 
learned to predict which US to consume. The growth in percentage correct predictions for 
the H stimuli with increasing blocks of trials was from 83.3 % (SEM = 4.6) to 90.6 % 
(SEM = 4.4) to 98.4 % (SEM = 1.5). The growth for N stimuli was from 45.8 % (SEM = 
5.5) to 85.9 % (SEM = 4.5) to 95.3 % (SEM = 3.3). As in Experiment 1, predictive 
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elemental learning was confirmed by main effect of block in RM-ANOVA with block 
and stimulus-type as within-subject factors, F(2, 30) = 31.63, p < .01. However, there 
was also an effect of stimulus-type, as well as an interaction of the factors, F(1, 15) = 
36.2, p < .01 and F(2, 30) = 10.74, p < .01, respectively. The latter effects stemmed from 
the low percentage correct score in the first block of N trials / or from the high percentage 
correct score in the first block of H trials, even though participants were mostly guessing 
what the outcome was in that first block. The reason for this difference is likely to be that 
participants had an initial bias to pick their favourite foods when guessing the outcome / 
before they had any information to base their predictions on. Figure 8 illustrates the 
acquisition of the prediction response across compound training. The prediction response 
to the BH compound was maintained across compound training in the blocking condition. 
By contrast, in the control condition, with the change in US the participants initially made 
the wrong predictions before rapidly learning the new correct predictive response. 
Concurrently, they also rapidly learned the correct prediction in the neutral condition. 
There was a significant Condition X Trial interaction for the percentage correct 
prediction responses during compound training, F(4, 60) = 6.81, p = .01, and  simple 
main effect analysis showed that performance in the blocking and neutral conditions was 
superior to that in control condition in blocks 1-2, F(1, 15) = 56.53, p < .01.  
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Fig 8. Compound Predictive Learning 
 
This figure exhibits how the participants continued to predict, which 
food US was paired with the given brand CS compounds, in compound 
training of Experiment 2. Initially the predictions were poor for the 
control CN brand compound as they were now unexpectedly paired with 
hedonic food compared to the blocking BH brand compound, which 
continued to be rated as predictors of hedonic food. See Table 4 for 
the compound (and elemental) training conditions used in this blocking 
paradigm. 
 
 
Cue Competition 
Evaluative Ratings. The top panel of Figure 9 displays the mean differences 
between the initial and final evaluative ratings for the CSs introduced during compound 
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training. There was no evidence for evaluative blocking in that the ratings for the B logos 
were similar to those for the control CSs, the C logos. However, the fact that the ratings 
for these CSs were higher than those for the CSs trained with the neutral US, logos X/Y, 
established that compound training supported evaluative conditioning. An analysis of the 
evaluative ratings yielded a reliable interaction between the evaluation test (initial versus 
final) and the type of CS, F(1, 15) = 5.05, p=.04. The source of this interaction was 
determined by a set of orthogonal contrasts between the difference between the initial and 
final ratings for each CSs type. There was no significant difference between these 
evaluative change scores for logos B and C, F < 1, although the combined evaluative 
score for these CSs were significantly higher than for logos X/Y, F(1, 15) = 7.01, p = .02.  
Contingency Knowledge. The bottom panel of Figure 9 shows the contingency 
knowledge scores. In contrast to the evaluative scores, blocking was observed for 
contingency knowledge  in that the B logos obtained lower scores than the C logos, F(1, 
15) = 6.16, p = .02. Unexpectedly, however, the participants showed little knowledge 
about the contingency between the X/Y logos and the neutral USs in that the contingency 
knowledge for these CS, were significantly lower than those for the C F(1, 15) = 4.54, p 
= .05.  
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Fig 9. Lack of Evaluative Blocking  
 
 
No competition between brands for liking (a), in contrast to blocking 
in predictive learning (b). The top graph shows the evaluative blocking 
comparison, where the B to-be-blocked brand logo CSs were, however, not 
liked significantly differently from the C control CSs. The bottom 
graph shows the equivalent results for non-evaluative predictive 
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learning, the results differing from first graph in that the 
participants were significantly less knowledgeable about which foods 
the B to-be-blocked pictures were paired with, as compared to the 
higher knowledge of what food the C control pictures were paired with. 
ns indicates non-significance above threshold alpha 0.05. X/Y brand 
scores are provided for control comparisons (see text). 
 
Discussion 
In summary, we found that the visual CSs, which were paired with hedonic food, were 
evaluated higher than the logos paired with neutral food USs, thereby replicating the 
cross-modal evaluative conditioning observed in the first experiment. More importantly, 
however, we found no evidence for blocking of evaluative conditioning.  The strength of 
evaluative conditioning accruing to a CS as a result of compound training with a hedonic 
US was unaffected by whether or not the other element of the compound had been 
pretrained with a hedonic or neutral US.  
Our failure to find blocking was not due to the absence of evaluative conditioning 
during compound training because the visual CSs paired with the hedonic US were more 
liked than those paired with neutral CSs at the end of this training. Nor was the absence 
of evaluative blocking due to the failure of our paradigm to support blocking because the 
participants failed to learn as much about the predictive relationship between a CS and 
the particular US, if the other element of the compound had been pretrained as a signal 
for this US. In other words, our procedure supported blocking of predictive or 
contingency learning. This being said, it must be acknowledged that the failure to find 
evaluative blocking is a null result, and it is always possible that a more sensitive 
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measure of liking would have detected a difference in evaluative conditioning as a 
function of the pretraining of the other element of the compound. Furthermore, our study 
is more under-powered than that of Tobler and colleagues (2006). That is, retrospective 
power analysis showed we had power of .46 to detect a medium effect, making lack of 
power a considerable alternative interpretation to the lack of evaluative blocking. In other 
words we may ascertain with sufficient confidence that evaluative conditioning does not 
exhibit strong blocking (with a difference of more than 0.8 standard deviations), but the 
same cannot be said about medium or small effect sizes. This alternative interpretation 
needs to be tested in future studies with increased sample sizes, achieving power of at 
least .8 for medium effects, and perhaps even endeavouring to detect smaller effects. It 
remains noteworthy, however, that we did observe parallel blocking of predictive 
learning.  
Our results stand in contrast to those of Tobler and colleagues (2006) who 
reported blocking of “pleasantness” ratings for a visual CS paired with fruit juice. 
Although there are many differences between the procedure that they employed and our 
paradigm, one of potential importance concerns the control condition against which the 
blocking was assessed. In Tobler and colleagues (2006) the pretrained element of the 
control compound was presented alone without any outcome during the pretraining, and 
consequently it is possible that their participants stopped attending to this CS during the 
pretraining, a decrement that then transferred to compound training. As a result, the 
control pretrained CS would not have competed with the added CS for visual attention, 
thereby enhancing conditioning to the added CS. By contrast, the pretrained CS in the 
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blocking condition, having been paired with the US, would have competed with the 
added CS for attentional resources and so blocked conditioning to this CS. In summary, it 
is possible that the blocking observed by Tobler and colleagues (2006) reflected 
attentional competition between pretrained and added CSs. 
It is unlikely that such attentional competition would have exerted a differential 
effect in our procedure. First, during pretraining the control pretrained CS (N – see Table 
4) was paired with a neutral US which the participants had to learn to predict, a task 
requirement that should have maintained visual attention to this CS. It could be argued, 
however, that such a neutral CS may not provide an adequate control for the role of 
attentional processes. Although the participants clearly learned about the relationship 
between neutral CSs and the neutral USs during conditioning (see Figures 3 and 4), they 
showed little evidence of contingency knowledge about X and Y in the final test. We 
suspect, however, that a failure to learn about the relationship between neutral CSs and 
USs is not the reason why the contingency knowledge acquired during XY compound 
training did not transfer to the final test in which X and Y were assessed alone. It is well 
established that human participants often fail to show cue-competition effects, such as 
blocking, because they tend to adopt a configural strategy when processing compound 
stimuli, such as  the XY compound, so that little learning accrues to the elements of the 
compound (e.g. Williams, Sagness, & Mcphee, 1994). The pretraining to the H and N 
logos in the blocking and control conditions (see Table 4) may well have prevented  such 
configural processing of the BH and CN compound logos, respectively, thereby enabling 
cue competition to function. 
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In summary, we doubt whether attentional competition differentiated our control 
and blocking conditions. Consequently, the absence of evaluative blocking in our 
procedure suggests that this form of conditioning, in contrast to contingency learning, is 
not modulated by whether or not the US is surprising or unexpected when attentional 
competition is minimised. This conclusion accords with Dickinson and Brown (2007) 
finding that evaluative conditioning was not affected by whether or not the US was 
predicted or unexpected using a colour/flavour-flavour paradigm in which there was no 
within-modality attentional competition.  
What is also clear from the present results is that the blocking of contingency 
learning does not necessarily depend upon attentional competition, because we observed 
reliable blocking of this form of learning in spite of maintaining attention to the 
pretraining CS in both the blocking and control conditions. Dickinson and colleagues 
(1984) suggested that such learning depends upon whether or not the occurrence of the 
US generates a prediction error, which in turn governs learning either directly (Rescorla 
& Wagner, 1972) or indirectly (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). Alternatively, 
others have argued that blocking of contingency learning reflects the operation of causal 
inference processes (e.g. De Houwer, 2009).  
Whatever the merits of these various accounts, blocking joins other effects that 
have been claimed to differentiate evaluative conditioning from predictive learning 
manifest in standard forms of Pavlovian conditioning. For example, it has been claimed 
that evaluative conditioning is abnormally resistant to both extinction (Vansteenwegen, 
Francken, Vervliet, De Clercq, & Eelen, 2006) and conditional control by occasion 
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setters (Baeyens, Crombez, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996; Baeyens, Hendrickx, Crombez, 
& Hermans, 1998).  These dissociations have led Baeyens & De Houwer (1995) to 
endorse Martin & Levey’s (1994) original claim that evaluative conditioning is mediated 
by a form of referential or holistic learning that is distinct from the process underlying 
standard Pavlovian conditioning and other forms of contingency learning. The 
differential impact of the blocking procedure on these two forms of learning observed in 
the present experiment reinforces this claim. Another interesting way of looking at 
evaluative conditioning is to regard it as a form of second-order conditioning. Second-
order conditioning refers to the pairing of two CSs, where one of these CSs has been 
previously paired with a US. For example, associating a bell with a light, while the light 
has been previously associated with food reward. In evaluative conditioning, this 
interpretation is supported by the notion that the food USs themselves are really CSs, 
which have already undergone learning. That is, food stimuli may need to be involved in 
learning processes that associate the food CS with the accompanying reward USs. 
Referring to food stimuli as USs is then a short-hand for referring to this learnt 
association of food CSs with the reward elements as USs. Therefore, we are really pairing 
food CSs with the brand logo CSs, as a form of second-order conditioning.   
Human food consumption may be shaped by a lack of evaluative blocking. In 
particular, consumption may be enhanced for foods that are associated with liked brands, 
but brands that do not actually cause positive affect, which nevertheless are liked as if 
they were the causes of liking. This implication will now be explained step-by-step. 
Consider a situation in which you (1) drink a pleasant soft drink, and at the same time 
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notice both (2) a novel Mezzo brand logo, and (3) an already liked Pepsi visual CS. 
Before learning then, the Pepsi stimulus is already associated with a positive affective 
state due to past learning, but the Mezzo stimulus is not yet able to trigger a liking 
reaction. In accordance with our key finding, when the pairing of the pleasant drink and 
the two visual stimuli occurs, the already-liked Pepsi brand does not block the learning of 
liking for the Mezzo logo. The Mezzo logo becomes liked without competition from 
Pepsi. At this stage two effects have arisen. Firstly, Mezzo became liked despite Pepsi 
already predicting positive affective state, which occurred despite the redundancy of 
Mezzo as an affective stimulus. In other words, the lack of evaluative blocking implies a 
lack of competition from Pepsi, and enables contiguity-based learning instead of 
contingency-based learning; this is in line with the referential account of evaluative 
conditioning (see Baeyens & De Houwer, 1995). The second key effect was that Mezzo 
produced superstitious liking. As indeed Mezzo is not the actual cause of positive affect, 
attribution of causality to this stimulus represents misattribution. Therefore, as a 
consequence of Pepsi not having decreased the liking for Mezzo, Mezzo will be preferred 
to another neutral brand and the Mezzo drink consumed more (other things being equal), 
even though it is not the actual cause of positive affect. 
However, evaluative learning does not necessarily give brands the ability to 
induce a genuine pleasurable reaction per se: instead evaluative learning associates 
brands with an abstracted or cognitive representation of positive affect. As Russell 
(2003a) explained “A stimulus can be perceived as to have affective quality with no 
change in core affect … as when a depressed patient admits that the sunset is indeed 
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beautiful but is still not able to alter a persistently depressed mood” (p. 149). In our 
example, seeing the Mezzo logo on its own after evaluative learning, need not make you 
feel pleasure as such, instead you could value the brand more highly for having felt good 
in its presence. This model does not propose, however, that the process of learning 
evaluative likes is deliberative or highly explicit and rule-based in its nature. In fact, 
development of likes is posited to be automatic in the sense that you ‘cannot easily help it 
happening’. For example, when pleasantly intoxicated with wine you tend to attribute 
liking to any stimuli you encounter, or similarly, when you are having a ‘bad day’, you 
are inclined to automatically dislike the most salient stimuli co-present with your 
negative mood. Therefore, the concluding assertion is that the lack of evaluative blocking 
may lead to automatic liking, in a non-pleasurable evaluative sense, of brands and other 
targets as if the stimuli were the causes of positive affect, even when such causality is not 
present. 
 
This chapter found that pleasure has the capacity to attribute value of some kind to 
stimuli that co-occur with the hedonic reactions. I shall discuss the nature of that value in 
the concluding chapter; just point out now that the nature of that value seems to not be a 
propagation of pleasure reactions themselves from the hedonic stimuli to the initially 
neutral stimuli. Next I shall explore what perhaps are the most important consequences of 
pleasure, which are its effects on our choices and on our motivation.  
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V. Hedonic Consumption and Motivation 
 
Have you ever found yourself reaching for chocolate just before passing the till or 
perhaps even going out for the sole purpose of buying chocolate? You will likely have 
seen people linger around the doughnut/bakery section in the supermarket; or you will 
have snacked on grapes (rather than Brussels sprouts) before dinner was ready. Have you 
been unable to stop eating before a packet of crisps you like was empty? Perhaps you can 
find room for dessert even though you are full; or find yourself regularly going to the 
fridge looking for tasty snacks. Hedonic consumption, whereby the more pleasurable the 
food the more it is chosen and consumed, is a well-established phenomenon. For 
instance, Nisbett (1968) used a basic taste manipulation by either adding or not adding 
bitter tastant quinine to ice cream, and found that more grams of the ‘good’ ice cream 
were eaten than the ‘bad’ ice cream. Bellisle and colleagues (1984) found that highly-
palatable sandwich snacks were consumed in a larger amount and for a longer duration 
than the less-palatable sandwich snacks. They also observed a higher eating rate for the 
high preference meal, including faster chewing per food unit in the first quarter of the 
meal, measured with strain gauges on a headset. Spiegel and colleagues (1989) also used 
preferred and non-preferred foods in the form of solid food units (SFUs) - custom-made 
sandwiches with different fillings - and similarly found that the more palatable test SFUs 
were consumed in larger amount, for a longer time. Additionally, more SFUs (of standard 
bite-size) were eaten per minute, in the beginning of the eating session. Bobroff and 
Kissileff (1986) used a different approach, whereby yoghurt was either adulterated or not 
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adulterated with a flavouring cumin, making it less palatable, while not changing the 
macro-nutrient content of the yoghurts. Again, they found that the more palatable / 
unadulterated yoghurt was eaten in larger quantity, for a greater length in time and at a 
faster initial rate, measured using a hidden weighing scale under the drinks. The initial 
eating rate was calculated as the linear coefficient (slope) in a quadratic model of the 
cumulative intake curve (see more at Kissileff & Guss, 2001). There are many more 
reports of hedonic consumption, for example de Graaf and colleagues (2005) and 
Yeomans and colleagues (1997); for reviews of this literature see Sorensen and 
colleagues (2003) and Yeomans (1998), for instance. 
This literature showcases hedonic consumption, the profiling of which we were targeting. 
Demonstrating this effect is an important part of the relation of these studies to our work. 
In terms of the designs and methods used, our work both shares some similarities and has 
some distinct differences compared to the studies carried out in the past. For instance, 
unlike many of these studies (e.g. Bobroff & Kissileff, 1986; Nisbett, 1968), we also 
targeted hedonic motivation in addition to hedonic consumption (motivation was perhaps 
indexed by chewing rate in Bellisle et al., 1984). Similar to e.g. Spiegel and colleagues 
(1989), and de Graaf and colleagues (2005), we compromised controlling for 
macronutrient composition and energy density in favour of incorporating a number of 
different foods with different hedonic qualities. We also employed actual food 
consumption rather than anticipated consumption, or replacing food with pictures of food 
(as did Yeomans et al., 1997 and many others). In contrast to e.g. Bobroff and Kissileff 
(1986), we aimed to profile these phenomena without the help of unpleasant foods (they 
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used adulteration producing more unpalatable food rather than more palatable food); 
further pros and cons of our approach are highlighted later. 
The impact of food pleasure on intake can become pathological, and so it would 
be clinically highly relevant to find specific ways to control the impact of this pleasure on 
intake (e.g. Halford, Boyland, Blundell, Kirkham, & Harrold, 2010; Nathan & Bullmore, 
2009). In a substantial proportion of cases, food pleasure, through its impact on intake, is 
a primary factor that leads to over-consumption and obesity (e.g. Blundell & Finlayson, 
2004; Erlanson-Albertsson, 2005; Schultes, Ernst, Wilms, Thurnheer, & Hallschmid, 
2010). Although the mechanisms of over-consumption are not entirely clear, effects that 
occur near the end of meals are important. However, meal termination effects need not be 
the only critical mechanisms. In addition to the ‘dessert stomach’ or ‘pudding tummy’ 
phenomenon (Lowe & Butryn, 2007), food palatability influences how much is eaten in 
the midst of a meal (in the maintenance phase; Yeomans et al., 1997). Hedonic aspects 
also predict whether consumption is initiated in the first place, and how frequently, as 
well as which foods are preferred (Berteus-Forslund, Torgerson, Sjostrom, & Lindroos, 
2005; Drewnowski & Hann, 1999; Rosas-Nexticapa, Angulo, & O'Mahony, 2005). Given 
that food pleasure is a considerable determinant of overeating, interventions against 
hedonically driven over-consumption would seem sensible. Intervening against hedonic 
over-consumption requires measurement of hedonic consumption, which in turn obviates 
the need for a relevant methodology.  
Yet, we are not aware of any procedures specifically designed to model the 
impact of pleasure on food intake. Existing paradigms, such as various ad libitum intake 
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or preload test-meal designs serve multiple useful purposes, while focusing primarily on 
factors influencing inhibition and termination of eating. The picture task developed by 
Finlayson and colleagues (2007a) involves rating pictures of foods, but does not measure 
actual consumption of food. Alternatively, the Universal Eating Monitor (UEM; 
Kissileff, Klingsberg, & Van Itallie, 1980) comes close as a tool for current purposes. 
The UEM consists of a highly accurate and precise weighing scale that is normally 
hidden under the food to be eaten: as the food is eaten, readings from the scale are 
monitored programmatically such that continuous information is available as to the 
amount of food eaten, as well as the eating rate. This covers the dependent variable of 
consumption. Pleasure and motivation are indexed using Visual Analogues Scales for 
pleasantness and appetite, respectively, presented to the participant on a computer screen 
at regular intervals during the eating session. However, the main issues in using this 
general-purpose instrument for profiling hedonic consumption and motivation 
specifically, are: 1) that the UEM allows incorporation of a relatively narrow sample or 
range of the independent variable to be assessed i.e. relatively few foods of different 
hedonic values can be given to any participant, often studying only two different levels of 
palatability, which is far from ideal for gauging into hedonic consumption. 2) If no cover 
story is built into the setup, task demand is more likely to alter the ingestive behaviour 
under study – even though the weighing scale is concealed, it is rather obvious to the 
participant that the main foci of the studies with UEM are about how much food is eaten, 
because that is all the participants are doing, sitting in a room with a food plate in front of 
them and filling in questionnaires. Ideally, there would be a plausible cover story that 
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draws the participant’s attention away from hedonic consumption. 3) UEM uses self-
report scales to assess both palatability and appetite, which may produce cross-
contamination of the measures (e.g. Booth, 2009; but see also Yeomans, 2000); given the 
serious potential for confusion when measuring both liking and wanting together, it 
would be very useful to index these phenomena through more independent means. 
Therefore, a laboratory procedure that specifically targets the profiling of hedonic 
consumption and motivation per se, is missing. The current study aimed to fill that 
important niche by providing a much wider set of hedonic experiences as the independent 
variable (by incorporating more foods); by providing a plausible cover story of taking 
part in a physiology experiment where the main focus is on the effect of food on the 
‘micro-sweating’ in the fingers of the participant; and by measuring motivation with a 
non-self-report technique. Our procedure aimed to incorporate the measurement of 
motivation by modelling the ‘drive’ effects of incentive, as exemplified by starting to 
walk faster to a food-store when motivated to attain food, compared to walking more 
slowly if you were not as motivated to attain the food. Operationally, the implicit 
measurement of force exerted was an appropriate technique: participants had to press a 
hand-grip in order to get food without knowing that any forces were being measured. 
In order to design an optimal procedure for assessment of hedonic consumption 
and motivation, three additional features were incorporated. Firstly, a laboratory tool 
should possess high ecological validity, in terms of employing familiar foods and actual 
eating. Otherwise, there is a real danger of studying arbitrary effects that actually have 
little relevance to the behaviour claimed to be under study. To reduce this risk, the 
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current study incorporated primary rewards themselves rather than their symbolic 
representations, such as pictures of foods. Pictures of food, and food itself, might produce 
equivalent effects in participants, at least in every important respect. But, that 
equivalence needs to be explicitly established in order to equate effects obtained with 
pictures to effects obtained with foods. A strong explicit link has not yet been established 
between choosing from pictures of foods as a valid model of choosing from actual foods. 
In order to avoid the high impact risk of this link being weak, we opted for the use of 
common foods. Secondly, most existing paradigms involve negative feedback satiety 
signals. Such signals confound clear measurement of the impact of food palatability on 
intake. Thus, minimal fullness is the second feature incorporated in our dedicated hedonic 
assessment technique. As a final key feature, we incorporated automated rather than 
manual delivery of foods. Such a feature made the procedure convenient to use. This is 
particularly important given that the utilization of real foods made it somewhat less 
convenient and inconvenience beyond a certain threshold can become a critical handicap 
for the adoption of a procedure (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2009, pp. 308-309). Automated 
delivery also minimizes observer or experimenter biases (Hetherington, Anderson, 
Norton, & Newson, 2006). 
In summary, there is a critical need for a procedure specifically designed to assess 
the impact of pleasure on food motivation and intake. In order to achieve this aim, such a 
procedure would preferably possess high ecological validity, as well as not be 
confounded by satiation factors and provide automated delivery of the foods used. The 
V. Hedonic Consumption and Motivation 
 
 
117 
current study proposes a procedure meeting all these criteria. We have named this 
procedure the Jaffa Cake task.  
 In addition to developing a novel procedure for testing hedonic consumption and 
motivation, another, separate core aim for this study was to provide an analogue of a 
dose-response curve between pleasure and intake. While other investigations, e.g. 
Bobroff and Kissileff (1986) and Yeomans and colleagues (1997), have quantified the 
relationship between food palatability and consumption, we aimed to elucidate that 
function in more detail by assessing the relationship across a large selection of different 
foods for each participant. This study provided data from more than 15 different foods 
from each participant, compared to the use of 2 different foods per participant in most 
previous studies. Therefore, based on a comprehensive within-subject dataset, the second 
independent aim of this study was to derive equations that best describe hedonic 
consumption by quantifying this relationship (Zandstra, de Graaf, van Trijp, & van 
Staveren, 1999), beyond simply establishing the presence of an identifiable effect. 
Furthermore, by taking advantage of a technique called linear mixed modelling, the study 
aimed to incorporate individual differences parameters into the function. Establishing 
such a formula enables accurate and useful predictions, such as how many marshmallows 
Bob would consume based on how pleasant he found marshmallows to be.  
The aim of Experiment 1 was to validate the laboratory procedure, the Jaffa Cake 
task, which models the impact of food pleasure on food intake, in order that this tool 
could be used to assess interventions that would give control over this impact. The aim of 
Experiment 2 was to establish the impact of pleasure on motivation in the Jaffa Cake 
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task. Finally, data from both Experiment 1 and 2 was used to quantify the impact of food 
pleasure on food intake, resulting in best-fit equations of hedonic consumption.  
 
Exp 1. Hedonic Consumption 
Participants self-administered a series of different food snacks with the option of deciding 
when to change the snack, while giving hedonic ratings of each snack. The main outcome 
measures in Experiment 1 were hedonic liking ratings of the snacks and the 
corresponding amounts of snacks consumed.  
 
Participants, Apparatus and Stimuli 
Sample. 27 student volunteers (17 female) were included in this experiment 
through university-wide e-mail recruitment. The students received an invitation linking to 
a web-based recruitment questionnaire at http://tinyurl.com/JaffaCakeStudy that served 
as a common introduction to the study. Any candidates acquainted with the first author, 
or reporting psychology as their main specialty, were excluded from taking part of the 
study to minimize familiarity with study aims and to minimize highly analytical task 
performance. Participants were also required to be native speakers or fluent in English, 
and have no food allergies. For the participants that were selected, absence of food 
allergies was confirmed verbally at the start of the study. In addition, a silenced mobile 
phone was given to the participant with a direct line to the experimenter / first-aider 
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seconds away, in the unlikely event that an emergency would have arisen. The sample 
size was chosen based on rule-of-thumb for psychology experiments. The actual sample 
size was below the detection threshold for large effects of hedonics, as approximately 40 
participants would have been needed to achieve that (f 2 = 0.35). We were not interested 
in smaller effects, because the aim of the Jaffa Cake task was to isolate and profile the 
effects of hedonics, and a task that produces small effects would lack in these 
characteristics. Recruits were provided free food and received 7 GBP (approx. 12 USD) 
for participation in a 75-minute session.  
Experimental Setup. As Figure 10 illustrates, participants were tested individually 
in a test room in which they sat at a table facing a computer screen (PC with a 1280x1024 
resolution display). In addition, a dispenser containing all the snacks for the session was 
positioned to the left of the participant. This dispenser was built using standard Lego 
bricks and conveyor belts, Lego Mindstorms motors and sensors, and was controlled 
wirelessly over Bluetooth connection in order to allow user-initiated automated delivery 
of snacks. Unlike in Figure 10, however, the dispenser was concealed in a cardboard 
enclosure throughout the experimental sessions with only the food plate visible in front of 
the participant. A force hand-grip was also placed to the right of the participant (see 
Figure 10). This BIOPAC hand dynamometer (model TSD121C) had to be squeezed to 
trigger delivery of snacks by the dispenser. Before all experimental sessions, the hand-
grip was calibrated using standards with fixed mass. The output units of these devices are 
set by the manufacturer to be in kg force rather than Newtons. Additionally, a filled non-
drip water-bottle was placed in front of the participant. Finally, skin conductance sensors 
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were used in this experiment. This GSR (Galvanic Skin Response) sensing system 
consisted of EL250 reusable electrodes, GSR100C amplifier and MP150 psycho-
physiological data acquisition system (all BIOPAC equipment). The software package 
controlling the Lego and Biopac device communications as well as delivering 
instructions and rating scales to the computer screen, was custom-coded for this 
experiment in Visual Basic 2008 (.NET 3.5), and utilizing IONET.dll and NXT# 
libraries. 
 
Fig 10. Jaffa Cake Task 
 
Participants squeezed the hand-grip (1a) to deliver snacks one by one 
(1b). The pleasantness of each snack was rated on the LAM scale while 
eating the snack (2). After each snack the participants had a choice to 
deliver more of the snack they had just eaten or alternatively to move 
on to snack on a different food (4). Unlike the depiction in the image, 
during experimental sessions the food apparatus was covered, so the 
upcoming snacks were not visible to the participants.  
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Food Stimuli. 17 separate foods were selected from a pilot study. The pilot 
established which foods did not evoke aversive disgust evaluations while instead eliciting 
a range of hedonic ratings on tasting. The foods used were Tesco Whole Food Apricots, 
Oatland Mini Jaffa Cakes, Co-Operative Malt Crunchies, McVitie’s Mini Cheddars, 
Tesco Whole Food Cranberries, Fiddes Payne Pearl Swirls, Schneider German Rye 
Bread, Nestle Milkybar White Chocolate Buttons, Arnott’s Barbecue Shapes, Nutberry’s 
Yoghurt Coated Raisins, Jacob’s Cheeselets, WeightWatchers Cheese Puffs, Tesco Whole 
Food Black Cherries, Tesco Butter Pastry Cases, Tesco Chocolate Flavour Cornflake 
Cakes, Weetabix Crisp Minis and Fazer Tutti Frutti Original. See Table 5 for details of 
the energies and macronutrient compositions of the stimuli used in the study (data given 
per 100 grams of each food).  The practice food was always the same (the apricots) and 
was not re-used in test trials. The order of all the other foods was randomized by the 
software and pre-loaded onto the dispenser according to the random sequence given. 
Each food was available as 6 individual snacks, as visible in Figure 10. The individual 
snacks were cut to approximately uniform sizes, weighing about 2 grams each.  
 
Table 5. Food Energies and Macronutrients Per 100g 
Stimulus Energy 
/kJ (/kcal) 
Protein /g Carbohydrate /g 
(Sugars /g) 
Fat /g 
(Saturates /g) 
Fibre /g 
Tesco Whole 
Food Apricots 
705 
(165) 
3.9 36.0 (36.0) 0.6 (0.4) 6.3 
Oatland Mini 
Jaffa Cakes 
1623 
(385) 
4.2 72.2 (52.4) 8.8 (4.8) 2.2 
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Co-Operative 
Malt Crunchies 
1461 
(344) 
11.7 69.3 (0.7) 2.2 (0.5) 11.8 
McVitie's Mini 
Cheddars 
2160 
(516) 
11.2 51.2 (4.8) 30.0 (12.0) 2.4 
Tesco Whole 
Food Cranberries 
1380 
(325) 
0.4 79.0 (78.4) 0.8 (0.2) 4.7 
Fiddes Payne 
Pearl Swirls 
1210 
(289) 
0.0 77 (77) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 
Schneider Rye 
Bread 
788 
(186) 
5.8 37.7 (0.8) 1.3 (0.3) 8.4 
Nestle Milkybar 
White Buttons 
2283 
(546) 
7.5 58.1 (57.7) 31.6 (20.0) 0.0 
Arnott's Barbecue 
Shapes 
2221 
(520) 
0.0 63.2 (1.6) 25.2 (11.6) 0.0 
Nutberry's 
Yoghurt Raisins 
1833 
(429) 
3.3 66.0 (62.7) 16.5 (13.2) 3.3 
Jacob's 
Cheeselets 
2053 
(491) 
9.5 55.1 (1.9) 25.8 (15.2) 2.3 
WeightWatchers 
Cheese Puffs 
1759 
(417) 
7.8 72.4 (3.2) 10.7 (1.4) 2.2 
Tesco Whole 
Black Cherries 
1480 
(350) 
0.2 84.3 (66.6) 1.1 (0.4) 2.1 
Tesco Butter 
Pastry Cases 
2005 
(480) 
7.8 65.3 (20.0) 20.5 (8.6) 2.4 
Tesco Chocolate 
Cornflake Cakes 
2093 
(500) 
7.5 75 (48.8) 22.5 (13.8) 3.75 
Weetabix Crisp 
Minis 
1563 
(369) 
9.5 70.9 (21.6) 5.3 (2.5) 9.4 
Fazer Tutti Frutti 
Original 
1480 
(355) 
1.5 84.0 (56.0) 0.2 (0.0) 0.9 
Ryvita 
Crackerbread 
1612 
(380) 
10.3 76.9 (1.5) 3.5 (0.5) 3.5 
Taj Cassava 
Chips 
2093 
(500) 
0.0 73.3 (0.0) 23.3 (6.7) 10 
Mars Maltesers 
2112 
(505) 
7.9 61.9 (53.3) 25.0 (15.2) 1.1 
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Tesco Free From 
White Bread 
1140 
(270) 
3.6 47.6 (0.0) 7.2 (0.8) 4.0 
Kallo Organic 
Rice Cakes 
1578 
(372) 
8.0 78.7 (2.2) 2.8 (0.6) 5.1 
Whittard 
Marshmallows 
1404 
(330) 
3.1 79.5 (64.5) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was carried out according to a written Standard Operating Procedure to 
maximize accurate and consistent execution of experimental protocol.  
Preparation. Sessions were scheduled to start at 09.00, 10.45, 12.30, 15.45 or 
17.30. Recruitment confirmation emails asked the participants to either have a light 
morning/afternoon meal before the session (at a time they would normally have it) or to 
skip that meal altogether if the meal would have been eaten 3 hours or less before the 
session. A day before a given session a reminder email was sent which asked the 
participants to avoid snacking and excessive drinking within the 3 hours leading to the 
start of the session. Snacks were cut fresh and set up on the dispenser half an hour before 
each session. 
On arrival, the participant was asked to wash their hands with warm water but no 
soap. In order to ensure that the participants were aware of a plausible purpose for the 
study, the experimental aim from the recruitment web-page was repeated as the 
assessment of the effect of different foods on micro-sweating in their fingers. On entry to 
the test room the experimenter explained that the foods were hidden inside the cardboard 
enclosure in order to minimize any expectation effects on the physiological GSR 
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measure. BIOPAC GEL101 was then applied and the GSR sensors slid onto the index 
and middle finger of the left hand.  
Main Trial Structure. An interactive tutorial of the main task explained each part 
of the procedure to the participant, by way of step by step instructions that led the 
participant through their first snack (see Appendix D). As the arrow 1a indicates in 
Figure 10, the participants were first instructed to squeeze the food grip: “Whenever you 
are ready press and hold the food grip, to move a piece of food in front of you.” As a 
consequence of pressing the food grip, the dispenser responded by delivering a unit of 
food (a snack) onto the food plate in front of the participant (1b in Figure 10; the snack 
for the tutorial was a piece of apricot). The force that participants exerted to earn a snack 
was recorded, but the participants were not informed about this measurement until 
debriefing. In this experiment, little effort was required to cause food delivery, such that 
any single press that reached above 3 kg forcef initiated food delivery. Although pressing 
stronger did not deliver the food faster in this experiment, differential sound feedback 
was given to the participant depending on the strength of the press: i.e. a Lego 
Mindstorms motor hidden inside the dispenser produced a slow rotating noise if the 
participant pressed with a force above 3 kg and below 8 kg force; the hidden motor 
produced a fast rotating noise if the participant pressed above 13 kg force; and a noise in-
between the fast and slow for forces between 8 and 13 kg. 
                                                 
f Units of the hand-grip device we used were set by the manufacturer as kg force rather than Newtons. 
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The second screen instructed the participant to eat and rate the food: “Now please 
eat the food and rate how much you like it. Please remember this sequence: 1) Put food 
in your mouth 2) Rate how much you like the food. For ratings, please do not focus on 
any other aspect of the food - we want to see if the physiological measure correlates with 
how much you like the food at this moment in time. Therefore, we need your rating to be 
honest and to not be about anything other than how much you like the food at this 
moment in time.” To provide evaluative ratings, the hedonic reactions to the foods were 
rated on a digital version of the Labelled Affective Magnitude (LAM) scale (Schutz & 
Cardello, 2001). The LAM scale is a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) that displays the 
following (negative) positive semantic anchors: (dis)like extremely; (dis)like very much; 
(dis)like moderately; (dis)like slightly; neither like or dislike. The positioning of the 
labels is not uniform on the LAM scale, however, but has been derived through 
magnitude estimation to yield ratio properties (for further details see Cardello & Schutz, 
2004). On the third screen, the participants were then instructed to sip a bit of water to 
neutralize the taste in their mouth. 
At the end of each snack, the participants were given a choice to either have the 
snack again they had just tasted, or alternatively to switch to a different food thereby 
starting a new trial, by means of two buttons on the screen: “Press More of Same if you 
want to have the food that you just had, again. Or press Stop Same, if not.” Four practice 
snacks followed that were presented without the concurrent written instructions of the 
tutorial. Before the participant embarked on test trials the experimenter prompted for any 
questions and clarified the procedure, if necessary, and then left the experimental room 
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until debriefing. The participants then carried through with the learned procedure with the 
remaining 16 trials, each composed of snacks of different foods. A minimum of two 
snacks had to be eaten before the participants had the opportunity to terminate the trial by 
switching to a new food on the next trial. Participants were free to choose to consume 
from three to six snacks of the same food type in succession. If the participant chose to 
eat all the six snacks of a given food, the program automatically switched to the next trial 
with snacks of a new food type. 
A hunger / fullness scale called Satiety Labelled Intensity Magnitude (SLIM) 
scale (Cardello, Schutz, Lesher, & Merrill, 2005) appeared on the computer screen 
immediately after the last snack of the 17th food trial. Participants then rated their hunger 
/ fullness on this scale. The SLIM scale was also presented to the participants at the start 
of the session, after practice snacks and before test trials, so we obtained hunger / fullness 
ratings from both the start and end of the session.  
Data Analysis. Raw force scores from Biopac AcqKnowledge data files were 
transformed into percentage maximal force scores using the peak force from all test trials 
as the per participant maximal force. The percentage maximal force scores were averaged 
over 1 second from the start of pressing the hand-grip. All data points where a participant 
rated a snack below -15 on the hedonic LAM scale were excluded from all analyses, in 
order to study positive hedonic influences on motivation and consumption. Number of 
snacks consumed was transformed into percentage available consumption scores whereby 
the minimum number of snacks per trial (2) corresponded to 0 % and the maximum 
number of available snacks per trial (6) corresponded to 100 %. Data and statistical 
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analyses were carried out using Microsoft Excel 2010 and SPSS 19 software packages, 
except for Cohen’s d effect size values, which were retrieved from 
http://www.uccs.edu/~faculty/lbecker/  
 
Exp 1. Results and Discussion 
In order to determine whether effort was exerted preferentially for obtaining highly-
palatable over bland snacks, we compared the forces applied for high- versus medium- 
versus low-hedonic snacks. Firstly, the forces for the different hedonic snacks were 
calculated from trials when the participant knew what snack they were working for: we 
included only responses for a snack that was the same as the snack that the participant 
had just eaten. Secondly, these trials provided the hedonic ratings to classify a given force 
trial hedonically into the low-hedonic (-15 < LAM < 25), medium-hedonic (25 <= LAM 
<= 50) and high-hedonic (LAM > 50) categories. Thirdly, the force was averaged over 
the 1-sec time window that the hand-grip was squeezed. Finally, this force was calculated 
as the percentage of the maximal force: maximal force was the largest force the 
participant applied throughout the test trials of the whole session.  In this analysis the 
low-hedonic snacks attracted a mean force of 20.7 % (SEM = 1.0), the medium-hedonic 
snacks a force of 19.3 % (SEM = 1.1) and the high-hedonic snacks a force of 19.8 % 
(SEM = 1.0). There was no evidence of a difference between the low-, medium- and 
high-hedonic forces, F(2, 52) < 1.  
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Next we determined whether higher hedonic ratings were associated with higher 
amounts of consumption. First, for each participant each food was assigned to one of the 
three hedonic categories based on the mean of the first two LAM ratings, which was used 
as the independent variable. The hedonic categories were then plotted against the 
percentage of snacks consumed as the dependent variable. As Figure 11 illustrates, high-
hedonic foods were consumed in larger amounts than medium-hedonic foods, which, in 
turn, were consumed in larger amounts than low-hedonic foods. This difference in 
percentage of available snacks consumed was confirmed by a Repeated Measures 
ANOVA, with a main effect of hedonic rating at the three hedonic levels, F(2, 54) = 
42.78, p < .01. An overall three-point linear relationship was then confirmed with 
pairwise comparisons: low-hedonic versus medium-hedonic, t(26) = 4.55, p < .01, d = 
0.72, and medium-hedonic versus high-hedonic, t(26) = 4.90, p < .01, d = 0.78.We 
included other factors in the above ANOVA as well: 1) Time of day for when the 
sessions took place as a covariate. 2) Energy density of the foods (as energy in 
kilocalories per 100 grams of each stimulus), with a third of the foods classed as high-
energy foods (more than 500kcal per 100g), a third as low-energy (less than 350kcal per 
100g), and a third in-between. 3) Food presentation order within each session as another 
covariate. 4) Mean fullness ratings of each participant as a final covariate. In this 
experiment, the time of day covariate had a significant effect on overall consumption, 
F(1, 26) = 7.56, p = 0.01. The parameter estimate of -0.34 (SEM = 0.01) showed that the 
participants consumed less food in evening sessions compared to afternoon sessions, and 
even less in the morning sessions. Although there appears to be order in the consumption 
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of foods with respect to their energy densities – 22.1 % (SEM = 5.5) for low-energy 
foods, 25.6 % (SEM = 4.6) for medium-energy and 34.8 % (SEM = 5.1) for high-energy 
foods - the effect of energy density was nevertheless not significant, F < 1. The 
remaining covariates, food order and fullness, did not produce significant effects in this 
experiment, all Fs < 1. 
 
Fig 11. More Pleasure More Intake 
 
Mean percentage of snacks consumed as a function of hedonic ratings in 
Experiment 1. As expected, more pleasure was associated with more 
consumption. This demonstrates that Jaffa Cake task is sensitive to 
hedonic consumption and an ecologically valid procedure specifically 
designed to assess and compare the impact of pleasure on consumption. 
SED is Standard Error of the Difference 
 
As intended, these participants were predominantly ‘hungry’ rather than ‘full’. 
Mean fullness ratings were -11.0 (SEM ±5.9), which was significantly lower than 
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‘slightly full’ on the SLIM scale, t(26) = 7.21, p < .01. When the mean fullness ratings 
were separated into individual ratings at the start of the session and individual ratings at 
the end of the session, both were still significantly lower than ‘slightly full’, at both the 
start -23.1 (SEM ±6.3), t(26) = 8.69, p < .01, and at the end 0.9 (SEM ±6.6), t(26) = 4.63, 
p < .01 (all one sample t tests).  
In summary, Experiment 1 established an association between food hedonic 
ratings and amount of food consumed. It was hypothesized that the lack of association 
between food hedonic ratings and force was due to a limitation of the procedure: 
participants were only required to make a short single press to obtain the food. Therefore, 
this force parameter was changed in Experiment 2.  
 
Exp 2. Hedonic Motivation 
Experiment 2 required a long and continuous press to obtain snacks instead of the short 
single press required in Experiment 1. This manipulation would determine whether the 
single press in Experiment 1 was too brief and insensitive to detect an association 
between hedonic ratings and force applied. Otherwise the basic design was equivalent, 
and thus provided further data to quantify and predict consumption based on food 
hedonic ratings. The main outcome measures in Experiment 2 were hedonic liking ratings 
for the snacks that participants tasted and the corresponding forces applied for the snacks, 
as well as the corresponding amounts of snacks participants chose to consume.  
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Participants, Apparatus and Stimuli 
The sample for Experiment 2 was 25 student volunteers (16 female) recruited through 
http://tinyurl.com/JaffaCakeStudy2, using the same sampling procedure as in Experiment 
1. The apparatus used in Experiment 2 was also the same as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 
10). The food stimuli were changed to serve an additional experimental aim discussed in 
a following chapter: Nestle Milkybar Buttons, Ryvita Crackerbread, Taj Cassava Chips, 
Mars Maltesers, Tesco Free From White Bread, Nutberry’s Yoghurt Coated Raisins, 
Kallo Organic Rice Cakes and Whittard of Chelsea Marshmallows.  
 
Procedure 
The basic procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as for Experiment 1. As in 
Experiment 1, we attached GSR sensors to the participant fingers under the pretext of 
measuring physiological response to different foods as part of the cover story for the 
study. The basic trial structure was also the same in Experiment 2 (see Figure 10): First 
the participants squeezed a hand-grip to make the dispenser deliver a piece of food (a 
snack). Second, the participants ate and rated the pleasantness of the snack, followed by a 
sip of water. Finally, the participants chose whether to have more of this snack or switch 
to a different trial with new snacks. The second snack had to then be earned by pressing 
the hand-grip again, followed by eating the snack while rating the stimulus on the 
hedonic LAM scale and so forth.  
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Experiment 2 was critically different from Experiment 1, however, in terms of 
hand-grip force parameters. In this experiment a single press was not sufficient to trigger 
food delivery and, instead, a squeeze was required that produced a total effort of at least 
21 kg force seconds. Again, the output units of the force measuring devices were set by 
the manufacturer to be in kg force rather than Newtons. A total effort of 21 kg s was 
achieved on average with a 5 kg press held for about 4 seconds. The thresholds for sound 
feedback were slightly lower than in Experiment 1 for the Lego Mindstorms motor 
hidden inside the dispenser, which created rotating noise as if part of the dispensing 
process, giving an impression how fast the food machine was working in delivering the 
participant the food. In Experiment 2, the motor produced a slow rotating noise if the 
participant pressed above 1.5 kg and below 5.5 kg force; the hidden motor produced a 
fast rotating noise if the participant pressed above 10.5 kg force; and a noise in-between 
the fast and slow for forces between 5.5 and 10.5 kg. Experiment 2 was also different 
from Experiment 1 in that the first snacks in each trial were compulsory, so the 
participants had no choice to change the foods in the first three snacks of each trial. These 
three compulsory snacks were always different from the following snacks (snacks 4 to 6). 
This pre-exposure manipulation was used to investigate an additional question posed by 
this experiment, the details for which are available in the subsequent chapter. For the 
purposes of the current investigation, a minimum of one snack (the fourth snack) had to 
be eaten before the participants had the opportunity to terminate the trial, which the 
participant could do by switching to a new food of the next trial. Participants were free to 
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choose to consume from one to three snacks of the same food type in succession (snacks 
4 to 6). 
Data Analysis. Raw force scores were transformed into percentage maximal force 
scores as in Experiment 1. The percentage maximal force scores were then, however, 
allocated into 1.2 second time windows, because the squeeze lasted for many seconds in 
this experiment. These time bins were then normalized, because participants varied in 
terms of how long they pressed the hand-grip from as short as a 2-second duration to as 
long as 12 seconds. The time bins were normalized such that by definition food delivery 
always occurred in the fourth time bin. Number of snacks consumed was transformed 
into percentage available consumption scores. The minimum number of test snacks per 
trial, which was one snack, corresponded to 0 % and the maximum voluntary test snack 
number of three per trial corresponded to 100 %.  
 
Exp 2. Results and Discussion 
In order to determine whether effort was exerted preferentially for obtaining 
highly-palatable over bland snacks, we compared the forces applied for high- versus 
medium- versus low-hedonic snacks. The forces were analysed in an equivalent manner 
to Experiment 1, with the exception that there was the additional factor of time. The 
forces are conventionally shown as time traces, although our main interest was the mean 
difference between the forces regardless of time bins. As Figure 12 illustrates, 
participants exerted more force for the high-hedonic and medium-hedonic snacks than for 
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the low-hedonic snacks. The difference between percentage maximal force means was 
confirmed by a Repeated Measures ANOVA, as a main effect of hedonic rating on effort, 
F(2, 48) = 7.01, p < .01. The main effect of time was also significant, F(2, 48) = 67.00, p 
< .01, with no interaction of hedonic rating and time, F(2, 48) = 1.21, p = .30.  
 
Fig 12. More Pleasure More Force 
 
 
Hedonic motivation in Experiment 2. Unbeknownst to the participants, 
the forces they exerted on the hand-grip to deliver the snacks were 
recorded. Mean percentage maximal force applied was associated with the 
hedonic ratings of the snacks, such that the participants worked more 
for the high- and medium-hedonic than for the low-hedonic snacks. Food 
delivery always started at the fourth time bin.  
 
Next we determined whether higher hedonic ratings were associated with higher 
amounts of consumption. The high-hedonic snacks were consumed in larger amounts at 
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39.3 % (SEM = 7.4), than the medium-hedonic snacks at 28.1 % (SEM = 8.4) which, in 
turn, were consumed in larger amounts than low-hedonic snacks at 6.9 % (SEM = 2.4). 
The difference in percentage of available snacks consumed was confirmed by a Repeated 
Measures ANOVA, as a main effect of hedonic ratings at the three hedonic levels, F(2, 
48) = 19.81, p < .01. Identically to the analysis in Experiment 1, we included more factors 
in this analysis than just the hedonic levels: time of day, energy density (low, medium 
and high), food order and fullness ratings. In Experiment 2, however, time of day was not 
a significant predictor of consumption, F < 1, whereas fullness ratings were, F(1, 24) = 
6.52, p = .01. The parameter estimate for fullness ratings, -0.21 (SEM = 0.08), indicated 
that the fuller the individual felt, the smaller the amount of food eaten. Energy density did 
not predict consumption reliably, with 26.1 % (SEM = 7.2) consumption for low-energy 
foods, 16.3% (SEM = 3.7) for medium-energy, and 25.1 % (SEM = 4.7) for high-energy 
foods. That is, energy density and food order did not reach significance again, all Fs < 1.  
As in Experiment 1 and according to our intentions, these participants were 
predominantly ‘hungry’ rather than ‘full’. Mean fullness ratings were -12.3 (SEM ±4.7), 
which was significantly lower than ‘slightly full’ on the SLIM scale, t(24) = 9.29, p < .01. 
When the mean fullness ratings were separated into individual ratings at the start of the 
session and individual ratings at the end of the session, both were still significantly lower 
than ‘slightly full’, at both the start -32.0 (SEM ±3.7), t(24) = 16.86, p < .01, and at the 
end 7.2 (SEM ±7.2), t(24) = 3.38, p < .01 (all single sample t tests).  
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Modelling Hedonic Consumption 
Combined Data Analysis 
We employed specialized analysis techniques on data combined from Experiment 1 and 2 
to derive quantitative best-fit equations for hedonic consumption. Linear mixed model 
analyses and model selection were carried out in the freely available R software (version 
2.10.1; http://www.r-project.org/). The package used within R was lme4 with analytical 
practice procedures adopted from Bates (2010). Starting with a linear mixed model with 
most components, stepwise regression with backward elimination was then used to 
identify models with components that possessed significant predictive power while 
retaining parsimony. The starting model (with most components) consisted of a general 
hedonic component as a fixed factor regressor, in addition to two random factors of 
personal hedonic component and a personal consumption baseline (e.g. Equation 2 in 
Results below). Different versions of the starting model were tested in parallel, with 
either linear or exponentially transformed hedonic components (the non-linear 
transformation used was 100/(1+160 exp (-0.06 x); see more below). Model selection then 
consisted of excluding models with non-significant fixed factors. Non-significant random 
factors were removed as well, except those required for repeated measures modelling. 
Finally, amongst the models with only significant factors, the best fitting model with the 
highest overall predictive power surfaced based on overall R2 values. 
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Combined Results 
To describe the relationship between hedonic ratings and amount consumed in more 
detail, we employed curve-fitting on data combined from both Experiment 1 and 2. As 
presented in Figure 13, visual inspection of data that was not averaged into one of the 
three hedonic categories suggested that the high hedonic ratings were associated with a 
disproportionally large increase in consumption when compared to low hedonic ratings. 
In fact, the hedonic ratings appeared to be linked to consumption only after reaching a 
certain threshold hedonic rating. Thus closer analysis revealed that a linear function was 
not an accurate model of the relationship. Instead, an appropriate function had to model a 
disproportional increase in consumption. An additional constraint was that the output 
values could never exceed 100 % consumption, irrespective of hedonic ratings. The 
mathematical nature of the logistic function is able to satisfy these criteria. Specifically, 
this exponential transformation was employed:  100/(1+160 exp (-0.06 x). 
Curve-fitting with this exponential transformation produced the overall function 
with the highest predictive power compared to all the other linear and non-linear models 
tested, R = 0.76 (see above for details of model selection procedure). The exponential 
component of the best-fitting model is illustrated by the curve in Figure 13, which 
yielded the following relationship: 
 
            0.6 * 100 
Percentage snacks consumed =   ______________________________________________ (1) 
      1 + 160 e - 0.06 Hedonic LAM rating 
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Applying Equation 1 estimates that a 20 point increase in hedonic rating on the 
LAM scale, from food ‘neither liked or disliked’ to food that is ‘liked slightly’, is 
associated with a 1 % increase in available snacks consumed. By contrast, from food 
‘liked very much’ to food ‘liked extremely’, that same hedonic rating increase of 20 points 
is associated with an approximate 20 % increase in available snacks consumed. 
 
Fig 13. Non-Linear Effect of Pleasure 
 
In-depth analyses revealed that the effect of pleasure on consumption 
is not linear. Raw data illustrates how most of the snacks that were at 
the bottom half of the liking scale were consumed in minimal amounts. 
By contrast, for the rarer extremely liked snacks, consumption 
increased disproportionally above this apparent hedonic threshold. 
Equation 1 was found to be the best model describing average percentage 
consumed based on hedonic ratings of snacks. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 S
na
ck
 C
on
su
me
d 
Hedonic Rating of Snack 
Non-Linear
Equation 1
Raw Samples
V. Hedonic Consumption and Motivation 
 
 
139 
Equation 1, however, does not take individual differences between participants 
into account. We were able to determine the size and relative importance of individual 
differences by using mixed models (see Data Analysis for details on this technique). 
Equation 2 presents the full model whereby consumption is predicted not just for an 
average person, but for specific individuals.  
 
% consumed = General Hedonics  ± Personal Hedonics           ± Personal Baseline    (2) 
 
                     =     Equation 1        ± b*Hedonic LAM rating     ± c  
 
A completely average person from the population would be predicted to consume 
food according to just Equation 1 i.e. the personal components in Equation 2 have values 
of 0 for a completely average person. However, in non-average participants, the personal 
hedonic function and the personal baseline components in Equation 2 allowed for a more 
accurate individual prediction of amount consumed, as a deviation from the average 
person, or as added personal components to Equation 1. Accordingly, any given 
individual was found to have an individual hedonic relationship to consumption that 
deviated more or less from the general hedonic relationship of the average person 
(General Hedonics ±Personal Hedonics). Any given individual also had a non-hedonic 
consumption baseline (Personal Baseline; c), which reflected their level of consumption 
regardless of how pleasant the food was. Specifically, each individual had their own 
weight (b) for the personal hedonic function e.g. Mary’s personal hedonic function was -
0.1*Hedonic LAM rating and Bob’s personal function was 0.5*Hedonic LAM rating. The 
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standard deviation of all the personal hedonic functions was ±0.4*Hedonic LAM rating, 
providing an estimate for how differently hedonic ratings impacted upon consumption 
relative to the average person (see Equation 3). The personal consumption baselines 
changed Equation 1 by ±17.1, standard deviation, as an indicator of the size of individual 
baseline differences across participants. When there is no individual participant 
information available, Equation 1 predicts the consumption of an average person and is 
able to account for about 41 % of the modelled variability observed in consumption (r2 = 
0.41). By knowing the personal hedonic component and the personal consumption 
baseline for a given individual (Equation 2 for a given individual), the predictive power 
added is 59 % to the total modelled consumption.  
 
           % consumed    =    Equation 1     ± 0.4*Hedonic LAM rating    ± 17.1 (3) 
 
Using mixed models analysis allowed us to also determine the relative predictive 
power of hedonic versus non-hedonic influences on consumption. The hedonic 
components in the form of the general and personal hedonic components together 
predicted 56 % (r2 = 0.62) of the modelled variability in consumption in contrast to the 
non-hedonic influence of personal consumption baseline adding 44 % (r2 = 0.44). 
Furthermore, we were able to contrast the importance of the general hedonic component 
with the personal hedonic component: the relative proportion of variance explained by 
the general hedonic function alone (Equation 1) was 55 % in contrast to the personal 
hedonic function that constituted the remaining 45 % of the hedonic predictive power. 
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Jaffa Cake Task Discussion 
The current study established and validated a laboratory procedure for the assessment of 
the impact that food pleasures have on food intake. Specifically, Experiment 1 
demonstrated the sensitivity of the procedure to hedonic consumption, which at the same 
time was not confounded by satiation factors, while possessing high ecological validity 
and incorporating automated delivery of the foods used. This Jaffa Cake task also 
allowed the assessment of hedonic motivation. In Experiment 2, participants exerted 
more effort to attain highly palatable foods compared to the lower effort exerted in order 
to obtain low-hedonic snacks, which occurred despite participants not being informed 
that forces were measured. We also established a quantitative hedonic consumption 
function (Equation 1) that turned out to be non-linear and that allows the amount of foods 
consumed to be predicted from food pleasantness. Using mixed models analysis we were 
able to increase the predictive power of the hedonic consumption function further by 
incorporating person-specific estimates of the amount to be consumed (Equation 2). 
Overall, the results of this study demonstrated that the Jaffa Cake task worked, allowing 
highly quantified and comparative profiling of hedonic consumption and motivation. 
The single short press required to obtain food in Experiment 1 appeared to not be 
sufficient to differentiate the forces applied based on the hedonic values of the target 
foods. By contrast, the longer continuous squeeze in Experiment 2 was sensitive to the 
hedonic properties of the snack outcomes. The latter is possibly the first quantification of 
primary reward driven motivation, as opposed to cognitively driven motivation, in 
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humans. The differentiation of motivation originating from primary rewards versus 
cognitively originating motivation is important (e.g. S. de Wit & Dickinson, 2009; 
Finlayson, King, & Blundell, 2008), because food is a primary reward and therefore the 
main aim is to measure this non-cognitive type of motivation that primary rewards 
trigger. As an example of cognitively initiated motivation, participants would exert more 
force when a blue square rather than a green square appears on the screen, if working for 
the otherwise arbitrary blue squares had been cognitively set up as the goal (Anderson, 
1936). Such cognitively specified motivations are different from primary reward initiated 
motivations. The force results of this study are potentially the first true reflection of 
human motivation originating from primary rewards, because our participants were 
neither informed that forces were being measured nor explicitly instructed to use more 
force to obtain the rewards. Furthermore, the hand-grip was naturally presented, without 
any special emphasis, as a necessary part of the experimental setup that was simply 
required to deliver the food without the experimenter being present. Thus, the hand-grip 
was presented as a practical means to an end rather than as any unnecessary, out-of-place 
addition, which might have aroused attention and suspicion. Altogether, these precautions 
should have minimized cognitively initiated motivations. Designs in existing literature, 
on the contrary, have not used such implicit measurement and often incorporate explicit 
instructions that are conducive to cognitive motivations, and therefore confound 
measurement of primary reward driven motivation (e.g. Talmi, Seymour, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2008). Furthermore, the demonstration of sub-conscious priming of a motivation 
(Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008) does not necessarily constitute measurement of primary 
V. Hedonic Consumption and Motivation 
 
 
143 
reward motivation. That is, once a motivation has been established, either through 
primary or cognitive means, it can be primed or activated by implicit or explicit methods. 
On the basis that only non-implicit designs have been previously employed, only 
cognitively induced motivation has been subconsciously primed (Pessiglione et al., 
2007).  
Beyond the fact that pleasure affects intake, we do not know the specific 
mechanism that explains how this occurs. It is possible that at least in healthy volunteers 
the palatability we measure might work through appetite or desire for food, which in turn 
determines whether more or less is consumed. A fitting mechanism detailing how this 
process might occur is instrumental incentive learning (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002), 
which involves the assignment of motivational value to outcome snack representations 
due to experiencing the hedonic reactions from the food. Therefore, if pleasure effects are 
mediated through motivation, pleasure may have non-linear effects on motivation, instead 
of having non-linear effects on consumption directly (consistent with force findings in 
Figure 12). Hedonic consumption is not explained by the concept of alliesthesia 
(Cabanac, 1971), whereby pleasure derived from a stimulus is determined by the degree 
to which the stimulus satisfies an internal homeostatic state such as nutrient deficiency. 
Alliesthesia does not apply here, especially in Experiment 1, because the internal state 
indexed through fullness did not change between the different foods while the different 
foods still produced different pleasantness scores. The different hedonic ratings could not 
have therefore primarily have been determined by alliesthesia. Furthermore, the effect of 
pleasure on consumption is likely to have not been mediated by satiety, because we know 
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that palatability does not affect satiety, while it does affect satiation or the termination of 
a meal (see e.g. Benelam, 2009; De Graaf, De Jong, & Lambers, 1999). Given that the 
Jaffa Cake task captures hedonics, motivation and consumption all-in-one, then this 
procedure could also be used to investigate potential dissociations of pleasure and 
motivation, or liking and wanting (Finlayson et al., 2007b; Mela, 2006). In that regard, 
the Jaffa Cake task would be a complement to the development of a liquid reinforcer / 
ratio schedule procedure, which currently is not yet sensitive to measurement of wanting 
(Gondek-Brown et al., 2007). The picture task developed by Finlayson and colleagues 
(2007a) would also be complemented by the Jaffa Cake task, with the measurement of 
actual food intake. A general concern with regard to distinguishing liking from wanting 
(see e.g. Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009) needs to be raised here, however. Namely, as 
discussed before, a pleasure rating scale does not necessarily index pleasure, but it may 
be an index of wanting instead, or at least be influenced by wanting as well as liking. It 
might be possible to test this alternative interpretation in future studies employing 
objective measures of pleasure, instead of self-report ratings (see Chapter I).  
Equation 1 and 2 allow the prediction of consumption based on pleasure. Such 
predictions may be of practical use in many situations and can be made at group-level 
(Equation 1) or if the person-specific coefficients are determined, at the level of specific 
individuals. The magnitude of this predictive power demonstrates that food palatability is 
a critical influence on intake. However, the non-linearity of the relationship between 
pleasure and consumption is not necessarily a reflection of true non-linearity between 
these phenomena, but potentially a reflection of the variables being non-linear 
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themselves. Firstly, consumption was measured with a discrete number of units per food 
and as such was not a continuous variable. Furthermore, if there was a floor effect such 
that participants would have actually consumed the less-hedonic foods in smaller 
amounts than was allowed, then that would also contribute to apparent non-linearity.  
Secondly, pleasure was indexed with a LAM scale, which is based on magnitude 
estimation and which in turn is known for producing exponential scales rather than linear 
scales. The latter concern is, however, alleviated by the fact that the development of the 
LAM scale took into account the exponential nature of magnitude estimation and actually 
corrected for it, such that the LAM scale itself is not exponential. This was achieved 
through: “Since magnitude estimates have been shown to be log-normally distributed … 
the data were analyzed by equalizing the magnitude estimates across subjects … and then 
calculating the geometric means of the normalized magnitude estimates across subjects 
for each phrase” (Schutz & Cardello, 2001, p. 123). Finally, the non-linear nature of the 
relationship needs to be treated with caution, because sensory specific satiety may have 
contributed to it.  
However, hedonics is not the only influence on consumption. Consumption is also 
influenced by multiple non-hedonic factors (Drewnowski, 1997). For instance, even if 
foods were neither liked nor disliked, people tend to clean their whole plate once the 
foods and quantities of food have been chosen (Wansink & Cheney, 2005). In parallel to 
highlighting the complexity of consumptive decision-making, this observation 
emphasizes the importance of how much food is chosen at the start of the meal in 
determining food intake (Brunstrom & Shakeshaft, 2009). Therefore, as it stands, our 
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unitary hedonic model of consumption fails to take into account a plethora of important 
observations regarding non-hedonic factors influencing consumption and therefore 
substantially reduces the explanatory power of the model (see e.g. West, 2005, pp. 21-
22). Factors such as dietary motives, boredom, frustration and novelty seeking should all 
be incorporated into a future model. For example, at times participants will be pressing a 
button to have less of a food not because it is less pleasant, but because they want to get 
through the experiment faster. As we saw in Experiment 1, time of day also plays a role 
in food-choice, which is likely to result from choosing to eat less breakfast-food types, 
such as cereals, in the evening. Such contextual effects were not detected in Experiment 2 
probably because it incorporated fewer breakfast foods. Experiment 2, however, 
witnessed an effect of satiety such that less hungry participants ate less. Experiment 1 did 
not produce that effect likely because the participants were more hungry in that 
experiment. Interestingly, the participants in Experiment 2 were far from being full as 
such, demonstrating that satiety is a continuous variable that can have effects before 
feeling fully bloated. Although energy density and food ordering did not yield effects in 
this study, these factors do influence intake in different designs (e.g. Drewnowski, 1998), 
and a complete picture of food intake would be incomplete without them. All-in-all, in 
addition to predicting specific consumption more accurately, a fuller model of 
consumption would facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of food intake. In the 
process of advancing the unitary hedonic model into a broader multi-componential 
model, it is likely that parts of the person-specific random factors (see Equation 2 and 3 
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and mixed models analyses) will be absorbed into fixed trait and state variables such as 
novelty seeking.   
The Jaffa Cake task provides an opportunity to assess hedonic consumption 
profiles against variables such as varying degrees of Body Mass Index (BMI) or the 
propensity for binge-eating. Having been specifically designed to assess the impact of 
food pleasure on intake, our procedure is perhaps the only tool available for such a 
purpose. In fact, we postulate that it is not just food pleasure that increases food intake, 
but that pleasure from any stimulus type enhances the extent of exposure to those hedonic 
stimuli. Such a general pleasure mechanism would yield desirable consequences in terms 
of amplifying exposure to many different kinds of rewarding stimuli. However, at times 
pleasure may play a critical role in leading to escalations in contact with stimuli that have 
undesirable effects or side-effects: in addition to the over-consumption of palatable foods, 
sexual pleasure driving use of pornographic materials (Delmonico, 1997), excessive 
engagement with video games (Klimmt, Schmid, & Orthmann, 2009) or encounters with 
euphorigenic drugs in substance abuse (Fischman & Foltin, 1991), and so forth. Perhaps 
the same hedonic consumption relationships hold for such non-food stimuli, Equations 1 
and 2.  
In summary, this study presents a special-purpose laboratory tool which allows 
for the assessment of hedonic motivation and consumption. We plan to further develop 
this Jaffa Cake task, so that the relevant apparatus could be built easily and inexpensively 
in any laboratory. We welcome any modification or feature requests to incorporate into 
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this upgrade process. Additionally, this study provides formulae that allow the prediction 
of food consumption based on the hedonic value of that food.  
 
This chapter observed large effects of pleasure on consumption, as well as effects of 
pleasure on primary motivation. We suggested that the two are linked by incentive 
learning i.e. the effect of pleasure on consumption is mediated by the effect of pleasure 
on motivation. This is the role of pleasure in behaviour that we regard to have critical 
influences in health and disease, which we will elaborate on in the last chapter. Before 
that, we will, however, study another effect of pleasure, which is its effect on itself. 
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VI. Habituation of Affective Evaluations 
 
Can you have too much of a good thing? In particular, what if you start to enjoy snacks 
less after snacking on a variety of pleasant foods. For instance, you might try a selection 
of different delicious cheeses at a cocktail party, followed by a few great-looking 
marshmallows, but which you would actually enjoy less because of having experienced 
the mouth-watering cheeses beforehand. If this example is true, it would represent a 
phenomenon by which the hedonic experience derived from a stimulus decreases as a 
result of repeated pleasurable experiences. Critically for this investigation, the reduction 
in pleasure would be caused by preceding pleasures rather than any other aspect of the 
preceding experience. We term this possible phenomenon hedonic habituation. 
Determining whether food stimuli exhibit hedonic habituation was the key aim of the 
current study. To clarify, we regard hedonic contrast (e.g. Yeomans, Chambers, 
Blumenthal, & Blake, 2008) as one possible form of hedonic habituation, but hedonic 
habituation is a broader umbrella effect that may also take the form of decreases in 
pleasure that occur regardless of expectancy effects, or that are independent of perceptual 
processes and interpretations of situations. An example of such non-cognitive and non-
perceptual affective after-reactions is opponent processes (see Mauro, 1988 for more 
about the distinction). That is, hedonic habituation is a decrease in hedonic ratings caused 
by preceding pleasures, independent of what the underlying mechanisms of the decrease 
might be.  
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A number of studies have explored contrast effects. Some of these focus on 
expectancy effects, whereby hedonic evaluations are manipulated by providing 
information about the test stimuli prior to experiencing them. For instance, Zellner and 
colleagues  (2004) found both assimilation (affective ratings biased towards the prior 
expectations) or contrast (affective ratings biased away from prior expectations), 
depending on how certain and different the expectations were from the test experiences. 
This and other studies of this type utilised prior descriptive information and labelling to 
alter these expectations e.g. telling the participants beforehand that other people strongly 
disliked the foods, or that they will be eating candy. However, this study focuses on the 
effect of actual prior experiences, specifically on the effect of hedonically laden pre-
exposures. The contrast literature has employed this approach as well, whereby prior 
exposure to hedonic context stimuli is used instead of providing prior information. For 
example, test paintings were rated higher after viewing unpleasant paintings (positive 
hedonic contrast; Zellner et al., 2010), also fruit juices became less hedonically 
discriminable after being exposed to pleasant fruit juice (hedonic condensation; Zellner, 
Allen, Henley, & Parker, 2006).  
To our knowledge, hedonic habituation has not been addressed for taste stimuli. 
Related works exist on a phenomenon called Sensory Specific Satiety (Rolls, Rolls, 
Rowe, & Sweeney, 1981), which similarly to hedonic habituation involves decreasing 
pleasure from food, but in Sensory Specific Satiety the cause of the reduction in food 
pleasure is attributed to the sensory rather than hedonic properties of the preceding foods. 
The term Sensory Specific Satiety should not be confused with decreases in sensory 
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intensity of tastes. In both Sensory Specific Satiety and hedonic habituation the result is a 
decrease in food pleasure rather than food taste intensity. In Sensory Specific Satiety 
(SSS), however, the cause of this decrease in food pleasure is due to repeated exposure to 
the same foods with the same sensory properties, whereas the cause of the decrease in 
pleasure in hedonic habituation is repeated exposure to pleasant experiences. As an 
example of SSS, the hedonic evaluation of a chocolate was reduced when the chocolate 
had been eaten having the same colour, but the hedonic evaluation was not reduced when 
the same chocolate had been previously eaten having a different colour (Rolls, Rowe, & 
Rolls, 1982). The same study also showed that eating pasta of shape A reduced the 
pleasantness of shape A pasta, but did not reduce the pleasantness of the same pasta in 
shapes B or C. Furthermore, generalisation can be found in SSS,  such that pre-exposure 
to cheese and crackers not only reduced their hedonic ratings, but also reduced hedonic 
ratings of potato chips and sausages, while not reducing hedonic ratings of bananas and 
yogurt (Rolls, Van Duijvenvoorde, & Rolls, 1984). A concept similar to SSS, but broader, 
is habituation (Epstein, Temple, Roemmich, & Bouton, 2009). Habituation also aims to 
explain decreases in eating, but goes beyond liking, encompassing measures of salivation, 
acoustic startle etc, as well as employing different experimental designs and wider variety 
of independent variables such as distractions and stress. Although habituation does 
sometimes involve decreases in hedonics, these hedonic decreases are not the focus of 
habituation (see Epstein et al., 2009). For instance, habituation as measured through 
salivation is not predicted by concurrent decreases in liking (Epstein, Caggiula, Rodefer, 
Wisniewski, & Mitchell, 1993). Given this related but different focus, habituation does 
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not directly pertain to hedonic habituation. Another related phenomenon, termed affective 
habituation, has also been investigated (e.g. Beebe-Center, 1929; Cain & Johnson, 1978; 
Dijksterhuis & Smith, 2002; Leventhal, Martin, Seals, Tapia, & Rehm, 2007). Studies of 
affective habituation involve decreasing hedonic experiences as well, but without 
specifying a specific source as the cause of these reductions. Well-being literature uses 
yet more labels: hedonic adaptation or hedonic desensitization (see e.g. Frederick & 
Loewenstein, 1999), but again these terms and investigations are general in the sense that 
they do not pinpoint the cause for decreasing hedonic experiences to be the preceding 
pleasures per se. Perhaps the most directly related research has been carried out by 
Grabenhorst and Rolls (2009) using the label relative reward, but they utilised odours as 
stimuli, so the question whether taste stimuli exhibit hedonic habituation has not been 
addressed.  
In order to determine whether having a pleasant snack now makes you less able to 
enjoy a subsequent snack, participants first ate either three pleasant snacks or three bland 
snacks, followed by a fourth test snack (see Table 6). The preceding snacks were either 
all different foods or all the same food (while also being pleasant or all being bland). The 
key dependent variable was the hedonic rating of the fourth test snack, after the varied-
pleasant compared with the varied-bland snacks. The same-pleasant pre-exposure 
condition, in which all the preceding snacks were the same food as the test snack, served 
as a control. This same-pleasant pre-exposure condition determined whether a decrease 
in the hedonic rating of the fourth test snack was due to the hedonic rather than the 
sensory properties of the preceding foods. That is, we expected the hedonic ratings for the 
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test snack to be lower on the pleasant-same trials than on bland-same trials. However, 
such a reduction could be due to Sensory Specific Satiety and/or hedonic habituation. 
Insofar that there was a contribution from hedonic habituation, as opposed to Sensory 
Specific Satiety, we expected the decrease to be similar for both same-pleasant and 
varied-pleasant pre-exposures (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Pleasant or Bland x Varied or Same 
Trial Type Pre-Exposure Effect on Rating (and Consumption) 
Pleasant-Varied Hed1 Hed2 Hed3 
Test Rating 
of Same Snacks Across All Conditions 
(+choose to eat 1-3 pieces) 
Pleasant-Same Hed4 Hed4 Hed4 
Bland-Varied Low1 Low2 Low3 
Bland-Same Low4 Low4 Low4 
 
Hed: a snack of a high hedonic rating 
Low: a snack of a low hedonic rating 
 
 
Auto-Inhibition Experiment 
Participants, Apparatus and Stimuli 
Sample. 25 student volunteers (16 female) were included in this experiment 
through university-wide e-mail recruitment. These are the same participants that 
generated the data for the previous study. The students received an invitation linking to a 
web-based recruitment questionnaire at http://tinyurl.com/HedHabitStudy that served as a 
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common introduction to the study. Any candidates acquainted to the first author, or 
reporting psychology as their main specialty, were excluded from taking part in the study 
to minimize familiarity with study aims and to minimize highly analytical task 
performance. Participants were also required to be native speakers or fluent in English, 
and have no food allergies. Session slots were otherwise allocated on a first come first 
served basis; no further exclusion criteria were applied. For the participants that were 
selected, absence of food allergies was confirmed verbally at the start of the study. In 
addition, a silenced mobile phone was given to the participant with a direct line to the 
experimenter / first-aider seconds away, in the unlikely event that an emergency would 
have arisen. The sample size was chosen based on rule-of-thumb for psychology 
experiments. In order to detect large within-subject effects between pre-exposure type 
and hedonicity a sample size of approximately 20 was needed. This design was sensitive 
to detect large effects, but not medium or small ones. Given that a priori detectability of 
smaller effects was desirable as well, however, this study is under-powered in that regard. 
As advertised on the web-page, recruits were provided free food and received 7 GBP 
(circa 12 USD) for participation in a 75-minute session.  
Experimental Setup. Participants were tested individually in a test room in which 
they sat at a table facing a computer screen (PC with a 1280x1024 display). In addition, a 
dispenser containing all the snacks for the session was positioned to the left of the 
participant. The dispenser was concealed in a cardboard enclosure throughout the 
experimental sessions with only the food plate in front of the participant. Further 
procedural details are in the previous chapter. The results of that chapter also 
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demonstrated that participants did not become full during this experiment, but were 
mostly hungry instead.  
Food Stimuli. Foods were selected from a pilot study. The pilot established which 
foods did not evoke aversive disgust evaluations while instead eliciting hedonic reactions 
at the bland and highly pleasant extremes of the spectrum: Nestle Milkybar Buttons, 
Ryvita Crackerbread, Taj Cassava Chips, Mars Maltesers, Tesco Free From White 
Bread, Nutberry’s Yoghurt Coated Raisins, Kallo Organic Rice Cakes and Whittard of 
Chelsea Marshmallows. The foods were divided into groups of three snacks that 
constituted either the bland versus pleasant pre-exposure conditions combined with same 
snack versus varied snack conditions, described in more detail under the procedure. The 
order of the conditions consisting of different snack sequences was randomised by our 
software and pre-loaded onto the dispenser according to the random sequence given. The 
individual snacks were cut to approximately uniform sizes, weighing about 2 grams each.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure was carried out according to a written Standard Operating Procedure to 
maximize accurate and consistent execution of experimental protocol.  
Preparation. Sessions were scheduled to start at 09.00, 10.45, 12.30, 15.45 or 
17.30. Recruitment confirmation emails asked the participants to either have a light 
morning/afternoon meal before the session (at a time they would normally have it) or to 
skip that meal altogether if the meal would have been eaten 3 hours or less before the 
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session. A day before a given session a reminder email was sent that also prohibited 
snacking and excessive drinking within the 3 hours leading to the start of the session. 
Snacks were freshly cut and set up on the dispenser half an hour before each session. 
In order to ensure that the participants were aware of a plausible purpose for the 
study, the experimental aim from the recruitment web-page was repeated as an 
investigation into the effect of different foods on micro-sweating in their fingers. On 
entry to the test room the experimenter explained that the foods were hidden inside the 
cardboard enclosure in order to minimize any expectation effects on the physiological 
Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) measure.  
Main Trial Structure. An interactive tutorial of the main task explained each part 
of the procedure to the participant, by way of step by step instructions that led the 
participant through their first snack (see Appendix D). Details of these instructions are 
reported in the previous chapter. To provide evaluative ratings, the hedonic reactions to 
the foods were rated on a digital version of the Labelled Affective Magnitude (LAM) 
scale (Schutz & Cardello, 2001). The LAM scale is a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) that 
displays the following (negative) positive semantic anchors: (dis)like extremely; (dis)like 
very much; (dis)like moderately; (dis)like slightly; neither like or dislike. The positioning 
of the labels is not uniform on the LAM scale, however, but has been derived through 
magnitude estimation to yield ratio properties (for further details see Cardello & Schutz, 
2004). After eating a snack participants were then instructed to sip some water to 
neutralize the taste in their mouth. Finally, the participants were given a choice to either 
have the snack they tasted again or alternatively to switch to a different food thereby 
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starting a new trial, by means of two buttons on the screen: “Press More of Same if you 
want to have the food that you just had, again. Or press Stop Same, if not.” Before the 
participant embarked on test trials the experimenter requested questions and then clarified 
the procedure, if necessary, before leaving the experimental room until debriefing.  
The participants then completed the test trials, which consisted of 3 snacks as the 
pre-exposure condition, followed by a minimum of 1 test snack and a maximum of 3 test 
snacks. Each trial started with 3 snacks that were either 3 pleasant snacks or 3 bland 
snacks. These two types of pre-exposure snacks constituted the critical manipulations as 
the pleasant pre-exposure and the bland pre-exposure conditions. The first 3 snacks in 
each trial were compulsory: the participants had no choice but to continue with the snack 
given for the first three snacks in a given trial. Additionally, the pleasant pre-exposure 
condition was split into two sub-types: one in which the three pleasant pre-exposure 
snacks were all the same foods (and the same as the test food); and the other in which the 
three pleasant pre-exposure snacks were all different foods (and different from the test 
food as well). Following the three pre-exposure snacks, the trial ended with test snacks, 
where the participant was free to choose to consume either 1, 2 or 3 further snacks. If the 
participant chose to eat all the 3 test snacks of a given food, the program automatically 
switched to the next trial with another pre-exposure condition. The two conditions were 
crossed (bland versus pleasant combined with same versus varied), and the resulting 
trials were all repeated twice per participant. See Table 6 for summary of the different 
trial types.   
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Data Analysis. Number of snacks consumed was transformed into percentage 
consumption scores whereby the minimum number of voluntary snacks per trial (1) 
corresponded to 0 % and the maximum number of available snacks per trial (3) 
corresponded to 100 %. Data and statistical analyses were carried out using Microsoft 
Excel 2010 and PASW 18.  
 
Results 
Figure 14 presents the hedonic ratings given to test snacks depending on what snacks 
were eaten beforehand, and whether or not those snacks were varied. Test snacks were 
rated as less pleasant following a sequence of pleasant snacks compared with bland 
snacks. This appeared true regardless of whether the pre-exposed snacks were varied or 
same (1a and 1b). These effects were confirmed by a two-way ANOVA with pre-
exposure hedonicity (pleasant versus bland snacks) and pre-exposure type (varied versus 
same) as within-subject factors: there was a main effect of pre-exposure hedonicity, F(1, 
24) = 8.42, MSE = 155.62, p < .01, η2p = 0.26, whilst there was no evidence of an effect 
of pre-exposure type, F(1, 24) < 1, nor interaction, F(1, 24) < 1. The above results 
replicate the classic finding that hedonic ratings decrease after exposure to same foods 
(Figure 14b). The emphasis, however, is on the observation that test foods were also 
rated as less liked when a sequence of varied-pleasant snacks preceded the test foods, 
compared to test foods that were preceded by varied-bland snacks. Figure 14a presents 
the hedonic ratings given to test snacks in those conditions. Furthermore, hedonic ratings 
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were similarly reduced irrespective whether the preceding foods constituted a variety of 
different pleasant snacks or whether the preceding snacks were of the same kind. The 
reduced test ratings when a variety of pleasant snacks preceded the test (Figure 14a) were 
similar to the reduced test ratings when the preceding pleasant foods were all the same 
snack (Figure 14b), as reflected by the aforementioned lack of main effect of pre-
exposure type and lack of interaction of pre-exposure type with pre-exposure hedonicity.  
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Fig 14. Hedonic Habituation 
 
 
 
Mean hedonic ratings of the test snacks after consumption of pleasant 
and bland snacks, which were either (a) varied or (b) all the same. 
Snacks were rated lower after a series of pleasant snacks compared to 
after a series of bland snacks; snacks were rated lower not only after 
same-pleasant snacks, but also after varied-pleasant snacks.  
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The difference in hedonic ratings after pleasant versus bland snacks reflected a 
reduction in hedonic ratings after pleasant snacks rather than an enhancement of hedonic 
ratings after bland snacks. Snacks after pleasant pre-exposure were rated at a mean of 
37.6 down from an initial baseline of 44.6 . The initial baseline rating was for the first 
snack of each pleasant pre-exposure trial. In contrast to the decrease from baseline after 
pleasant snacks, snacks after bland pre-exposure remained similar to baseline at 44.9. 
Within-subject variability for the baseline versus pleasant pre-exposure test scores was 
SEDg = 2.7 and SED for the baseline versus bland pre-exposure test conditions was 2.5. 
The significance of the reduction in the pleasant pre-exposure condition was confirmed 
by a one-way Repeated Measures ANOVA, as a reduction in pleasant pre-exposure test 
compared to initial baseline level, F(1, 24) = 6.52, MSE = 94.20, p = .01, η2p = 0.21. In 
contrast, there was no evidence that the bland pre-exposure test ratings differed from 
initial baseline, F(1, 24) < 1. 
In order to determine whether test foods were consumed differentially depending 
on which snacks were consumed beforehand, percentage available snacks consumed 
following pleasant snacks were compared with the percentage following bland snacks. 
The percentage of snacks consumed was 27.6 % when a variety of pleasant snacks 
preceded the test, and was 42.1 % when the preceding variety of snacks was bland. 
Within-subject variability for this comparison was SED = 8.8 %. However, consumption 
after pleasant snacks was not significantly lower than consumption after bland snacks, as 
                                                 
g SED is Standard Error of the Difference (for uses of SED see Cardinal & Aitken, 2006, pp. 95-101) 
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determined by lack of main effect of pre-exposure hedonicity, F(1, 18) = 1.91, MSE = 
964.91, p = .18. There was also no significant interaction between pre-exposure 
hedonicity and pre-exposure type (same versus varied), F(1, 18) < 1. 
 
Discussion 
This study found that snacks were rated lower after a series of pleasant snacks compared 
to after a series of bland snacks. The test snacks were rated lower not only after pleasant 
snacks that were all the same, but test snacks were also rated lower after pleasant snacks 
that were all different snacks.  
The reduction in pleasantness observed may have resulted solely from sensory 
similarity of test foods to the preceding snacks. This interpretation becomes less likely, 
however, because both same and varied pre-exposure were associated with a non-
differing decline in pleasantness, which is similar to what Grabenhorst and Rolls (2009) 
found with odour stimuli.  
The difference in hedonic ratings observed after pleasant snacks relative to post-
bland snacks may have arisen from the snacks being valued more after bland snacks 
rather than the snacks being valued less after pleasant snacks. In opposition to this 
positive contrast effect interpretation, the ratings after bland snacks were not higher than 
baseline ratings for these foods. Furthermore, ratings after pleasant snacks were found to 
be lower than baseline ratings.  
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The direction of effect on consumption of foods reflected the decline in food 
ratings after pleasant snacks, but the effect on consumption was not statistically 
significant. We interpret this result to suggest that the difference in hedonic ratings was 
not large enough to elicit a parallel consistent difference in number of snacks chosen for 
consumption, perhaps because the pre-exposure was not sufficiently extended for an 
effect on consumption to surface. Similarly, the measure of consumption may have been 
too insensitive to detect an effect because it only measured three possible levels of 
consumption. Alternatively, hedonic ratings may have a non-linear effect on 
consumption, so the lack of effect on consumption may reflect the finding that for any 
food below a high pleasure threshold, consumption is relatively unaffected by hedonic 
changes (see previous chapter). 
Despite the lack of effect on consumption, this study constitutes the first 
demonstration of hedonic habituation with food stimuli. Equally, as a first demonstration, 
the results of this study are hardly generalizable to different circumstances and 
populations and as such await for further research to complement this investigation. The 
current findings of hedonic habituation may, however, explain existing research that 
argued intensely flavoured foods were more susceptible to Sensory Specific Satiety than 
bland foods (Vickers, Holton, & Wang, 1998), insofar that the intensity correlated with 
hedonicity. It must be acknowledged, however, that the conclusion is based on a no-
difference between the same and varied pre-exposures, which may have arisen due to 
lack of power rather than due to true lack of effect. Retrospective power analysis showed 
we had power of .66 to detect a medium effect, making lack of power a plausible 
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alternative interpretation. This alternative interpretation is much more substantial for 
small effects. We would consider power prospectively in any future investigations of 
hedonic habituation.  
The hedonic habituation effect observed may reflect a decline in the evaluation of 
food, but not an actual decrease in the pleasantness of food. That is, instead of 
experiencing a decrease in genuine pleasurable reactions to foods, participants may rate 
the foods lower in terms of a cognitive representation of affective value (Russell, 2003a). 
The distinction is similar to rating a film very highly, because a friend you watched it 
with rated it very highly, while really believing in / not lying about your hedonic 
evaluation, in contrast to actually having enjoyed the film more. This type of evaluative 
judgment may be especially sensitive to immediate past experiences and the reason we 
observe the decline in ratings may be due to the preceding pleasant snacks heightening 
the standard against which the current snack is compared. In a similar way, Riskey and 
colleagues (1979) found that participants rated the sweetness of a drink as less sweet after 
having experienced highly sweet drinks compared to after having experienced less sweet 
drinks; although it is debatable whether the participants actually perceived lower 
sweetness in the first case or the sweet perception remained the same, but the sensory 
judgment and scaling changed. Furthermore, hedonic habituation may be seen because 
the participants treat the relatively pleasant test snacks to be in the same category as the 
preceding pleasant snacks; by contrast, participants may not treat the relatively pleasant 
test snacks to be in the same category as the preceding bland snacks, resulting in a 
categorisation effect. This type of categorisation effect has been found with flower 
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experts who do not show hedonic contrast in their aesthetic judgments of orchids versus 
irises, because they treat these flowers as belonging to different categories, whereas 
novices do show hedonic contrast because they treat orchids and irises as belonging in the 
same category of flowers (see Rota & Zellner, 2007). Alternatively, if genuine pleasure 
reactions are decreased in hedonic habituation, this effect may arise as a result of hedonic 
opponent-processes, whereby any pleasant reaction is followed by an unpleasant counter-
reaction, which lowers the actual pleasure experienced from food (Solomon, 1980). The 
mechanisms which may underlie hedonic habituation are, of course, a speculation, at this 
stage, and the focal point of this paper is on the effect rather than process of hedonic 
habituation. Finally, the dishabituation paradigm (Epstein, Rodefer, Wisniewski, & 
Caggiula, 1992) could potentially be used to study hedonic habituation if the variable 
under study is chosen to be hedonics rather than salivation, of course. The essence of the 
dishabituation paradigm consists of repeatedly presenting food stimuli such that 
habituation would occur, but then presenting a novel stimulus that reduces the habituation 
(that novel stimulus being the dishabituator).  
Should you be worried about going to too many good restaurants? Not on the 
basis of this evidence. The size of hedonic habituation effect appears too small to be of a 
practical concern and may only affect evaluations rather than genuine enjoyment of food. 
Food hedonic habituation does not seem to be in the same league as pharmacological 
tolerance, for instance, whereby euphoria from drugs such as heroin is drastically reduced 
due to a receptor desensitization process of one kind or another. Nevertheless, if taste 
hedonic habituation is found to be robust and gets larger with prolonged exposure, then 
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the finding should have serious consequences for everyday choices and behaviour. To 
speculate further, hedonic habituation may occur for any type of pleasurable stimuli. For 
example, if you have just listened to three great songs, will this exposure to three highly 
enjoyable and different songs make you enjoy a fourth song less? As another instance, 
from the realm of euphorigenic drugs, snorting one line of cocaine after another would 
also produce a reduction in the rushes and highs elicited by each subsequent snorting. 
Importantly, this reduction would not occur because of general pharmacological 
tolerance, but due to the recent hyper-stimulation of pleasure reactions. For now, 
however, based on this study, food pleasure appears to remain an accessible and 
renewable daily joy of life, which does not undermine itself at a practical level.  
 
This chapter found that we give lower affective ratings after a series of pleasurable 
experiences. We interpret this effect to primarily reflect the process of affective 
evaluation rather than any change in true pleasure reactions per se i.e. the preceding 
pleasures make us feel ‘rich’ and being ‘rich’ we assess the additional ‘pounds and 
pennies’ we earn as less valuable, even though the absolute amount of ‘money’ we 
receive is the same as before. This chapter was the last empirical chapter and next we 
conclude with a contextualisation of our findings into a framework that highlights the 
overall impact and importance of pleasure. 
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VII. Roles and Importance of Pleasure 
 
Firstly, a short summary of our findings: 1) It appears that there are at least 17 different 
ways to induce pleasure, such as with highly palatable flavours or through positive self-
image; 2) Highly motivational stimuli do not make your approach and withdrawal 
reactions faster; 3) When you pair pleasurable experiences with novel neutral stimuli (e.g. 
unfamiliar brand logos), then you start indiscriminately ‘liking’ them through a learning 
process that involves just the simple pairings of the stimulus with a pleasurable event; 4) 
We exert more force to obtain foods that are pleasant rather than bland, even though we 
appear to be unaware of doing so. We also consume more of tasty foods; in fact, we can 
predict exactly how much more with empirically-derived equations; 5) Pleasure seems to 
inhibit itself, or to be more accurate, we evaluate foods to be less pleasant if they are 
preceded by a series of pleasant snacks … Now how do these findings fit together?  
Figure 15 presents an illustrative model of the key roles of pleasure in behaviour, 
which I will now explain with our findings linked to some of its structure. Firstly, certain 
types of triggers have the power to elicit pleasure (centre of Figure 15), in this instance it 
is the taste of the chocolate bar. The plethora of ways by which this pleasure state can be 
heightened is described in the Causes chapter and is by no means restricted to ‘sensory 
pleasures’ only. Furthermore, the Hedonic Triggering arrow is a gross simplification  of 
the processes by which pleasure may be triggered i.e. different core causes of pleasure 
will have their own mechanisms by which they elicit hedonic reactions, which differ  
fundamentally from each other. 
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Fig 15. Pleasure-Driven Incentive Learning 
 
Pleasure from tasting chocolate provides an illustration of the general 
process of pleasure-driven incentive learning by which hedonic 
reactions assign motivational value / desire to co-occurring stimulus 
representations. That desire or craving then translates into increased 
choice and consumption of the chocolate, next time it is seen. 
Arrows represent spreading activation, dependent on how many ‘holes’ 
there are in the path connecting the nodes. These paths become 
strengthened with more learning and weakened by time. 
Affective evaluation is a comparison of either the current pleasure 
level with some reference, or a comparison of the current 
motivation/craving with a reference, which can be output 
as evaluative self-report (hollow arrow).     
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For example, some pleasure sources are more homeostatic, such as temperature 
normalisation, while others are more cognitive or rooted in appraisals, such as fulfilment 
of expectations. For illustration purposes I will use the taste of chocolate as the trigger, 
however. 
The chocolate bar is also a visible object that is perceived as a kind of a 
representation of chocolate in the brain (from here and after italics refer to components 
in the figure). During the elicited pleasure (from the taste), any representations that are 
active at the same time as the pleasure acquire motivational value through the process of 
incentive learning. This is conceived as the strengthening of the path from the chocolate 
representation to the state of motivation. Motivation can be manifest as a state of desire 
or craving, but not necessarily one of large overwhelming magnitude. When you are 
motivated to do something then you have a tendency to allocate your resources towards 
the outcome, such that your actions are likely to be directed towards the outcome, and 
you are likely to pursue the outcome with more vigor, compared to another outcome you 
are not motivated to attain. The state of motivation does not mean you actually realise 
those actions, however, you might not have the opportunity to act on your motivation, but 
the motivation is nevertheless there, as might be the case with a thirsty individual lost in a 
desert. As such, motivation is related to concepts of incentive, appetite, wanting, 
enthusiasm and so on. Our force findings give credence to the face-valid idea that 
pleasure affects motivation (Hedonic Motivation Experiment). Furthermore, I argue that 
the Blocking Chapter concurs within this model as well. This is a novel interpretation of 
this type of learning of new likes and such a modelling suggests that incentive learning 
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does not exhibit the blocking phenomenon, which means that we attach motivational 
potency to any and all stimulus representations that are active during a pleasure episode. 
In this instance, the chocolate representation does not become capable of eliciting true 
pleasure as a result of pairing it with the pleasure from the taste of chocolate, instead the 
chocolate acquires incentive motivational value as we already described. The reason 
participants deem the chocolate representation ‘liked’ - on its own, after one or more 
paired tastings - is because of the sensitivity of affective evaluation not just to true 
pleasure but also to motivational properties of stimuli. Affective evaluation is basically 
evaluative self-report (and it is verbalisable), and our findings with food words in the 
second empirical chapter support the idea that affective evaluation is sensitive to the 
motivational values of stimuli.  
So the next time we come across that chocolate bar we are more likely to prefer it 
and taste it, because the chocolate representation has become motivating (the path 
between the representation and motivation has become stronger), and because motivation 
triggers goal-directed seeking leading to increased consumption when possible. The 
hedonic consumption experiments corroborate such a link. In fact, we have established 
quantitative formulae for the relationship between pleasure and intake (Equations 1, 2 
and 3).  
Going back to pleasure being more than just the peaks, but the background core 
affect as well, then desires would constantly be born when the baseline pleasure is 
enhanced as well e.g. when we are sufficiently merry from alcohol and take in the world 
around ourselves, or in the case of any other less stimulus-bound pleasure-level increase. 
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According to this model, this would lead to ‘Increased Consumption’ later as well, of 
whatever representations became motivationally enhanced.  The observation that 
pleasure appears to inhibit itself is posited to occur at the stage of affective evaluation 
while not influencing the true pleasure reactions themselves: affective evaluation is not a 
direct reading of the pleasure level, but a comparison of the current pleasure with a 
reference that can be influenced by various factors (Zellner, Mattingly, & Parker, 2009). 
In this model,  the preceding pleasurable snacks heighten the status of the reference (the 
comparator between pleasure and affective evaluation), thus decreasing the estimation of 
the current pleasure. The hollow arrow going out of affective evaluation indicates not 
only that such evaluations can be verbalised, but also that such affective evaluations may 
be used by higher-order deliberative ‘thinking-type’ processes. Finally, as we have 
already discussed, motivational stimuli do not seem to produce fast automatic 
potentiation of approach reactions, which is why such responses are not specified in this 
model. In summary, our findings fit well with the pleasure-incentive model and provide 
evidence for the majority of the links and components specified in the figure.    
Next I give a short overview of how this pleasure-incentive model relates to 
existing models covering similar ground. Firstly, the pleasure-incentive model is directly 
based on the incentive learning model of Dickinson and Balleine (1994), except for one 
notable exception.  The pleasure-incentive model does not differentiate between 
Pavlovian and instrumental types of incentive learning. That is, animal literature provides 
evidence for distinguishing the acquisition of motivation to stimuli such as a chocolate 
wrapper (which predicts likely presence of a chocolate bar; the Pavlovian type) against 
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learning the motivational significance of stimuli that are the outcomes themselves, which 
is the chocolate bar in this case (the instrumental type). In the pleasure-incentive model, 
however, both a representation of chocolate and representation of chocolate wrapper 
could become more strongly associated with motivation through the same incentive 
learning process: if paired with pleasure, and allowing for the chocolate wrapper to 
acquire a less strong link to motivation if needed, as long as the process itself is the same. 
I argue for this non-splitting simply on the basis that we do not have human evidence to 
support splitting the incentive learning process into the Pavlovian and instrumental types, 
at this stage.  
Secondly, the pleasure-incentive model can in principle accommodate Hedonic 
Interface Theory (HIT; Dickinson & Balleine, 2010), whereby the pleasure has to be 
conscious pleasure for it to be able to determine incentive value. That is, the possibility 
that subconscious pleasure could drive incentive learning (see the general Introduction), 
goes against HIT, and the pleasure-incentive model does not currently commit to either 
scenario: the pleasure in the model might have to be conscious or could also be 
subconscious. 
Thirdly, the current model is not a drive model, whereby pleasure is intimately 
linked to motivating homeostatic balance (e.g. Wells, 1924). According to such theories, 
pleasure results from only satisfying needs that restore our internal milieu to a stable 
biological state e.g. sufficient nutrients in the blood, attainment of osmo-regulation set-
points etc. In the pleasure-incentive model, there are indeed determinants of pleasure that 
are homeostatically-driven as exemplified through increased pleasure from food when 
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deficient in nutrients or pleasure from temperature normalisation (not depicted in Figure 
2; often related to a term alliesthesia; Briese & Quijada, 1979; Pfaff, 1982). But the 
causation of these pleasures is not necessarily directly related to homeostasis and there a 
lot of pleasure triggers that are non-homeostatic (see Causes chapter). That is, some but 
not all of the hedonic triggers in the pleasure-incentive model are linked to homeostasis. 
Fourthly, while incorporating behavioural, cognitive and phenomenological 
elements, this model is clearly a psychological model - i.e. we have not informed the 
model from the biological / neuroscientific perspective, comprising the brain substrates 
that implement such mental processes (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009). Such a level of 
analysis, with identification of accompanying ‘bridging laws’ (Nagel, 1961), is an avenue 
awaiting to be integrated with the current psychological analysis. That is, understanding 
the neural networks that make such pleasure- and motivation-related phenomena happen 
would help to determine what exactly happens, as long as we have valid rules to translate 
neuroscience results into psychological results; the same is true about conversion of 
psychological findings and models into neurobiological frameworks. For a full 
understanding and cross-validation both are ultimately needed (Barrett, Mesquita, 
Ochsner, & Gross, 2007).  
Lastly, multiple entities and interactions are not specified in this model e.g. that 
displeasure - the negative side of pleasure - reduces incentive motivation, or that 
motivation is critically influenced by non-pleasurable factors as well. In fact, incentive 
value appears to be the common currency by which very different things - e.g. going out 
vs preparing for exams - can be compared and ranked for action, rather than pleasure per 
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se being that common currency (Cabanac, 1992). The lack of a lot of other entities and 
interactions in the model is not an issue, however, as my purpose was to highlight 
important roles of pleasure and I have provided a zoomed-in view of the central role of 
pleasure with its impacts on motivation and intake.   
 
Lessons Learnt 
Before applying the pleasure-incentive model to select real-life phenomena, I will review 
some of the general limitations of the work presented in this thesis in a form of lessons 
learnt for future work in this area. Firstly, second time around, I would conduct a priori 
power analyses before running experiments, in order to determine what sample sizes 
exactly to collect so as to be able to detect presumed effect sizes. This approach would 
minimise the alternative interpretations stemming from null results of under-powered 
experiments; a good practical protocol for a priori power analyses is available at 
http://www.jeremymiles.co.uk/misc/power/. 
Secondly, I would pay much more attention to the proper execution of running 
human experiments and precisely following ethical regulations, so as to make sure to not 
cause any harm to study volunteers and to make sure proper fail-safes are in place, if 
anything were to go wrong. Experimenting with food is especially relevant in that regard, 
given the low probability, but high impact possibility of administering a food that triggers 
anaphylactic shock in an allergic individual, which dictates dire need for adequate risk 
management. 
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Thirdly, I would focus more on a better question-to-design match, or selection of 
most optimal designs with respect to the key questions being asked. For example, the 
core causes of pleasure study would have benefited from focussing less on the workplace 
i.e. to discover sources of pleasure outside the workplace, a more encompassing time 
period and location is needed. This poses its own limitations on the design, of course, and 
a web-based instrument may not have been suitable any more, so one of the ideas for the 
future is to carry out case studies with fewer individuals, but involving sessions of wider 
depth and breadth. Similarly for the investigation of congruency effects on approach 
reaction times, it would have been better to carry out the experiments outside of the larger 
sibutramine study. At the same time, pragmatic criteria do need to be taken into account. 
To somewhat work around this balancing act, however, a lesson learnt with regard to 
project management is to resist the demand to deliver results, in order to spend more time 
validating design decisions in terms of whether the design really answers the primary 
questions posed: as well as possible given the current opportunities.  
In hindsight, I would also lean more on existing experimental paradigms in my 
research agenda, because new designs may not work for the smallest of reasons; I took 
huge risks by incorporating many novel designs. At the same time, if designing novel 
tasks, I would take laboratory psychology even closer to field studies (without sacrificing 
experimental control), so as to make sure the tests really model the real world phenomena 
of interest. In other words, to make sure we are not isolating and amplifying effects in the 
laboratory that are arbitrary with respect to the key questions asked about out-of-the-
laboratory human psychology, and by doing that enhance that hard-to-measure construct 
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validity. In addition, I would perhaps focus less on food pleasure, because finding about 
food pleasure are not necessarily generalisable to pleasure in general. There are many 
other lessons learnt, of course, e.g. I would utilize multilevel modelling / linear mixed 
models in most of my analyses, while still presenting the results in a readable manner; I 
would code the experimental tasks according object-oriented programming principles 
using design patterns that I have started to learn etc. I hope to incorporate all these 
lessons learnt into my future work.  
  
Pleasure in Everyday Life 
I will now relate the terminology of the pleasure-incentive model to a real-life 
phenomenon, the very writing of a thesis. Pleasure appears to critically guide the whole 
process from the speed of progress to the generation of content and commitment to 
quality (Wellington, 2010). For example, when a paragraph is perceived to have 
worthwhile interesting content (Fulfilled Expectations in Causes chapter), a pleasure 
reaction results, which amounts to eagerness about one’s own work, because of 
establishing a stronger link to motivation through incentive learning. This motivation then 
translates into ‘practical motivation’ through the link from motivation to potentiated 
goal-directed seeking (with potential induction of flow as well; Csikszentmihalyi & 
Rathunde, 1993). On the other hand, when a paragraph is perceived to read clumsily or to 
be unclear and confusing (Unfulfilled Expectations; Torrance, Thomas, & Robinson, 
1992), the perceiver feels displeasure - or pleasure’s negative side if you agree with the 
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bipolarity of pleasure - and the opposite effects are observed on motivation and actual 
progress. Furthermore, if your colleague or supervisor comments on your work with 
sincere praise (Positive Self-Image in Causes chapter), this also triggers pleasure, leading 
to the same positive effects on motivation and through that makes you want to work and 
think more on the topic. If the feedback is negative in style or substance, however, the 
opposite occurs (Negative Self-Image; Caffarella & Barnett, 2000; Can, 2009), with 
difficulties initiating and continuing each next step and with an obvious dislike for the job 
(affective evaluation). Furthermore, avoidance of required work tasks may result, lasting 
days or weeks, based on the disincentives that have built up, as a mechanism to avoid 
experiencing these ‘aversive’ qualia (Boice & Jones, 1984). Similar arguments apply to 
caring about the work in general, because of real or illusory perceptions of doing very 
well and consequently wanting to base your whole future career on the topic (Robins & 
Kanowski, 2008): as a sum of all the different sources of pleasure and its repeated effects 
on motivation and goal-directed seeking. The other extreme would result from persistent 
feelings of negative affect: e.g. constantly missing deadlines with resulting barrages of 
displeasure; having null results everywhere; or the findings just being confusing and 
incomprehensible (all Unfulfilled Expectations); and from the total of such senses of 
inadequacy not wanting to proceed to a post-doctoral position or wanting to leave science 
altogether (Rennie & Brewer, 1987).  
There are countless other everyday situations where pleasure seems ubiquitous, 
which can be identified, for instance, by selecting any other examples from Table 1 in the 
Causes chapter. When applied in combination with the pleasure-incentive model, these 
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central hedonic effects contribute further to the importance of pleasure in everyday 
choices of action and their continuation (as well as to the intermediary incentive 
motivations). Everywhere, where there is pleasure - and we are not just including large 
overwhelming pleasures - pleasure will be a critical influence on our wants and desires, 
and through them, on our everyday choices and behaviour.   
 
Pleasure and Addictions 
Next I discuss the potential importance of pleasure in addictive behaviours. At the outset, 
it must be made clear that addictions are syndromes rather than pathologies of a single 
origin and mechanism, so only a subset of compulsive behaviours are to do with positive 
reinforcement. However, it is argued that this type of addiction is one of the main types 
of dependence (Newton, La Garza, Kalechstein, Tziortzis, & Jacobsen, 2009; West, 
2005). Firstly, drug addictions. As exemplified by substance abuse and contrary to 
popular belief, hard-core heroin addicts, for instance, get high daily despite their 
tolerance levels, as well as exhibit multiple behaviour patterns directed directly towards 
attaining the euphoria from heroin (McAuliffe & Gordon, 1974). Furthermore, one of the 
few approved and working treatments for opiate addictions are methadone and 
naltrexone, both of which decrease the pleasurable effects of the abused narcotic (e.g. 
Hammond, 1971; Sim, 1973). Although such pharmacological treatments have their own 
problems (e.g. Dougherty, 2003), they are part of a large body of evidence that hedonic 
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reactions may play a key role in a considerable portion of addictive behaviours (H. de 
Wit & Phan, 2009). 
When applying the pleasure-incentive model (Figure 15), however, it is not 
currently clear which of the entities in the process might be critical. Some of the key 
untested hypotheses relating the pleasure-incentive model to drug addiction are: 1) 
Addicts may derive more pleasure per stimulus injection than non-addicts (critical 
difference in hedonic triggering link); 2) The connection from pleasure to motivation 
may define an ‘addictive personality’, such that the same magnitude of pleasure would 
induce a much stronger desire in the addict than in the non-addict (but note that the 
presence of pleasure would still be necessary); 3) Incentive sensitisation, such that with 
prolonged incentive learning the motivation trace may become over-learnt as to become 
almost permanent and thus independent of pleasure (as formalised in e.g. Robinson & 
Berridge, 2008). This version would be similar to vampires’ immense craving for blood, 
as long as the assumed pleasure from sucking blood switched to having negligible impact 
on the vampire’s desire; 4) There may be no differences in the operation of the pleasure-
incentive process, instead the transition to addiction may comprise of escalating access to 
drugs, as well as of concurrent life-style changes, which make the highly euphorigenic 
agent available to an extent that most normal individuals would be locked into a ‘dead 
circle’,  due to immensely powerful triggering of a normally-functioning incentive-
pleasure system. 
Secondly, obesity and over-eating disorders are also syndromes arising from 
various aetiologies. The argument for sub-types of the conditions - what might be called 
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food addictions – is, however, equivalent to the roles posited for the pleasure-incentive 
model in drug addictions (see e.g. Davis & Carter, 2009; Volkow & Wise, 2005). In cases 
where overweight or binge-eating arises from a positive energy balance, a necessary 
cause of the underlying over-eating behaviour might be 1) That the patient group derives 
more pleasure from food and therefore triggers the hedonic motivation and subsequent 
consumption more strongly (e.g. Bartoshuk, Duffy, Hayes, Moskowitz, & Snyder, 2006). 
2) Food may be equally palatable to the patient group, but the impact of that palatibility 
on motivation (incentive learning) may be more powerful in food addictions, again 
suggesting the existince of an ‘addictive personality’ type, which would lead to amplified 
engagement with anything pleasurable without actually deriving more pleasure from 
stimuli (e.g. J. Feldman & Eysenck, 1986). 3) Once learnt, motivation for palatable food 
may become harder to ‘erase’ and somewhat impervious to changes from further 
experience and learning opportunitites, this loss of plasticity being another potential way 
by which the pleasure-incentive model could lead to over-eating (e.g. Clark, Dewey, & 
Temple, 2010). 4) Obese individuals may not enjoy food more, may not find it more 
motivating, may be perfectly normal in forgetting or re-adjusting their food motivations; 
but leaving the pleasure-incentive process to work   under certain conditions, in a 
microcosm where highly palatable foods are abundant, cheap and easily available, where 
eating motivations are not oucompeted by other activities etc, then in these circumstances 
according to this hypothesis anyone of us would become obese. Alternatively, if releasing 
the pleasure-incentive process in certain environments is not sufficient to lead to over-
eating, it may still be necessary as a cause of obesity. It is, of course, plausible and likely 
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that many of these hypothesis hold true at the same time i.e. they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Finally, pleasure and pleasure-incentive model may have further 
implications in other conditions, such as in depression, in bipolar disorder and in 
schizophrenia. In summary, it is plausible that the pleasure-incentive process plays some 
role in compulsive behaviours. However, it is yet to be determined which components of 
that mechanism might be most critically afflicted.   
 
Intrinsic Value 
To conclude the importance of pleasure, we mustn’t forget the core property of pleasure 
itself, its intrinsically good nature. It is for this reason that core affect plays a part in 
many constitutions and is sometimes even regarded a human right, as illustrated by this 
quotation from the U.S. Declaration of Independence: “that all men … are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness” (U.S. Constitution, 1776). The same rationale applies to the more 
extreme and less balanced forms of hedonistic philosophical traditions (for review, see 
e.g. F. Feldman, 2004). Religions are not untouched either, excluding pleasures of the 
flesh, of course: for example, the promise of paradise or heaven in the Bible: “you will fill 
me with joy in your presence, with eternal pleasures at your right hand” (Psalm 16:11, 
New International Version). Besides the sizable consequences of pleasure to motivation 
and behaviour then, the importance of pleasure stems from the same root as does the 
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importance of not inflicting pain, which are respectively the intrinsically good and 
aversive subjective qualities of the experiences.    
While pleasure is very well and easily recognised as an explanatory variable by 
the layman and the clinician, it is not on the research agenda of many scientists. From this 
millennium, the comprehensive search engine ISI Web of Knowledge returns about 7000 
reports on (pleasure OR hedonic) compared to >200000 hits on (attention), for instance. 
In my opinion, the main reason for such an imbalance is prejudice, and rejecting ideas, 
procedures and observations from fields outside our own paradigm. This is true not only 
about the laboratory scientists, but the scientists on journal boards and grant committees 
that have the collective power to direct research. Instead of restricting ourselves, or more 
importantly, restricting others to the boundaries of our disciplines, we should seek to use 
and review empirical work as dictated by the question being posed. That is, for most 
questions about human behaviour and psychology, we should critically use the relevant 
information from the behaviourist, cognitivist, introspectionist, biological-reductionist, 
and other schools of thought, and not ignore or reject one of those a priori, if the question 
clearly demands otherwise. Taking this position back to the current object of study, 
pleasure is not some immeasurable and dirty thing, but a substantial constituent of our 
daily lives, as well as a critical factor in some serious addictive behaviours. We should 
therefore desire to learn more about this explanatory variable.  
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E. Ethical Approval  
 
The Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee has given ethical approval to your research project: 
Cross-Modal Evaluative Conditioning and Evaluative Blocking, as set out in your application dated October 
2008. 
The Committee attaches certain standard conditions to all ethical approvals. These are: 
(a) that if the staff conducting the research should change, any new staff should read the 
application submitted to the Committee for ethical approval and this letter (and any 
subsequent letter concerning this application for ethical approval); 
(b) that if the procedures used in the research project should change or the project itself 
should be changed, you should consider whether it is necessary to submit a further 
application for any modified or additional procedures to be approved; 
(c) that if the employment or departmental affiliation of the staff should change, you should notify us of that 
fact. 
Members of the Committee also ask that you inform them should you encounter any 
unexpected ethical issues. If you will let me know that you are able to accept these conditions, I will record 
that you have been given ethical approval. 
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F. Recruitment Information 
Favourite Food Experiment 
Welcome to the information and recruitment webpage for the Favourite Food Experiment.  
Here you will find information regarding the study followed by a recruitment 
questionnaire for you to fill in if you wish to take part.  
 
Short Description 
Take part in a pleasant study involving some simple computer-based tasks as well as 
eating food you like.  
We are investigating physiological responding with Galvanic Skin Response, which is 
done by attaching a few completely harmless sensors to your fingers.  
The study takes place in the Department of Experimental Psychology (easy walking 
distance) and lasts about one and a half hours.  
If you wish to take part, you will be provided free food and paid 10 pounds.  
Eligibility Criteria 
The one and only real condition is that you skip breakfast or have a light lunch on the day 
of your participation,  
so that you will have not eaten anything for at least 4 hours before the start of the 
experimental session i.e. so that you would be really quite hungry.  
More Detailed Information 
Your contact person for this study is Kristjan Laane ( K.Laane@psychol.cam.ac.uk ), 
please feel free to get in touch with any queries.  
Scheduling for Your Participation 
Choose a date for the experimental session :  select  
Choose a time slot suitable for you, for the date chosen above :   
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Your Basic Details 
Name :   
Email :   
Phone / Mobile :   
 
How good is your English :  
Mother tongue  
Fluent  
Advanced  
Intermediate  
Beginner  
Gender : Female  Male  
Year of birth :   
Dominant hand :  
Left  
Ambidextrous  
Right  
What is your main speciality or field of study :   
Food Questionnaire 
 
Do you generally enjoy food : Yes  No 
Favourite Foods 
In each category or line below, please choose and specify your favourite food items.  
Make sure to pick a sub-category in each row and then write out the specific brand or kind 
of product you most like e.g. choose "Chocolate" from the list and then write "Toblerone" 
or "white chocolate bought from Sainsbury's"  
 
But please avoid food that has to be warmed up or kept cold or that comes in liquid(ish) 
form and the choices should generally be available in the Cambridge area.  
Do not worry if you do not have an absolute favourite, just make sure you fill in all the 
boxes, including the textboxes.  
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• 
Fruit  
• 
Bakery  
• 
Berries  
• 
Sw eets and Chocolate  
• 
Snacks  
• 
One more or other  
 
Now please put the whole list above in order of preference, so that the food you like most 
comes top, then your overall second favourite, then third and so on.  
To order the list drag and drop the grey areas up or down with left mouse button.  
( Please note that you are not guaranteed to be provided with your top choices )  
 
Meal Times and Allergies 
Meal  Average Time  
Breakfast   
Lunch   
Dinner   
 
Do you have any allergies to food, please list :  
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G. Consent Form 
 
 
Prof Anthony Dickinson and Kristjan Laane 
Dept of Experimental Psychology 
Cambridge,  
CB2 3EB, UK 
                       Tel: +44 (0) 1223 333563  
        K.Laane@psychol.cam.ac.uk 
 
Favourite Food Experiment Consent Form 
 
Please read the information below to decide if you would like to take part in the project: 
 
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate physiological responding to foods by 
measuring changes in the resistance of your skin, which is done by attaching two 
completely harmless sensors to your fingers (the Galvanic Skin Response), as well as your 
liking for the foods. If you take part, the whole session will last no more than 1.5 hours 
and involve some simple computer-based tasks as well as eating food you like. The task 
will be fully explained to you, and you have an opportunity to practice before you start. 
The chosen foods are provided for free plus you will be paid 10 pounds after completing 
the session. The one and only real condition for you to take part is that you skip breakfast 
or have a light lunch on the day of your participation, so that you will have not eaten 
anything for at least 4 hours before the start of the experimental session i.e. so that you 
would be really quite hungry. 
 
Confidentiality. Your data will be entered via a code number that will not identify 
you by name. 
 
Use of Data. In the first instance, the data will be reported in a PhD thesis. 
However, at a later date it may also be published in an academic journal and 
disseminated at research meetings. If any individual data is presented, the 
data would be totally anonymous. 
 
Withdrawal.  You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without 
explanation by informing the experimenter that you wish to do so. 
 
Approval. The project has received ethical approval from the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee of the University of Cambridge. 
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
 
I agree to take part in this experiment. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the experiment 
at any time, and that the data collected will be stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
NAME    SIGNATURE    DATE 
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H. Interview and Debriefing 
Sample ID Choose an item. Interview for EX Study 
 Before Session 
 General Questions 
 
Q: When did you last drink coffee or similar and how does that compare to your regular 
consumption? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Do you smoke? If so, how many per day? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: How much alcohol do you drink in a week? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did you feel ill today, do you feel ill now? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Do you wear glasses or contact lenses, how good is your vision? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
Q: Are you colour blind? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 Study Specific Questions 
 
Q: When and what exactly did you eat most recently prior to this experimental session? 
A: What: Click here to enter text. 
A: When: Click here to enter a date. Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Do you remember when you last ate the foods here today? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
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After Session 
 Experience of Session 
 
Q: Did you forget to follow instructions or did you get confused at any point in the experiment? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did you feel unpleasant or uncomfortable at any stage of the experiment? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did you use any specific strategies at any stage of the experiment? Please describe.  
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did you get bored or tired at all during the session? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 Experimental Hypothesis 
 
Q: Do you know any other participants that already took part or plan to take part of this study? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: What do you think this experiment investigated? Please separate what you think now and 
what you thought during the experiment. 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 Study Specific Questions 
 
Q: Did you do exercise today before you came here? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: In the last stage, did you feel you remember what picture went with what food? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
Q: Can you describe any particular pictures now which you remember went with a specific food? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Why do you think there was a stage where there were two pictures presented together during 
eating? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
Q: Did you look directly at them? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
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Q: Did any of the pictures evoke any immediate thoughts or feelings that came in your mind the 
second you saw this picture? I.e. did any of the pictures remind you of anything or where they 
just abstract pictures to you? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did you try to actively remember anything during the experiment or did you go through the 
stages passively? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: When you had to press left and right (G and H) did you try to be as fast as you could? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
Q: Did you find your responses getting quicker as the experiment progressed? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did the sensors hinder you or were they too tight or similar? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: How did you like the foods in general? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did the pictures evoke any emotions in you? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did you pour more water? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Was the prediction bar that showed your certainty hard to use? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Did remembering that a picture was paired with a specific food affect your rating of that 
picture? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 General Feedback 
 
Q: What are your general impressions and observations from this experiment? What could be 
done better? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
Q: Do you have any comments or questions? 
A: Click here to enter text. 
 
